| ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THIS JUDGMENT (INCLUDING ITS RESULT) UNTIL 5.00 PM ON 27 MAY 2024. |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 138/2023 [2024] NZSC 60 |
| BETWEEN | THE PATHWAY TRUST |
| AND | NZME PUBLISHING LIMITED AND STUFF LIMITED |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Ellen France and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | K J Beaton KC and C A Twyman for Applicant |
Judgment: | 20 May 2024 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BWe make an order prohibiting publication of this judgment (including its result) until 5.00 pm on 27 May 2024.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicant seeks leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeal quashing a High Court order suppressing the name and identifying particulars of the applicant and associated entities.[1]
[1]NZME Publishing Ltd v Brider [2023] NZCA 590 (Miller, Gilbert and Mallon JJ) [CA judgment].
The applicant is a registered charity which provides reintegration services to prisoners and parolees, including in collaboration with the Department of Corrections. It was through the provision of these services that the applicant became connected to the second respondent, Joseph Brider. Near the end of his sentence for sexual violence offences, Mr Brider was paroled from prison to a flat owned by the applicant. It had been working with Mr Brider for some five months prior to his release through a reintegration programme called the Navigate Initiative. On 22 January 2021, Mr Brider broke into the flat next door and murdered Ms Bonilla-Herrera. Ms Bonilla‑Herrera was not aware of Mr Brider’s background or prior offending.
The first respondents are media organisations seeking to publish the applicant’s name in connection to Mr Brider’s offending. The third respondent, the Crown, also opposes suppression. Mr Brider indicated his support for the proposed appeal, but elected not to file submissions.
In the course of the criminal proceedings against Mr Brider, the applicant sought name suppression under s 202(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 as an entity connected with Mr Brider, arguing that it would suffer undue hardship if named in connection to the murder.[2] It submitted that the negative publicity would cause reputational damage and reduce its capacity to perform its purposes, which is dependent on the receipt of donations.
[2]Criminal Procedure Act, s 202(2)(a).
The High Court made a suppression order, accepting that undue hardship to the applicant would result from publication.[3] However, the Court of Appeal quashed that order on appeal, finding that undue hardship had not been made out.
[3]R v Brider [2022] NZHC 3579 (Eaton J).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the applicant was connected to the offending, not just to the offender, and the connection was not coincidental or peripheral.[4] Although the applicant is not a…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read The Pathway Trust v Nzme Publishing Limited and Stuff Limite... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] NZSC 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in the High Court, where the Trust sought a suppression order under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The High Court granted the order, but this was subsequently quashed by the Court of Appeal. The Trust now seeks leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Court of Appeal err by considering public interest at the threshold stage of the test under section 202(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011?
2. Did the Court of Appeal fundamentally misunderstand the Trust's functions and role in connection to Mr Brider, leading to an erroneous finding that it was connected to his offending?
3. Did the Court of Appeal incorrectly conclude that the Trust's potential hardship was not disproportionate to the interests supporting publication, by conflating the public interest in Mr Brider's offending with a public interest in the Trust's involvement?
Held
1. The Court of Appeal did not err by considering public interest at the threshold stage of the test under section 202(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The Supreme Court found that this Court's recent decision in M (SC 13/2023) v R has resolved the disagreement regarding whether public interest can be considered at both stages, and there is no need to revisit that issue in this case.
2. The Court of Appeal did not fundamentally misunderstand the Trust's functions and role in connection to Mr Brider, leading to an erroneous finding that it was connected to his offending. The Court concluded that while there was no risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court of Appeal was well aware of the differences between the roles of the Trust and other entities, but ultimately concluded that there was still a legitimate public interest in the Trust's involvement.
3. The Court of Appeal did not incorrectly conclude that the Trust's potential hardship was not disproportionate to the interests supporting publication, by conflating the public interest in Mr Brider's offending with a public interest in the Trust's involvement. The Court found that the Court of Appeal identified mitigating factors which were likely to soften the blow of publication, and concluded that the principle of open justice must prevail.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court assessed the application for leave to appeal and found that it did not raise a matter of general or public importance. The Court noted that there has been some disagreement regarding whether the threshold stage in section 202 deals exclusively with the degree of hardship arising from publication, leaving all consideration of public interest to the discretionary stage. However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in M (SC 13/2023) v R has resolved this disagreement in favour of the former formulation. While the Court of Appeal made an apparent error in its application of the test, the Supreme Court found that this did not materially alter the outcome. The Court of Appeal was well aware of the differences between the roles of the Trust and other entities, but ultimately concluded that there was still a legitimate public interest in the Trust's involvement, arising from its involvement in Department of Corrections processes and its work with Mr Brider. The Court also identified mitigating factors which were likely to soften the blow of publication, and concluded that the principle of open justice must prevail in any event. The Supreme Court found that the Trust's prospects of success before it were too remote to justify allowing the appeal. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Supreme Court will not revisit the issue of whether public interest can be considered at both stages of the test under section 202(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, and will follow the approach set out in M (SC 13/2023) v R. The Court also found that there is a legitimate public interest in the involvement of entities like the Trust in prisoner rehabilitation services and processes, which requires scrutiny, and that this interest may outweigh the potential hardship to the entity of publication.