TGHP Limited (in receivership)
[2025] NZHC 2296
•13 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2025-409-435
[2025] NZHC 2296
IN THE MATTER of an application under s 32 of the Receiverships Act 1993 IN THE MATTER
of TGHP LIMITED (in receivership)
BETWEEN
NEALE JACKSON AND DANIEL STONEMAN
Applicants
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
A R MacDuff and S V Reedy-Young for Applicants
Judgment:
13 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J
This judgment was delivered by me on 13 August 2025 at 1 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
RE TGHP LIMITED (In Receivership) [2025] NZHC 2296 [13 August 2025]
[1] The applicants, Neale Jackson and Daniel Stoneman, as the receivers of TGHP Ltd (in receivership) (TGHP), seek orders relieving them of personal liability in respect of amounts falling due under employment contracts in the receivership of TGHP.
[2] They filed an originating application without notice under s 32 of the Receiverships Act 1993 (the Act), seeking the following orders:
(a)the period under section 32(1)(b) of the Receiverships Act 1993 ("Act") within which notice of termination of TGHP's contracts of employment relating to the company in receivership ("Employment Agreements") is required to be given by the Receivers to employees of TGHP is extended to end on 14 November 2025;
(b)the Receivers are permitted to bring these proceedings by way of originating application;
(c)the Receivers are granted leave to commence these proceedings without notice;
(d)(i) notice of the orders will be provided by circular to the employees under the Employment Agreements of TGHP: sent by email where an email address is known to the Receivers or by post if a postal address (but no email address) is known to the Receivers;
(ii)physical copies will be made available for employees at the premises at which TGHP operates; and
(iii)posted on the Calibre Partners website at
is reserved for any person who can demonstrate a sufficient interest in the receivership of TGHP to apply (on notice) to vary or set aside these orders; and
(f)leave is reserved to the Receivers to apply further in respect of any modifications or ancillary issues arising out of the orders made.
Background
[3] TGHP owns and operates the Good Home Pegasus, a restaurant and bar business, from leased premises at 62 Pegasus Main Street, Pegasus, in the Canterbury region.
[4] On 31 July 2025 the applicants were appointed as joint and several receivers and managers of TGHP by a general and secured creditor, Lion NZ Ltd.
[5] The receivers’ present strategy is to secure a sale of the business as a going concern. In the interim, they intend to continue trading the business of TGHP in a stable manner to maximise the value retained in the business.
[6] On their appointment, TGHP had, based on information presently available to the receivers, seven full time and 14 part time employees engaged under employment agreements on various terms.
[7] Under s 32(1)(b) of the Act a receiver is personally liable for the payment of wages or salary that, during the receivership, accrue under an employment contract entered into before the appointment of the receiver relating to the property in receivership, unless the receivers lawfully give notice terminating those employment agreements within a 14-day period after their appointment.
[8] If this 14-day notice period is not extended, the receivers will either need to accept personal liability for wages and salary owed to the employees of TGHP or terminate the agreements and then re-engage the employees on standard receivership terms.
[9] The application is made under urgency because the 14-day notice period under s 32 of the Act expires tomorrow, 14 August 2024.
[10] The application is supported by a memorandum of counsel and a supporting affidavit of Neale Jackson affirmed on 12 August 2025. In it, he sets out the background in more detail. He also explains the options should the orders sought not be granted. Put simply, the receivers would unwilling to incur personal liability for maintaining the employment agreements and paying the wages and salaries of the employees.
[11] The alternatives, which are set out at paragraph 22 of his affidavit, include terminating the employment agreements and then re-employing the same employees on standard receivership terms which would be disruptive and unsettling for the employees and would be challenging to communicate and implement effectively in time. They also include reviewing the existing employments agreements (presumably to limit the extent of the receivers’ liability), but this would be resource intensive and unproductive.
[12] They note, in any event, that if a sale can be achieved, there would be a termination of the employment agreements and re-employment of the existing employees by the purchaser, leading to duplication of costs.
[13] Mr Jackson does not consider the employees would be disadvantaged by the making of the orders sought but they would minimise additional costs to creditors by avoiding the additional, and duplicative, costs of terminating and re-employing existing employees of TGHP within a relatively short time of that having to be done again on a sale.
[14] Mr Jackson also outlines why it is appropriate to proceed without notice. This includes because:
(a)the orders do not prejudice the counterparties to the employment agreements;
(b)the costs of serving the applications supporting documentation on all the counterparties to the employment agreements would be disproportionate given the lack of prejudice;
(c)it would not be possible to have the applications determined on notice before the expiry of 14 day period under s 32 of the Act;
(d)similar applications are often made without notice; and
(e)the orders sought, in any event, provide that any person affected by them may apply on notice to the Court for appropriate relief.
[15] Having reviewed that evidence, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case to dispense with service of the application and supporting affidavit.
[16] I am also satisfied that this is an appropriate case for the proceedings to be commenced by originating application without notice, given the urgency with which the application needs to be determined.
[17] Finally, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the notice period in s 32(1)(b) of the Act until 14 November 2025 for the reasons set out in Mr Jackson’s affidavit and the memorandum of counsel.
[18]Accordingly, I make orders as sought in the application.
Solicitors:
Russell McVeagh, Auckland
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