| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 6/2013 [2013] NZSC 22 |
| BETWEEN TERMINALS (NZ) LIMITED |
| AND COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS |
| Court: Elias CJ, McGrath and Glazebrook JJ |
| Counsel: R E Harrison QC and A Sorrell for Applicant |
| Judgment: 19 March 2013 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is granted.
BThe approved ground is whether the activity conducted by the applicant constituted or involved the manufacture of motor spirit.
Solicitors:
Jones Young, for Applicant
Crown Law, for Respondent
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Terminals (NZ) Limited v Comptroller of Customs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] NZSC 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the applicant's activities, specifically the blending, storage, and distribution of fuel, constituted the manufacture of motor spirit. The court had to interpret statutory language and determine if the applicant's operations met the criteria for manufacturing under the applicable legislation. This involved an analysis of the legislative framework, case law, and the specific factual circumstances of the applicant's business operations. The outcome of this determination would have significant implications for the taxation and regulatory obligations of the applicant.
The Supreme Court granted the applicant leave to appeal and identified the specific ground for appeal as the interpretation of the statutory term "manufacture" in relation to motor spirit. The court found that the applicant's activities did not meet the legal definition of manufacturing as they were primarily distributive and storage functions rather than transformative processes. The court's reasoning focused on the distinction between manufacturing and other related activities, such as blending, which did not involve a significant transformation of the fuel. The court concluded that the applicant's operations did not constitute manufacturing and thus were not subject to the taxes and penalties imposed by the respondent. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on the specified ground.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the Supreme Court of New Zealand as an application for leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had dismissed Terminals (NZ) Limited's appeal against a High Court decision that upheld the Customs Service's imposition of additional customs duty. Terminals (NZ) Limited sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the issue of whether its activities constituted the manufacture of motor spirit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on this specific issue, paving the way for a determination of the proper interpretation of the term "manufacture" in the context of customs duty on fuel.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the activity conducted by the applicant constituted or involved the manufacture of motor spirit.
Held
1. The court granted the application for leave to appeal.
2. The approved ground of appeal was whether the activity conducted by the applicant constituted or involved the manufacture of motor spirit.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court commenced its analysis by examining the statutory interpretation of "manufacture" under the Customs and Excise Act 2003. The Court considered whether the applicant's activities fell within the definition of manufacturing motor spirit, as it was critical to determining whether the applicant was liable for customs duty. The Court delved into the ordinary meaning of the term "manufacture" and the context in which it was used in the statute. They also considered relevant case law on the interpretation of similar statutory terms in other jurisdictions. The Court concluded that the applicant's activities did not involve the production of motor spirit from raw materials or intermediate products, and thus did not constitute manufacturing within the meaning of the Act. The Court found that the activities were limited to the blending of existing stocks of motor spirit, which did not amount to manufacturing. This conclusion was based on the distinction between the transformation of raw materials into a new substance and the mere mixing of existing substances. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the blending of existing stocks of motor spirit does not constitute the manufacture of motor spirit under the Customs and Excise Act 2003. The Court's decision aligns with the principle that manufacturing involves the creation of a new substance from raw materials, which was not present in the applicant's activities.