The Foundation for Anti-Aging Research v The Charities Registration Board

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA308/2014
[2015] NZCA 449

BETWEEN

THE FOUNDATION FOR ANTI-AGING RESEARCH
First Appellant

THE FOUNDATION FOR REVERSAL OF SOLID STATE HYPOTHERMIA
Second Appellant

AND

THE CHARITIES REGISTRATION BOARD
Respondent

Hearing:

3 September 2015

Court:

Randerson, Wild and Winkelmann JJ

Counsel:

S D Barker for Appellants
D Harris for Respondent

Judgment:

21 September 2015 at 10:30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is dismissed.

BThere is no order as to costs.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Randerson J)

Introduction

  1. This appeal arises from an interlocutory judgment of the High Court in the context of appeals brought by the appellants under the Charities Act 2005 (the Act).[1]

  2. The first appellant is The Foundation for Anti-Aging Research (FAAR).  The second is The Foundation for Reversal of Solid State Hypothermia (FRSSH).  Both are entities established by deed and incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957.  The respondent (the Board) refused applications by each of the appellants for registration as a charitable entity under the Act.  This led to both appellants filing appeals to the High Court under s 59 of the Act. 

  3. The appellants sought interlocutory orders in the High Court for leave:

    (a)To adduce further evidence on appeal;

    (b)To call evidence orally; and

    (c)To cross-examine an analyst from the Department of Internal Affairs (the department responsible for administration of the Act).[2]

    [2]Other orders were sought which are no longer at issue. 

  4. Williams J granted leave to the appellants to adduce additional evidence in limited respects but otherwise declined to make the orders sought.  On appeal, Ms Barker focused her argument for the appellants on the refusal to order an oral hearing.  She submitted that ss 59 and 61 of the Act and/or Part 20 of the High Court Rules (HCR) permitted an oral hearing of an appeal in appropriate cases.  This was, she said, such a case. 

  5. The appellants’ written submissions did not attempt to challenge the High Court’s refusal to allow further evidence beyond the limited extent granted.  Ms Barker was not in a position to advance any oral submissions on this point at the hearing of the appeal although she offered to file further submissions if we required them.  We do not propose to allow a challenge to the extent of further evidence permitted by the High Court.  If the appellants had wished to advance this point they have had ample time to do so.  Ms Harris for the Board properly advised us that she had not prepared any argument on this issue since the appellants had not dealt with it in their submissions.  We record that the appellants filed a further extensive affidavit in the High Court by Mr B P Best, a director of The Life Extension Foundation of Florida.  The affidavit was sworn on 3 September 2014 after the judgment under appeal was delivered.  If the appellants wish to adduce this…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read The Foundation for Anti-Aging Research v The Charities Regis... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] NZCA 449
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Foundation for Anti-Aging Research, an Australian charity, brought an appeal against the Charities Registration Board, challenging the Board’s decision to refuse its application for charitable status. The case was heard and decided in the High Court of Australia. The central issue in the appeal was whether the Court could permit the introduction of further evidence, beyond what was presented at first instance, under Rule 20.16 of the Court’s rules for appeals. The Foundation argued that the Court should admit new evidence to correct errors and update the record. The Charities Registration Board, on the other hand, argued that the Court should adhere strictly to the evidence already provided and not allow new submissions.

The Court considered the scope of its power to permit additional evidence on appeal. The legal issue was whether sections 59 and 61 of the Act restricted the Court’s ability to allow new evidence under Rule 20.16. The Court concluded that these sections did not oust the Court’s power to admit further evidence, as they related to the outcome of the appeal rather than the procedural aspects. The Court found that Rule 20.16 provided clear guidelines for when additional evidence could be introduced, and these rules were not inconsistent with the powers specified in the Act. The Court also noted that while there was no general right to a de novo hearing, it could admit new evidence for reasons of fairness or to correct errors. The Court decided that it could admit new evidence if it was necessary to properly address the appeal, such as updating evidence that had arisen after the initial decision.

Williams J’s decision was that the Court had the power to permit the introduction of further evidence on appeal, provided there were special reasons for doing so. The Court outlined specific circumstances under which new evidence might be admitted, such as correcting errors or updating the record. The Judge rejected the argument that sections 59 and 61 of the Act limited the Court’s procedural powers, finding that these sections dealt with the outcomes of the appeal rather than the procedures for admitting evidence. The Court also emphasized that it would adopt a more liberal approach in cases where the original decision-making process was informal and inquisitorial. The final outcome of the appeal hinged on whether the new evidence could be admitted and if it would change the Court’s decision on the merits of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Rule 20.16 is of particular relevance to this appeal since it deals with the Court’s power to permit an appellant to adduce further evidence on appeal:20.16 Further evidence(1)Without leave, a party to an appeal may adduce further evidence on a question of fact if the evidence is necessary to determine an interlocutory application that relates to the appeal.(2)In all other cases, a party to an appeal may adduce further evidence only with the leave of the court.(3)The court may grant leave only if there are special reasons for hearing the evidence. An example of a special reason is that the evidence relates to matters that have arisen after the date of the decision appealed against and that are or may be relevant to the determination of the appeal.(4)Further evidence under this rule must be given by affidavit, unless the court otherwise directs. Key points regarding this rule are that, except in relation to interlocutory applications, a party may adduce further evidence only with the leave of the Court. The Court’s power to permit further evidence may be exercised only if there are special reasons for doing so. Any further evidence permitted under this rule must be given by affidavit unless the court directs otherwise. Finally, the powers of the Court on an appeal under Part 20 are prescribed by r 20.19. These powers are available to the extent they are not inconsistent with the powers specified in s 59 of the Act:20.19 Powers of court on appeal(1)After hearing an appeal, the court may do any 1 or more of the following:(a) make any decision it thinks should have been made:(b) direct the decision-maker—(i)to rehear the proceedings concerned; or(ii)to consider or determine (whether for the first time or again) any matters the court directs; or(iii)to enter judgment for any party to the proceedings the court directs:(c)make any order the court thinks just, including any order as to costs.… Williams J rejected the appellants’ argument that ss 59 and 61 of the Act effectively ousted the regime for the introduction of further evidence under r 20.16.[26] Particular reliance had been placed by the appellants on s 61(4) in terms of which the Court may make any order it thinks fit. The Judge interpreted s 61(4) as expanding the list of possible outcomes available under subss (1) and (2) “probably consequentially or for ancillary purposes”.[27] It was, the Judge thought, designed to allow the Court the widest possible scope to do what was necessary in light of the substantive conclusions reached by the Court. In the Judge’s view, it related to the disposition of the appeal and did not address appeal procedure. As such, it did not displace the express wording of r 20.16. [26]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [41].[27]At [41]. The Judge then carefully reviewed a range of High Court judgments dealing with the correct approach to an application to adduce further evidence under r 20.16.[28] Williams J also referred to two judgments of this Court in competition cases.[29] To the extent necessary, we will discuss these cases below. The Judge’s conclusions may be summarised in these terms:[30](a)The authorities were clear there was no general right to a de novo hearing arising from the nature of the particular procedure adopted by the statutory decision-maker at first instance.(b)Nevertheless, more targeted evidence would be admitted on appeal either on the “usual grounds” or for more general reasons of fairness to the appellant.(c)Updating evidence would be allowed but only where it was necessary for the court to consider that material in order to properly address the appeal. Other categories might include cases where the appellant was taken by surprise by findings or reasons not traversed with the applicant by the statutory decision-maker or in order to correct a clear mistake.(d)In cases where the decision at first instance was in the nature of an informal inquisitorial process without a hearing, the court might adopt a more liberal approach towards the introduction of further evidence on appeal. [28]Canterbury Development Corp v Charities Commission [2010] 2 NZLR 707 (HC); Re Education New Zealand Trust (2010) 24 NZTC 24,354; Re Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust [2011] 3 NZLR 502 (HC); Re Greenpeace New Zealand Inc [2011] 2 NZLR 815 (HC); Liberty Trust v Charities Commission [2011] 3 NZLR 68 (HC); and Re New Zealand Computer Society (2011) 25 NZTC 20-033. [29]Telecom v Commerce Commission [1991] 2 NZLR 557 (CA) and Commerce Commission v Woolworths [2008] NZCA 276, (2008) 8 NZBLR 102,336. [30]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [58]–[60].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established