IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2020-404-1376
[2022] NZHC 496
BETWEEN TEMPEST LITIGATION FUNDERS LIMITED
Plaintiff/RespondentAND
WEN ZEN ZHANG
First Defendant
TENG MA
Second DefendantTIAN TIAN
Third DefendantXIANG ZOU
Fourth DefendantCont’d:…/2
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
W van Roosmalen for the Plaintiff / Respondent Ms Pang for the Fifth Defendant / Applicant
Judgment:
17 March 2022
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
[As to costs]
This judgment is delivered by me on 17 March 2022 at 11 am
pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
.....................................................
Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Adam Stevenson Botterill, Auckland, for Tempest Litigation Funders Ltd Counsel W van Roosmalen, Auckland, for Tempest Litigation Funders Ltd
MSP Pang, Auckland, for Kelly Yin
TEMPEST LITIGATION FUNDERS LTD v ZHANG [2022] NZHC 496 [17 March 2022]
…/2
KELLY YIN
Fifth Defendant/Applicant
SHUANG QIN
Sixth DefendantDANIEL OVERTON GOULDING LAWYERS
Seventh Defendant
[1]This is an application for costs by the fifth defendant, Kelly Yin.
[2] In a judgment of 14 February 2022 (the judgment)1 I granted Ms Yin’s application to set aside the judgment obtained by the plaintiff Tempest Litigation Funders Ltd (Tempest) against Ms Yin on a formal proof basis (formal proof judgment).2
[3] In the judgment I left it open to Ms Yin to make an application for costs. I indicated my preliminary view that this may be a case where costs should lie where they fall. That was because although Ms Yin had been successful, her application was only required because of her default (in failing to file a statement of defence).3
[4] In his memorandum on behalf of Ms Yin, Mr Pang refers to my findings that Ms Yin had a defence to Tempest’s claim which ought to be heard; her delay in responding to the service of the proceeding on her was lengthy, but excusable; and there will be no irreparable harm to Tempest if the judgment were set aside.4
[5] Mr Pang refers to two judgments of this Court regarding costs on an application to set aside a judgment obtained by formal proof. First, in Callis v Ward McCulloch Doogue J said:5
In the ordinary course, when a party seeks the indulgence of the Court because of its own default, the other party would be entitled to costs. That is not, however, the case here, where the defendants have had to apply to the Court because of the plaintiffs’ error. On the other hand, if the defendants had filed their defence within the appropriate time, the difficulties would never have occurred. This is not a case, therefore, where it is appropriate that there be any order as to costs, and neither party is ordered to pay costs.
[6] Mr Pang also refers to the judgment of (then) Master Faire in Active Leisure Sports (Pty) Ltd v Crocodile Sports & Leisurewear Ltd where the above analysis was adopted.6
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- Case
- [2022] NZHC 496
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments presented by both parties. Kelly Yin's counsel submitted that the costs should be awarded on a 2B basis, meaning that the losing party should pay the costs of both parties, but reduced by 50 percent due to her default in failing to file a statement of defence. Tempest Litigation Funders Limited opposed the application, arguing that costs should lie where they fall. The court found that the case could be distinguished from previous cases cited by Kelly Yin, as those cases involved errors made by the plaintiffs, whereas this case involved a default by the defendant. The court also noted that it had not made findings on the issue of standing or the conduct of Tempest Litigation Funders Limited and its counsel, as these were not relevant to the decision to set aside the judgment. Therefore, the court confirmed its preliminary view that costs should lie where they fall, and Kelly Yin's application for costs was refused.
The court's reasoning was based on the principle that when a party seeks the indulgence of the court because of its own default, the other party would be entitled to costs. In this case, Kelly Yin had sought to set aside the judgment obtained by formal proof due to her default in failing to file a statement of defence. Although she was successful in her application, the court found that it was not appropriate to award her costs. The court found that the issues of standing and the conduct of Tempest Litigation Funders Limited and its counsel were not relevant to the decision to set aside the judgment and should not be decided in the context of an application for costs. Therefore, the court refused Kelly Yin's application for costs.
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