Templeton Uq Limited v Watt & Hughes Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-311

[2024] NZHC 1366

UNDER the Companies Act 1993

IN THE MATTER

of an application to set aside a statutory demand

BETWEEN

TEMPLETON UQ LIMITED

Applicant

AND

WATTS & HUGHES LIMITED

Respondent

Hearing: (On the papers)

Appearances:

D M Hughes and A Williams for Applicant

R J Hollyman KC and A J Peat for Respondent

Judgment:

28 May 2024


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER

(on recall application)


This judgment was delivered by me on 28 May 2024 at 12:30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

…………………………

TEMPLETON UQ LIMITED v WATTS & HUGHES LIMITED [2024] NZHC 1366 [28 May 2024]

[1]                  Watts & Hughes Limited (WHL) seeks I recall my judgment of 3 May 2024 declining to set aside a statutory  demand  WHL  had  issued  against  Templeton  UQ Limited (Templeton). Recall is sought as neither counsel sought an order under s 291(1)(a) of the Companies Act 1993 (the Act) extending time for compliance with the statutory demand.

[2]                  The significance of no extension of time being sought is that in the absence of an extension, WHL is unable to rely on the statutory demand should it apply to liquidate Templeton — the statutory demand has gone “stale” by virtue of s 288(1) of the Act.

[3]                  I am satisfied recall is appropriate. It cannot have been understood by the parties that if the application to set aside the statutory demand failed, that nonetheless the demand would be worthless because no extension of time to meet the demand was made.

[4]                  Counsel for Templeton (not counsel involved in the application to set aside), submits first that, WHL has failed to adopt the proper process for recall of the judgment and secondly, that no grounds for recall exist as there was no error by the Court.

[5]                  As to matters of process, McGechan on Procedure notes that a formal interlocutory application is not invariably required but as a minimum a formal memorandum should be filed and served.1 That has occurred here. McGechan notes further that it is desirable a party seeking recall should first confer with the opposite party and endeavour to obtain their consent. Templeton’s counsel notes that no consultation occurred here but, as noted, such is described as a desirable step rather than a formal requirement. Templeton’s counsel suggests that WHL should be held to these requirements given the technical nature of WHL’s challenge in relation to the application to set aside its statutory demand.


1      Jessica Gorman and others (ed) McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR11.9.01].

[6]                  However, the process points taken by Templeton’s counsel are not fatal to the recall application, whereas the point WHL took concerning the defective service of the application to set aside, was fatal to that application. Any procedural issue with WHL’s recall request could if needs be, have been corrected.…

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Details
Case
[2024] NZHC 1366
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Watts & Hughes Limited (WHL) sought to recall a judgment that declined to set aside a statutory demand WHL had issued against Templeton UQ Limited (Templeton). The recall application was based on the fact that neither party had sought an extension of time for compliance with the statutory demand, as required by the Companies Act 1993. Without such an extension, the statutory demand had effectively become "stale" and could not be used by WHL to apply to liquidate Templeton. The court found that recall was appropriate as neither party could have intended that the statutory demand would become worthless if the application to set aside failed, simply because no extension of time had been sought. The court rejected arguments from Templeton's counsel that the recall process was not properly followed and that there was no error in the original judgment. The court noted that while the recall process could have been more formal, it was sufficient for the purposes of the application. The court found that the failure to seek an extension of time was a significant oversight, and one that both parties could have avoided if they had drawn the court's attention to the relevant legislative provision. The court recalled its earlier judgment and extended the time for compliance with the statutory demand by 15 working days. The court also noted that costs on the recall application should lie where they fell, but invited the parties to file memoranda on costs if they wished to do so. If no memoranda were filed within five working days, the costs order would be that costs were to lie where they fell.

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