Tegal Foods Ltd v Neal
[2018] NZHC 1921
•31 July 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV 2017-404-2659
[2018] NZHC 1921
BETWEEN TEGEL FOODS LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND
COLIN ASHLEY NEAL AND ANOR
Defendant
Hearing: 29 May 2018 Appearances:
C Harris for the Plaintiff
H L Thompson for the Defendant
Judgment:
31 July 2018
JUDGMENT OF VAN BOHEMEN J
This judgment was delivered by me on 31 July 2018 at 2.00pm Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
…………………………
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Jackson Russell, AucklandMcMahon Butterworth Thompson, Auckland
TEGEL FOODS LIMITED v NEAL AND ANOR [2018] NZHC 1921 [31 July 2018]
Introduction
[1] Tegel Foods Ltd seeks summary judgment in the sum of $748,030 plus interest against the defendants, Colin Neal and Exquisite Foods Ltd (formerly Santa Rosa Foods Ltd), the company of which Mr Neal is sole director and 99 per cent shareholder, for amounts unpaid by Exquisite for chicken products supplied by Tegel.
[2] The defendants raise matters of fact and contractual interpretation which they say mean the case is unsuitable for summary judgment. Most importantly, the defendants say Exquisite has a set off to its liability to Tegel because of an alleged breach by Tegel of its supply agreement with Exquisite.
Relevant background to Tegel’s claim
[3] In July 2012, Exquisite (then Santa Rosa Foods), Santa Rosa Marketing Ltd and Tegel entered into a deed of assignment under which Santa Rosa Marketing’s rights under a Supply Agreement concluded in April 2011 between Tegel and Santa Rosa Marketing were assigned to Exquisite.
[4] Under the Supply Agreement, Tegel undertook to supply specified chicken products to Exquisite at prices established under a pricing mechanism set out in a schedule to the Agreement and which was to be reviewed at agreed intervals. Under the Agreement, Exquisite undertook to obtain its chicken products exclusively from Tegel. It also agreed to pay interest at the rate of 14 per cent per annum on any late payment by Exquisite for products supplied under the Agreement. The Supply Agreement did not apply to supplies to Exquisite’s operations outside of Christchurch or Bulls unless the parties agreed otherwise in writing.
[5] On 1 August 2012, Mr Neal, on behalf of Exquisite, completed an Application for Account to open a credit account with Tegel for the supply of chicken products. The Credit Account form completed by Mr Neal had standard terms of sale for Tegel customers. The terms concerned the payment and delivery of goods supplied by Tegel, when risk and ownership in the products passed from Tegel to the customer, and liability for default interest and costs in the event of non-payment. In completing the
form Mr Neal also signed a section under which he apparently gave an unlimited personal guarantee for the payment of all amounts owed by Exquisite to Tegel.
[6] On 6 August 2012, Mr Neal and Tegel executed a separate deed of guarantee and indemnity in favour of Tegel under which Mr Neal undertook to be jointly and severally liable with Exquisite for the payment of all monies to be paid by Exquisite to Tegel under the Supply Agreement. The Deed specified that Mr Neal’s liability was limited to $500,000. That limit was increased to $800,000 under a deed of variation entered into by Mr Neal and Tegel on 20 October 2015.
[7] Between August 2012 and May 2017, Exquisite purchased chicken products from Tegel in accordance with the Supply Agreement. However, during 2016 and 2017, Exquisite defaulted at various times in its payments to Tegel. In its statement of claim, Tegel says the amount owing as at 3 October 2017 stood at $748,030 and seeks judgment against both defendants for this amount, interest at 14.45 percent per annum (being the rate specified in the Credit Account) or in the alternative, interest pursuant to the Judicature Act 1908, and costs.
Defences / set off claimed by Exquisite and Mr Neal
[8] The defendants do not dispute that Exquisite received chicken products from Tegel. Nor do they dispute that Exquisite did not pay for certain consignments of those products. However, the defendants question whether:
(a)The amounts claimed by Tegel are accurate and whether they have been calculated according to the agreed pricing mechanism in the Supply Agreement;
(b)Some of the products to which the amounts claimed relate were supplied in Auckland so were not covered by the Supply Agreement;
(c)The guarantee signed by Mr Neal as part of the Credit Account applies to products provided under the Supply Agreement.
[9] Most significantly, the defendants say that Tegel breached clause 21.1 of the Supply Agreement under which each party undertook, among other things, to carry out its obligations under the Agreement in cooperation with the other. The defendants say Tegel breached its obligations under this clause by aggressively marketing its own smoked chicken product into areas to which Exquisite supplied smoked chicken at a time when the Exquisite product had been recalled, thereby causing substantial loss to Exquisite.
[10] The defendants submit that these matters are reasonably arguable so summary judgment is not appropriate.
Summary judgment considerations
[11] Rule 12.2(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides that the Court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff satisfies the Court the defendant has no defence. The principles applicable on summary judgment are summarised in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd:1
[26] The principles are well settled. The question on a summary judgment application is whether the defendant has no defence to the claim; that is, that there is no real question to be tried: Pemberton v Chappell [1987] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 3. The Court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty. The onus is on the plaintiff, but where its evidence is sufficient to show there is no defence, the defendant will have to respond if the application is to be defeated: MacLean v Stewart (1997) 11 PRNZ 66 (CA). The Court will not normally resolve material conflicts of evidence or assess the credibility of deponents. But it need not accept uncritically evidence that is inherently lacking in credibility, as, for example, where the evidence is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable: Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 (PC) at
341. In the end the Court's assessment of the evidence is a matter of judgment. The Court may take a robust and realistic approach where the facts warrant it: Bilbie Dymock Corporation Ltd v Patel (1987) 1 PRNZ 84 (CA).
[12] As the Court of Appeal observed in Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, if the defence raises questions of fact on which the Court’s decision may turn, summary judgment will usually be inappropriate.2 On the other hand, where, despite the differences on certain factual matters, the lack of a tenable defence is plain on the material before the Court,
1 Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187, [2010] NZAR 307 at [26].
2 Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd CA248/02, 5 June 2003 at [28].
summary judgment will in general be entered, even if legal arguments must be ruled on to reach a decision. In such circumstances, there is no reason why a contract should not be interpreted and applied in summary judgment proceedings where the Court is satisfied that resolution of the factual matters in dispute is not necessary to provide the Court with such contextual background as is necessary to resolve the claim.3
[13]The Court of Appeal in Jowada Holdings also stated:4
Generally … where the ground relied on in seeking summary judgment goes to the substance of the litigation, the interests of justice would not permit refusal of judgment unless they provided a basis for it to be refused at the substantive hearing: Inner City Properties Ltd v Mercury Energy Ltd (1990) 13 PRNZ 73 (CA). It should not be thought that a plaintiff who has shown that there is no arguable defence will be denied judgment except in rare circumstances.
The pricing issue
[14] Mr Thompson for the defendants asserts that Tegel’s claim that Exquisite was charged for chicken products according to the pricing mechanism in the Supply Agreement is based on unsubstantiated assertions in the affidavits sworn on 3 November 2017 and 11 April 2018 by Richard Klette, Financial Controller for Tegel. Similarly, in his affidavit sworn on 9 March 2018, Mr Neal says there was nothing in Mr Klette’s affidavit of 3 November 2017 that enabled him to work out whether the amount Tegel is claiming has been calculated or billed according to the pricing mechanism in the agreement.
[15]I do not accept these contentions.
[16] Mr Klette annexed as an exhibit to his affidavit of 3 November 2017 a schedule showing the amounts claimed by Tegel based on invoices submitted to Exquisite. Mr Klette annexed as an exhibit to his affidavit of 11 April 2018, six sample invoices which correspond to entries in the schedule annexed to the 3 November 2017 affidavit. The chicken products were supplied and were received under the Supply Agreement. The Supply Agreement contains the mechanism that establishes the price of products supplied under the Agreement. In his affidavit of 11 April 2018, Mr Klette explains
3 Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd CA248/02, 5 June 2003 at [29].
4 Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd CA248/02, 5 June 2003 at [30].
how the pricing mechanism was applied and reviewed based on email exchanges between Tegel and Exquisite, notes that prices were adjusted in reviews undertaken in March 2016 and August 2016, and says that the adjusted prices were reflected in the sample invoices annexed to the affidavit.
[17] Mr Klette’s evidence and the documentary evidence of the schedule and the sample invoices satisfy me that the invoices for the supply of those products were properly based on prices set in accordance with the pricing mechanism in the Supply Agreement. This evidence establishes a prima facie case that there is an unpaid debt of $748,030 owing to Tegel for the supply of chicken products to Exquisite.
[18] The defendants do not dispute that Exquisite received chicken products from Tegel. They do not dispute that Exquisite had an obligation to pay for those products. They do not assert that chicken products were supplied or invoiced other than in accordance with the Supply Agreement. They have put nothing in evidence that casts doubt on the veracity of Tegel’s evidence. In the circumstances, I do not consider it is reasonably arguable that the amounts invoiced to Exquisite for the supply of chicken products under the Supply Agreement were inaccurate or were not based on the pricing mechanism in the Agreement. Accordingly, I am satisfied the defendants have no defence to Tegel’s claim as far as pricing issues are concerned.
The distribution issue
[19] Although Mr Thompson did not pursue this issue in submissions, in the Notice of Opposition to Tegel’s application and in Mr Neal’s affidavit of 9 March 2018, the defendants question whether some of the unpaid invoices may relate to product Tegel supplied to Exquisite in Auckland – that is, outside the area covered by the Supply Agreement.
[20] In his affidavit of 11 April 2018, Mr Klette says he has reviewed all of the invoices that comprise the debt claimed against Exquisite and Mr Neal and all have a Christchurch delivery address. He also says he has reviewed a sample of proofs of delivery pertaining to those supplies and all have a Christchurch delivery address. In addition, Mr Klette explains that the supplies to Exquisite in Auckland were for modest
amounts and that because the debt owed by Exquisite to Tegel was high, all supplies to Auckland required payment in advance or cash on delivery.
[21] Given this evidence, which is not challenged by the defendants, it seems unlikely that any of the amount claimed by Tegel relates to supplies in Auckland and outside the area covered by the Supply Agreement. The evidence establishes the prima facie case that Tegel’s claim relates only to products supplied in Christchurch. The defendants have not provided any evidence that leaves me with any real doubt or uncertainty about the credibility of Tegel’s evidence. In the circumstances, I do not consider it is reasonably arguable that the amounts invoiced to Exquisite were for the supply of chicken products in the area not covered by the Supply Agreement. I am satisfied the defendants have no defence to Tegel’s claim as far as distribution issue is concerned.
Applicability of Credit Account and related guarantee
[22] The defendants say that the Credit Account and the related unlimited personal guarantee by Mr Neal are not relevant to the supply of products under the Supply Agreement because:
(a)Under clause 21 of the Supply Agreement, any variations to the Agreement are effective only if recorded in writing and signed on behalf of both parties;
(b)Under clause 23 of the Supply Agreement, the Agreement is the entire agreement between the parties on the subject matter of the Agreement;
(c)Tegel does not say the Credit Account is a variation to the Supply Agreement and in any event it has not been signed by Tegel.
[23] Tegel says the Credit Account and its related indemnity apply in addition to the Supply Agreement and the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity. It says Tegel requires all new customers to sign up to Tegel’s standard terms and conditions as set out in the Credit Account and that the Supply Agreement is supplementary to the Credit Account. As far as its claim against Exquisite is concerned, therefore, Tegel maintains that it is
entitled to $748,030 plus interest at 14.45 per cent per annum, as well as payment of its costs on a solicitor-client basis. However, for the purposes of its summary judgment application against Mr Neal, Tegel seeks judgment only for the outstanding amount of $748,030 plus interest, up to a total sum of $800,000, the limit in the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity.
[24] The relationship between the Supply Agreement, the Credit Account and the Guarantee and Indemnity is a question of contractual interpretation.
[25] Although the Deed of Assignment assigning the Supply Agreement to Exquisite is not dated, it appears to have been executed in July 2012 – before the Credit Account application was signed on 1 August 2012. That in itself argues against the submission of Ms Harris for Tegel that the Supply Agreement was supplementary to the Credit Account even if, as Mr Klette says, the two documents were signed at much the same time.
[26] I agree with Mr Thompson that the Credit Account is not a variation of the Supply Agreement. The Credit Account has standard terms that apply to all Tegel customers. The Supply Agreement is specific to the arrangement between Tegel and Exquisite. It is unlikely that the standard agreement would have been intended as a variation to the specific Supply Agreement, particularly when Exquisite took over the Supply Agreement on assignment from Santa Rosa Marketing – which entered into the Agreement with Tegel in April 2011.
[27] It is difficult to reconcile aspects of the two documents. In some respects, they deal with distinct issues. The Supply Agreement is about the supply of product and the prices to be paid. The Credit Account is about the payment arrangements for that supply, including the extension of credit and related matters. However, in other respects, the two documents overlap and conflict, particularly on the rate of interest payable for debts owed to Tegel by Exquisite. The Supply Agreement sets the interest rate at 14 per cent per annum. The Credit Account sets it at four per cent per annum above the retail base lending rate of the Bank of New Zealand.
[28] It is also difficult to reconcile the Credit Account with the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity. If Tegel considered the Credit Account to be effective in its own terms, including the unlimited personal guarantee given by Mr Neal, there was no need for the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity. There are also aspects of the Deed that are inconsistent with the concurrent application of the Credit Account, in particular, clause
1.1 under which Mr Neal undertakes to be jointly and severally liable with Exquisite to Tegel for “all monies to be paid” to Tegel by Exquisite. That clause appears to cover all of the ground covered by the guarantee under the Credit Account.
[29] At the very least, the limitation of liability in the Deed must be taken as qualifying and capping the guarantee in the Credit Account – as Tegel implicitly accepts in saying that it seeks judgment against Mr Neal only for the outstanding amount of $748,030 plus interest, up to the sum of $800,000. However, I consider the inconsistencies between the Credit Account on the one hand and the Supply Agreement and the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity on the other mean that it would be inappropriate in the context of summary judgment to rely on the terms of the Credit Account because its application is too uncertain.
[30] For these reasons, I consider that the Credit Account should not be taken into account when considering the defendants’ liability to Tegel for the non-payment of products supplied under the Supply Agreement.
[31] The practical effect of excluding the Credit Account from consideration is limited. As Mr Thompson says, the point is relevant to Tegel’s claim for interest and indemnity costs which are based on the Credit Account. It does not negate the defendants’ liability to Tegel under the Supply Agreement and the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity. The difference in interest rates is not significant. In its Statement of Claim, Tegel claims interest at 14.45 per cent per annum based on the terms of the Credit Account. Under the Supply Agreement, the rate is 14 per cent per annum – the rate sought by Ms Harris in paragraph 43 of her submissions. The remaining relevant difference is in relation to costs which the Supply Agreement and the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity do not address. But the fact the Credit Account deals with costs while the other agreements do not is not a sufficient basis for holding that the Credit Account can still apply given the other difficulties described above.
Claimed set off based on clause 21.1 of Supply Agreement
[32]Clause 21.1 of the Supply Agreement provides:
Each Party will carry out its obligations under this Agreement or procure that its obligations under this Agreement are carried out at all times in cooperation with the other Party to the intent that the Parties at all times maintain a business relationship and perform their respective obligations under this Agreement in a manner that is mutually beneficial.
[33] The defendants say Tegel has breached its obligations under this clause and caused losses to Exquisite that will more than set off the amount claimed by Tegel against the defendants. In his affidavit of 9 March 2018, Mr Neal says that in December 2016,5 when Exquisite’s Santa Rosa-branded smoked chicken products could not be marketed because of a product recall, Tegel cut the price of, and actively promoted, its own-brand smoked chicken products which began appearing on supermarket shelves at lower prices and in different packaging than before. As a consequence, when the Santa Rosa products were again able to be marketed, they could not compete with the Tegel products.
[34] Mr Neal says Tegel’s activities had a direct and substantial effect on Exquisite’s business, causing unsustainable operating losses that resulted in Exquisite closing its production facilities. While he has not quantified Exquisite’s losses, Mr Neal says they “would run to millions of dollars.” Mr Neal also says he believes Tegel acted intentionally to try to exclude Santa Rosa smoked chicken products from the market and alleges he heard market chatter to this effect. He also says he would be surprised if discovery of Tegel’s internal emails and other documents did not confirm this to have been the case.
[35] In his affidavit of 11 April 2018, Mr Klette rejects the defendants’ allegations, saying that the Santa Rosa product recall had nothing to do with Tegel, that Tegel did not agree or promise not to promote its own products, that Tegel did not agree or promise not to compete on price, and that Tegel has always had a big brand presence in supermarkets. Mr Klette also says Tegel did not reduce its prices in supermarkets
5 Mr Neal’s affidavit says December 2015 but Mr Klette says in his affidavit of 11 April 2018 the relevant date is likely to be December 2016. The defendants do not challenge Mr Klette on this point.
as a result of the Santa Rosa product recall and that such an issue would not direct Tegel’s pricing strategy in supermarkets. He says at around the time Mr Neal was referring to, Tegel had been undertaking a brand refresh as part of a broader business strategy as part of a share offering on which Tegel was embarking.
[36] The defendants have challenged the admissibility of Mr Klette’s evidence on Tegel’s marketing strategies.
[37]There are two aspects to the set off argument raised by the defendants:
(a)Whether it is reasonably arguable that clause 21.1 applied to restrain Tegel from marketing its products at a time when Exquisite’s products had been recalled from the market? This is a matter of contractual interpretation.
(b)Whether it is reasonably arguable that Tegel deliberately acted to take market share from Exquisite in the manner alleged by the defendants? This is a matter of fact.
[38] If the answer to either question is no, the defendants’ set off argument cannot succeed.
[39] While Mr Thompson says the Court should have regard to the pre-contractual factual background of the Supply Agreement before interpreting its terms, I do not consider that factual evidence about the negotiations of the Supply Agreement is necessary in order to establish the meaning of clause 21.1. While the clause has its difficulties as discussed below, it is capable of interpretation without additional evidence. Moreover, both Tegel and the defendants put forward interpretations of the clause based on its language and not by reference to any surrounding circumstances that might be said to shed light on how it was intended to be interpreted.
[40] I have noted Mr Thompson’s submission that unless a contractual interpretation advanced by a party is clearly without merit, the Court should be extremely cautious about resolving disputes about interpretation by way of summary
judgment, particularly when the words of the contract do not clearly support one meaning over another. However, I consider that submission is not consistent with the observations of the Court of Appeal in Jowada Holdings that there is no reason why a contract should not be interpreted and applied in summary judgment proceedings where the lack of a tenable defence is plain on the material before the Court, and the Court is sure on that point.6 I consider Clavell Capital Ltd v Adamantem Capital Property Ltd,7 to which Mr Thompson referred me after the hearing, to be consistent with the Court of Appeal’s observations. The key question is not whether there is an issue of contractual interpretation but whether the Court is left with any real doubt or uncertainty about whether the defendant has a defence.
[41] Ms Harris for Tegel says the scope and content of clause 21.1 are not defined but that the meaning of the clause must be restricted according to its terms. These are that the parties should cooperate with each other in the performance of their respective obligations under the Supply Agreement. Tegel’s obligation is to supply chicken products to Exquisite according to the agreed pricing formula. Exquisite’s obligations are to purchase chicken products from Tegel and to pay for them in accordance with the payment terms. The obligation in clause 21.1 is not a general one that affects all aspects of the parties’ separate business operations, such as a pricing strategy applicable to a third party.
[42] Mr Thompson says the phrase “to the intent that the Parties at all times maintain a business relationship” means that clause 21.1 has a broader scope than Ms Harris contends. He says it is fairly arguable that the clause imposes a positive obligation on the parties to cooperate with each other with a view to maintaining a mutually beneficial business relationship. Further, Mr Thompson says that it is fairly arguable that clause 21.1 does not allow the parties solely to advance their self- interests and that in the circumstances it was not open to Tegel to reduce prices or increase its marketing activities for smoked chicken products in the temporary absence of Santa Rosa products from the market.
6 Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd CA248/02, 5 June 2003 at [29].
7 Clavell Capital Ltd v Adamantem Capital Property Ltd [2018] NZHC 861
[43] Clause 21.1 is poorly drafted. Even so, its intended meaning is reasonably clear. It is not necessary for me to decide whether, as Ms Harris submits, the clause has a content similar to clauses imposing an obligation of good faith.
[44] The governing phrase in the clause is “obligations under this Agreement”. The phrase appears three times. The first two occasions relate to cooperation of the parties and the intent that they maintain a business relationship. The third relates to acting in a manner that is mutually beneficial.
[45] The undertakings to cooperate, maintain a business relationship, and act in a mutually beneficial manner do not have separate content. They have meaning only in relation to the parties’ performance of their obligations under the Supply Agreement. It is a necessary inference that the phrase “obligations under this Agreement” in clause
21.1 is a reference to the obligations in the other clauses of the Supply Agreement. Clause 21.1 does not itself impose any separate obligations.
[46] As Ms Harris says, Tegel’s obligation under the Agreement is to supply chicken products to Exquisite at prices set in accordance with the Agreement. The Agreement does not address in any way Tegel’s other business activities, including its marketing of its own products. I do not consider, therefore, that it is reasonably arguable that the clause imposes a positive obligation on the parties to cooperate with each other with a view to maintaining a mutually beneficial business relationship other than in the performance of their specific undertakings in the other clauses of the Supply Agreement.
[47] It follows that I do not consider it is reasonably arguable that clause 21.1 applied to restrain Tegel from marketing its products at a time when Exquisite’s products had been recalled from the market. Accordingly, I do not accept that it is reasonably arguable Exquisite has a claim under clause 21.1 that can be set off against Tegel’s claim.
[48] The consequence of these conclusions is that it is unnecessary for me to address the factual question of whether Tegel did act to take market share from Exquisite in the manner alleged. It follows that it is also unnecessary to address the conflict in
evidence and the related issue of the admissibility of that evidence that bear on that question.
Conclusions
[49]I conclude that:
(a)Tegel has established a prima facie case that:
(i)Exquisite has an unpaid debt of $748,030 owing to Tegel for the supply of chicken products;
(ii)The interest payable on that debt is 14 per cent per annum;
(iii)Mr Neal has given a personal guarantee of that debt up to a limit of $800,000.
(b)The defendants have not provided any evidence that leaves the Court with any real doubt or uncertainty about the credibility of Tegel’s claims and I am satisfied the defendants have no defence to those claims;
(c)It is not reasonably arguable that Exquisite has a set off against Tegel based on a breach of clause 21.1 of the Supply Agreement.
[50] It follows that the defendants have no defence to Tegel’s claim and Tegel has made out its claim for summary judgment against both defendants.
[51] There is no basis for the exercise of the Court’s residual discretion under r 12.2 of the High Court Rules not to enter summary judgment when there is no defence to a plaintiff’s claim.
Orders
[52] Judgment is entered for Tegel Foods Ltd against Mr Neal and Exquisite Foods Ltd in the following terms:
(a)Judgment for the principal sum in the amount of $748,030;
(b)Interest on the principal sum at a rate of 14 per cent per annum from 3 October 2017 until date of payment;
(c)Costs,
provided that the liability of Mr Neal is limited to $800,000.
[53] I have set 3 October 2017 as the appropriate date from which interest should run. That is the date identified in Tegel’s statement of claim as the date on which Exquisite’s debt stood at the claimed amount of $748,030.
[54] Because I have held that the Credit Account cannot be taken into account, Tegel’s claim for solicitor-client costs based on the Credit Account cannot succeed. I consider costs on 2B basis to be appropriate and order accordingly.
[55] If the parties cannot agree costs, they may submit memoranda of not more than four pages. Any memorandum from Tegel should be filed by 21 August 2018; any memorandum from the defendants should be filed by 4 September 2018.
G J van Bohemen J
5
0
1