The Queen v Craig Bernard Pretty
[2000] NZCA 308
•26 October 2000
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND | CA 277/00 |
THE QUEEN
V
CRAIG BERNARD PRETTY
| Hearing: | 26 October 2000 |
| Coram: | Gault J Heron J Baragwanath J |
| Appearances: | A R Laurenson for Appellant J M Jelas for Crown |
| Judgment: | 26 October 2000 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY HERON J |
This is an appeal against a sentence of four years imprisonment for manslaughter.
On 27 November 1999 the appellant aged 19 years travelled with friends to New Plymouth. They had been drinking at a house in Stratford prior to the journey and were returning in very bad weather to Stratford that evening. The appellant’s car was driven by a sober member of the group. The driver left the car at Tariki and asked the appellant if he was in a fit condition to drive. On being assured that he was, the appellant drove his car in heavy rain back to Stratford. The appellant failed to see a Holden motor vehicle in front of him. He was driving at a speed of approximately 110 kilometres per hour. The impact with the car in front pushed that car into a car also travelling in the same direction. As a result of the impact the Holden car caught fire and the driver of the car was trapped in it and died. The passenger in that car and the driver of the other car were injured. Two and a half hours after the collision the appellant had a blood alcohol level of 147 milligrams per millilitre of blood.
He was convicted by a New Plymouth jury of manslaughter and two counts of dangerous driving causing injury. He was at the time the holder of a restricted driver’s licence and his driving at the time was in breach of those restrictions.
The sentencing Judge in the Court below considered the aggravating features were the consumption of alcohol; driving at excessive speed prior to the collision and for some time before; driving on a restricted licence outside its conditions and previous convictions for driving offences.
The mitigating circumstances were that he remained at the scene and made efforts to free the other driver. He had taken some precautions for a sober driver to drive for most of the journey, and although he did not plead guilty he would have pleaded guilty to a Transport Act offence. Generally he accepted responsibility and made a prompt statement of the circumstances to the police. In addition there was deep and sincere remorse expressed by the appellant and his family.
As with manslaughter sentences generally, motor manslaughter cases vary considerably in their range. What is clear is the hardening of community attitudes reflected in the imposition of lengthy sentences in the worst cases. It is a question of looking at the collection of circumstances which can be factors in mitigation or aggravation. See R v Skerrett, CA 236/86, 9 December 1986.
Mr Laurenson argued before us that the Judge’s reference to speed did not reflect the fact that the speed was only over the limit by a few kilometres and not in itself excessive. But the relativity of speed to the circumstances is what is important and in the very bad condition at the time the speed was plainly an aggravating factor directly leading to the collision.
Mr Laurenson urged on us the defence evidence as to amount of alcohol consumed but the Judge who heard the trial was entitled to select the evidence he preferred. On any view of it the allowable limit for a person of the appellant’s age was well and truly exceeded. Mr Laurenson put to us a number of cases where the aggravating circumstances were greater than the present but without dealing with them in detail we note that with one exception the sentences were considerably longer than the sentence here.
Then there is the appellant’s driving history which includes a breath alcohol offence, two careless driving convictions and one for disqualified driving.
This Court said in R v Fallowfield CA 181/96, 22 August 1996:
As was mentioned in Grey, it has become increasingly common where death has resulted for prosecuting authorities to charge manslaughter rather than offences under the Transport Act and the Courts have imposed sentences of more than five years imprisonment in serious cases. The earlier aversion to convicting persons of manslaughter for driving offences referred to in the judgment in Skerrett has been overcome where drink or drugs are involved by a clear shift in public attitude. In Skerrett it was said that nothing turned for sentenced purposes on the specific offence charged. That is indicated by the overlap of the statutory offences which was plainly intended. It follows, as indicated in Skerrett, that the only purpose for charging manslaughter can be that it is considered in the particular case the appropriate penalty should exceed the maximum provided for the Transport Act Offences.
The death of a young man, and the impact on his family and friends with particular consequences for one parent of the deceased, have been shattering in their effect. The appellant himself appears now to be a different person and has discarded his antisocial conduct of the past. As Ms Jelas notes, that is laudable, but it has taken these circumstances, so easily avoided to bring him to that position.
For the protection of public safety various provisions of the law applied to the appellant. His restricted licence prevented his driving after certain hours, and not to carry passengers. His age required him to drive with a blood alcohol level below 30 milligrams per millilitre. Despite these provisions, which the appellant chose to ignore, a death ensued. It is incumbent on the Court to deal with such matters with some severity.
Young persons offending in this way have found that the law will put aside their relative youth in these circumstances and they will receive prison sentences along with persons of greater age and maturity such is the need to protect the public from avoidable death and injury on the roads. This is one of those cases and the sentencing Judge was right to deal with it with a sentence of imprisonment of four years. We see no reason to disturb that sentence and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Crown
Govett Quilliam, New Plymouth for Appellant
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