THE KING vJODIE SHANNON HUGHES
[2023] NZHC 2956
•20 October 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA NGĀMOTU ROHE
CRI-2022-043-914
[2023] NZHC 2956
THE KING v
JODIE SHANNON HUGHES
Hearing: 20 October 2023 Appearances:
R L Hicklin for the Crown
T M Cooper KC for the Defendant
Sentencing:
20 October 2022
SENTENCING BY PALMER J
Counsel/Solicitors
Crown Solicitor, C & M Legal, New Plymouth
T M Cooper KC, C A Robertson, and O F Kazmierow, Barristers, Auckland
R v HUGHES [2023] NZHC 2956 [20 October 2022]
[1] On the morning of 14 August 2023, the first day of her trial, Ms Jodie Hughes pleaded guilty to burglary and kidnapping. At the end of the trial, she was found guilty by a jury of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and of manslaughter. All these offences were committed on Friday 29 July 2022, at Ōakura and on a dairy farm at Oānui in South Taranaki.
[2] The victim of all the offences was Mr Jacob Ramsay, who worked on the farm with Ms Hughes’ partner, Mr William Candy. By the time of the trial, Mr Candy had pleaded guilty to wounding Mr Ramsay with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, and murdering him. Another farm worker, Mr Ethan Webster, had also pleaded guilty to the murder of Mr Ramsay. The senseless murder of Mr Ramsay by Mr Candy and Mr Webster involved a high level of brutality, cruelty, depravity and callousness.1 For that, in March 2023, Mr Candy and Mr Webster were sentenced to life imprisonment with minimum periods of imprisonment of 17 years and 12 years respectively.2
[3] In sentencing Ms Hughes today for her offending, it is important to be clear about her role in these events.
What happened?
[4] Mr Candy, who was 39 years old at the time of the offending, and Mr Webster, who was 18, had worked on the farm for four and three years respectively. Mr Ramsay, who was 33, had only worked at the farm for three weeks at the time of the offending. In that time, he had borrowed money from Mr Candy and Mr Webster and others, in connection with drugs.
[5] In the days leading up to the offending, Ms Hughes, then aged 30, had worked herself up into a state about Mr Ramsay owing around $200 to Mr Candy. Ms Hughes’ texts indicate that she became angry and somewhat obsessive about it. This all played into her anxiety about her relationship with Mr Candy. He had started using methamphetamine again. She suspected that Mr Candy had effectively been repaid in
1 R v Candy [2023] NZHC 414 at [47].
2 At [98]–[99].
drugs, which he and Mr Ramsay had used. She also suspected he was cheating on her. All this came to a head on Mr Candy’s 39th birthday, Friday 29 July 2022.
[6] The previous evening, Ms Hughes had texted Mr Ramsay, demanding repayment of the money. That birthday morning, Mr Candy did not come home from breakfast after milking the cows, which was unusual for him but had been happening for around two weeks by then. Ms Hughes was suspicious and upset. She texted Mr Ramsay, abusing him and saying his house was getting done over. About 10 am, with her children, and a machete, she drove to Mr Ramsay’s house. Mr Ramsay was not there. Ms Hughes stole two televisions from Mr Ramsay’s house. She thought of it as “collateral” for the debt. This was the burglary. One television was broken and, by accident, she broke the other one.
[7] Later that morning, when Ms Hughes found out Mr Candy had been invited to a birthday lunch with the owner of the farm, Mr Francis Mullan, and the other farm workers, Ms Hughes was beside herself. She harmed herself and told Mr Candy so. Mr Candy came home, instead of going to lunch.
[8] Mr Ramsay had not been working at the farm that day, which was apparently not unusual. He had been out of town. Late in the afternoon, Mr Candy was told that Mr Ramsay was in Ōakura. He had been drinking, and Ms Hughes was suspicious of Mr Candy going off again. She drove him to Ōakura.
[9] There, after Mr Candy had searched the cemetery, Mr Ramsay turned up. Mr Candy got out of the car and confronted and attacked Mr Ramsay, wounding him. Both men ended up scuffling on the ground at about 6:30 pm. By her presence, Ms Hughes aided and encouraged Mr Candy. A passer-by interrupted them, asking what was going on. Ms Hughes explained that Mr Ramsay owed them money, had stolen from them, destroyed their farm, and that he needed to come back to the farm to address what he had done. The jury found Ms Hughes intended to encourage Mr Candy, knowing Mr Candy was going to wound Mr Ramsay with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm. Ms Hughes was, therefore, a party to wounding Mr Ramsay with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
[10] Mr Ramsay briefly escaped from Mr Candy but was recaptured and put in the car. Ms Hughes helped by turning on the child locks on the rear doors. She also picked up Mr Ramsay’s possessions and put them in the car. She drove Mr Ramsay and Mr Candy to the farm at Oānui, to the house of another farm worker. I accept Mr Ramsay was conscious during that trip. They arrived around 7 pm. By doing all that, Ms Hughes committed the offence of kidnapping.
[11] At the farm, Mr Ramsay was dragged out of the car and Mr Candy and Mr Webster gave him a severe beating, punching and kicking him, including in the head while he was on the ground. Ms Hughes did not participate in that. But I accept she encouraged it. She may have yelled encouragement. But she certainly held back another farm worker, when he tried to intervene at an early stage to stop Mr Webster. She said “let him fucking do this”. I accept the beating was a substantial and operative cause of Mr Ramsay’s death and that by aiding and encouraging it, Ms Hughes was a party to his manslaughter. Consistently with the Jury’s verdict, she intended to aid Mr Candy and Mr Webster to assault Mr Ramsay and she knew they were going to cause him more than trivial harm.
[12] It is important to note what has not been proven. Having listened carefully to all of the evidence at the trial, and having regard to the Jury’s verdicts, I do not consider it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Ramsay was unconscious when he arrived back at the farm. It has not been proven that Ms Hughes knew that Mr Candy and Mr Webster would go as far as causing Mr Ramsay’s death. It has not been proven that Ms Hughes aided or encouraged Mr Candy and Mr Webster to tie Mr Ramsay to the car and drag him 900 meters down the tanker track to the farm dump after the beating. The evidence suggests that the ferocity of the attack at the farm came as a surprise to her and to everyone other than Mr Candy and Mr Webster themselves. It seems inexplicable, senseless, and likely enhanced by drugs.
[13] There is no doubt about the magnitude of the impact of the offending on Mr Ramsay and his family. I have read their victim impact statements:
(a)Mr Ramsay’s partner spoke today, reading her victim impact statement. I do not repeat everything she said, so clearly. But although they were
supposed to grow old together, they only had a year and a half of marriage. She has to deal with Jake’s loss, and look after their children without his help, dealing with the added pressure day in and day out. She has talked about the impact on the children. Jake is not able to attend his children’s important events. He never even got to meet his youngest child. It should not be like this. But she is making sure her children are happy and healthy and loved.
(b)Jake’s partner’s father talks about how Jake’s memory, ashes, photos, and the odd video are all that his partner and her children have. He challenges Ms Hughes to take responsibility for her actions.
(c)Mr Ramsay’s aunt talks about the effect on his father, who has serious medical issues. He is not coping with the loss of his son and only child. His aunt is not coping with the stress and grief the family has been living with and has had to cut down her hours of work. Her own son’s mental health plummeted after Mr Ramsay’s death.
Approach to sentencing
[14] Sentencing is conducted for the purposes, and according to the principles, in ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act 2002. In terms of the principles of sentencing, I have regard to: the gravity of the offending and Ms Hughes’ culpability; the seriousness of these offences compared with others; the need to ensure the sentence is consistent with other sentences for this type of offending; the effect of the offending on the victims; Ms Hughes’ particular circumstances and background; and the requirement in law to impose the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances.
[15] In terms of the purposes of sentencing Ms Hughes, I have particular regard to: the need to hold her accountable for the harm her offending has done to the victim, his family, and the community; the need to promote in her a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of, that harm; the interests of the victims; the need to denounce the conduct with which she was involved and to deter others from committing similar offences; the need to protect the community from her offending in future; and I have regard to her rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
[16] The way the Court sentences is first to set a starting point reflecting the seriousness of the offending, then to make adjustments for the offender’s personal circumstances, and finally to stand back to check that the sentence reflects the totality of the offending.3
Starting point
[17] Ms Hicklin, for the Crown, submits, on the basis of a number of other sentences, that a global starting point of 13 to 15 years’ imprisonment is appropriate for the totality of the offending, depending on whether Ms Hughes is found to have been a party to the dragging which I have determined she was not. Ms Hicklin submits that Ms Hughes played a primary role in the offending. She was more than a driver, not under the direction of another, she was a manipulative and dominant instigator, aider, and abetter and showed a callous indifference to what happened.
[18] Ms Cooper KC, for Ms Hughes, acknowledges that what happened to Mr Ramsay was the most dreadful type of offending. But she stresses the importance of looking at Ms Hughes’ involvement and the dynamics of Ms Hughes’ relationship with Mr Candy. She accepts that the assault to which Ms Hughes was a party was a substantial and operative cause of death, that two offenders were involved, and that Ms Hughes was aware that Mr Webster intended to assault Mr Ramsay to punish him for the debt and thefts on the farm. Having regard to comparable cases, she submits a starting point of six years and six months’ imprisonment for the manslaughter, kidnapping, and wounding offences would appropriately reflect Ms Hughes’ overall culpability. She accepts an uplift to that of three months for the burglary would be appropriate.
[19] The Crown’s submissions refer to a number of cases, some of which are helpful but some of which I consider are not helpful. The Crown submissions are based on a view of Ms Hughes’ culpability being significantly greater than I consider the evidence at trial proved that it was.
3 Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296 at [46].
[20] Mr Candy and Mr Webster were directly responsible for causing Mr Ramsay’s death and have been sentenced accordingly. I do not consider their sentences for murder are helpful in setting this sentence for manslaughter. Murder is a more serious offence with a different level of culpability. However, I consider Ms Cooper’s proposed starting point is too low, having regard to the comparable cases.
[21] Taking the lead charge of manslaughter, I consider the aggravating features of Ms Hughes’ offending were that:
(a)There was some level of pre-meditation. I accept that Ms Hughes was not part of a plan by the farm workers to beat Mr Ramsay. But she knew more than trivial harm was going to be caused to Mr Ramsay at the farm, and she drove him there. As I have said, I do not accept she knew the extent of what was intended by Mr Candy and Mr Webster.
(b)She did encourage multiple attackers, Mr Candy and Mr Webster, to assault Mr Ramsay.
(c)When he was being attacked on the ground, Mr Ramsay was in a vulnerable position, though I do not accept that the evidence establishes that he was unconscious when he arrived at the farm.
(d)The assault involved a severe beating, including attacks to the head and extreme violence. The assault was a substantive and operative cause of Mr Ramsay’s death.
[22] Clearly, Ms Hughes carried out the burglary herself. But I do not accept that she was the primary instigator of, or played the dominant role in, the other offending. Compared with the cases the Crown refers to, she played a relatively passive role in being party to the wounding. She played a more active role in the kidnapping, by activating the child locks, picking up Mr Ramsay’s possessions, and driving the car. In relation to the lead offence of manslaughter, in driving the car, she drove Mr Ramsay to the site of his death, knowing he would suffer harm from a beating but not knowing the extent of that. She encouraged the beating by Mr Candy and by Mr Webster by
her presence and by her active intervention to prevent it being stopped at an early stage. But she was not physically involved in beating Mr Ramsay herself.
[23] The guideline case of R v Taueki, which covers situations of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, can be of some assistance in a manslaughter sentence, where there is serious violence and serious injury is a foreseeable outcome.4 The aggravating factors here suggest Ms Hughes’ offending falls towards the top of band two or bottom of band three identified in Taueki.5
[24]In R v Madams, Mallon J stated that:6
… cases suggest a range of up to eight years for non-physical participants and those whose physical involvement in the attack are minor, lower starting points are available for those whose physical involvement in the attack are minor and can be considerably lower for those with peripheral roles.
[25] Other sentences for manslaughter are also relevant. In particular, I have found five cases helpful to refer to and I need to mention them briefly:7
(a)In R v Chourn, Ms Chourn pleaded guilty to manslaughter and kidnapping.8 Ms Chourn was instructed to find a person who supplied a substance which killed a partygoer, so their friends could punish him. She found him and took him to an address where her co-offender and a number of others were awaiting their arrival. After she left, the victim was interrogated and assaulted, resulting in his death. Lang J adopted a starting point of four years and six months. I consider Ms Hughes’ culpability for manslaughter was greater than that of Ms Chourn. Although Ms Chourn was privy to the plan beforehand, she was not present for the attack, and she sent a text message to her co-offender asking her not to hurt the victim too much.
4 R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA); R v Jamieson [2009] NZCA 555 at [34]; R v Tai [2010] NZCA 598 at [11]; and R v Burke [2021] NZHC 136 at [25]. But see Murray v R [2013] NZCA 177.
5 R v Taueki, above n 4, at [34]–[41].
6 R v Madams [2017] NZHC 81 at [38].
7 I have also considered the other cases cited by counsel, including R v Clarke HC Rotorua CRI- 2009-270-73, 29 May 2009; and R v Pomare [2016] NZHC 1346. I, however, do not find these cases to be particularly useful comparators.
8 R v Chourn [2021] NZHC 1528.
(b)In R v Ahsin, Ms Ahsin was driving Black Power members when they saw a member of the public wearing a red hoodie.9 Ms Ahsin did a U-turn, stopped the vehicle next to the victim and enabled her two co-offenders to get out of the car and attack him.10 She was the getaway driver for the others.11 Dobson J adopted a five-year starting point for manslaughter. I consider Ms Hughes’ culpability for manslaughter was greater than Ms Ahsin’s, where there was less pre-meditation and Ms Ahsin told her co-offenders to stop before the violence escalated.
(c)In R v Jennings, as a senior gang member himself, Mr Jennings drove other senior gang members to a de-patching of two more junior members near Palmerston North.12 There was serious violence, with weapons involved, but Mr Jennings was not said to be directly involved with that. When the two victims were put in a car and driven away, Mr Jennings drove another car to the same location. Cull J set a starting point of six years and six months’ imprisonment for manslaughter and uplifted it by one year for the wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. She did not uplift further for two offences of kidnapping, having regard to the totality of the offending. I consider Ms Hughes’ culpability for manslaughter is lower than that of Mr Jennings, who was a senior gang member, was familiar with the violence to be expected, and had an ongoing active role after the beating.
(d)In R v Hura, Mr Hura, a prospect of the Mangu Kaha gang in Rotorua, was present when the gang interrogated and beat to death two people suspected of stealing methamphetamine from the gang.13 Mr Hura did not intend their deaths or know that the senior member of the gang, intended their deaths.14 Fitzgerald J set a starting point for manslaughter of six years and six months with a three-year uplift for
9 R v Ahsin HC Whanganui CRI-2008-083-2794, 23 July 2015, (Sentencing Indication of Dobson J).
10 At [8].
11 At [9].
12 R v Jennings [2022] NZHC 746.
13 R v Hura [2018] NZHC 3347.
14 At [18].
the second manslaughter charge.15 I consider Ms Hughes’ culpability for manslaughter is lower than that of Mr Hura, who offended in a gang context with a greater appreciation of the violence that was to occur.
(e)In R v AJN, Ms Heremaia was the lookout for her partner and another offender who attacked someone they thought was double-crossing them in relation to stealing chemicals for methamphetamine manufacture.16 She was a party to the planning of the attack, was under the influence of her partner, and was aware weapons would be used.17 Heath J gave her a starting point of six years and six months’ imprisonment.18 I consider Ms Hughes’ culpability is lower than that of Ms Heremaia, who was more involved in planning and pre-meditation, knew the roles of each of the parties, and knew weapons would be present.
[26] On the basis of my assessment of Ms Hughes’ culpability compared with that of the offenders in these cases, as well as the Taueki bands, I consider:
(a)An appropriate starting point for the lead offence of manslaughter is six years’ imprisonment.
(b)I uplift that by one year and three months for the kidnapping, by six months for being party to wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and another three months for the burglary.
(c)So that is a global starting point of eight years’ imprisonment.
Adjustments
[27] Ms Hughes, at the time of the offending you were a 30-year-old Pākehā woman. I have seen:
15 At [36].
16 At [42].
17 At [42] and [45].
18 At [46].
(a)A report about your personal background under s 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002, by Ms Shelley Turner. It is fairly described as a harrowing story of abuse. It is not necessary to go through it all now. In brief, you suffered extensive abuse from a very young age, which led you to drugs from the age of 12. You felt socially isolated and struggled to fit in at school. You became pregnant. At 15 you became a parent. You found a pattern of toxic, dysfunctional and destructive relationships. You deserved better than that.
(b)A psychological report was prepared by Ms Sarah Bramhall for the sentencing. This report should also be provided to the Corrections’ psychologists and taken into account in future treatment programmes, such as the Ngahere and Kowhiritanga programmes. Ms Bramhall says that your combination of substance abuse, trauma, complex mental health issues, and relationship dysfunction contributed causally to your offending. She explains that Mr Ramsay likely became the target for the various frustrations you were experiencing. She thinks you were also likely to be emotionally dysregulated at the time of the offending, which is common for those with Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which explains why you failed to recognise the seriousness of the situation that unfolded. She assesses you as having a below average risk of future violent offending.
(c)A pre-sentence report by Corrections assesses your risk of harm to others as high. It also identifies that you have very complex rehabilitative needs given your psychological background, medication, and drug use. Since your diagnosis with PSTD as a teenager, you have struggled with self-harm and addiction, mainly to cannabis and methamphetamine. You are now completing NCEA Level 2 which I expect you will find stimulating. I heard you give evidence. You were articulate and clear. You clearly have potential to achieve, if you give yourself a chance; no matter what you might think. You are waitlisted for rehabilitation programmes in prison for anger, trauma, and
relationship difficulties. The report by Corrections suggests you have shown remorse for Mr Ramsay and his family.
(d)I have seen a letter from your mother about the impact on your children, which I will not go through. But she is amazed at the changes in your approach to life and talks about her plans to support you in the future. She expresses how very sorry she is that someone lost their life.
(e)I have also seen a letter you have written, saying that you have had a lot of time to think about everything that happened. That you had no right to enter Jacob’s house and take his televisions, you did not have to drive William to pick him up, you were wrong to stop the farm worker from intervening. You are ashamed of how you talked about Jacob. Every night you lie in bed going over and over everything you did wrong, regretting every choice you made that day, wishing you had done everything differently. You say you will always regret your poor decisions. Every day, you regret you were a part of Jacob being taken from his family and friends. You know saying sorry is not ever going to make anything better, but you are sorry and you hope for the best for them all.
[28]I deal with the potential discounts to the sentence discussed by counsel in turn.
[29] First, Ms Cooper submits a 10 per cent discount is warranted for your guilty pleas and your cooperation with the Police which helped them discover physical evidence at Ōakura, and your remorse. Ms Hicklin submits Ms Hughes gave multiple versions of events and some items of the deceased have never been recovered.
[30] I deal with remorse later. I do not consider the guilty pleas to burglary and kidnapping, two of the four charges, on the morning of the trial justify a significant discount. But they did reduce the scope and duration of the trial and the time the victim’s family and the jury had to endure it. You did provide some assistance to the
Police, but you also lied to them. I reduce the sentence by two months for the guilty pleas and for the limited assistance to the Police.
[31] Second, Ms Cooper submits that your life has been nothing short of a tragedy. She submits a discount of 30 per cent is justified for the significant psychological factors and rehabilitative efforts that are the subject of the reports. Ms Hicklin accepts there was a causal nexus between the background and the offending but submits only a limited credit is available. And the Crown says there is no remorse.
[32] The psychological report and s 27 report are compelling. I am satisfied there is a causal connection between your background and your warped ideas about relationships, which were clearly demonstrated at trial. Given what you have endured, it would be surprising if you had the same attitude to relationships as most other people. I accept Ms Cooper’s submission that, as a result of the abuse you have suffered for most of your life, and Mr Candy’s controlling nature, you did not react the way most people would upon seeing violence. I also accept that the reports suggest you have reached a genuine turning point in your life, in custody. You are making an effort to break the cycle of trauma. You are making progress in counselling. I encourage that. Given your past, you will probably need therapy over many years to get better. You have only just started your journey. And, as you now seem to recognise now, your offending was serious. You recognise the impact it has had on Mr Ramsay’s family. I consider your background reduces your culpability for being a party to these offences.
[33] And I accept you have genuine remorse for your offending, not only by what you have said but by engaging in counselling and beginning to address the issues that led to your offending. As the Supreme Court has said, a discount is a material way of recognising and encouraging that.19
[34] I consider your reduced culpability because of your personal background, your remorse, and your potential for rehabilitation justify a discount of 19 months, or just less than 20 per cent.
19 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509.
[35] Finally, Ms Cooper submits there should be a 10 per cent discount for the impact your imprisonment is likely to have on your children. Ms Hicklin submits the children will have been impacted more by the offending than by incarceration.
[36] The Courts recognise that s 8(h) and (i) of the Sentencing Act, reinforced by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, require sentencing to consider all relevant circumstances, including children’s interests.20 Although your ability to care for your children varied in their childhood due to mental health and addiction, at the time of your offending you were their primary caregiver. Their father is not around and their step-father, Mr Candy, is serving a life sentence for murder. You have maintained your relationship with your children while in custody, to the extent possible. If you progress well on your journey of recovery, your care for them in the future will be important to their best interests. They deserve that. It will also, in turn, assist your rehabilitation. I discount your sentence by nine months, or less than 10 per cent, in the interests of your children.
[37] That gives a total sentence of five years and six months’ imprisonment, which I consider adequately reflects your culpability for this offending, given your circumstances.
Minimum period of imprisonment
[38] Ms Hicklin submits that a 50 per cent minimum period of imprisonment should be imposed on you under s 86 of the Sentencing Act due to the aggravating features of your offending and the insufficiency of your sentence to hold you accountable, denounce your conduct, deter others, and protect the community. Ms Cooper submits that is not justified.
[39] As I said, I do not accept the Crown’s submissions about all the aggravating features of the offending, or the level of your culpability. Neither do I agree that a minimum period of imprisonment is appropriate for those purposes. You do not have a history of violence. Your culpability is comparable with that of the cases I have
20 Philip v R [2022] NZSC 149, [2022] 1 NZLR 571 at [56]; See also Sweeney v R [2023] NZCA 417 at [27].
mentioned, which did not impose minimum periods of imprisonment. You are embarking on a difficult road to rehabilitation which will depend on your determination to continue to address the issues of your past. Rather than deciding now on a minimum period, I consider it is preferable for the Parole Board to make the decision about when you are suitable for release, in light of the progress you make, or do not make, with your rehabilitation.
Sentence
[40] Ms Hughes, please stand. I sentence you to imprisonment for a term of five years and six months. That is composed of terms of imprisonment of:
(a)five years and six months for manslaughter to be served concurrently, at the same time, as;
(b)three years’ imprisonment for kidnapping;
(c)two years’ imprisonment for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm; and
(d)five months’ imprisonment for burglary;
(e)but the overall term is five years and six months.
Palmer J
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