Teddy v The Queen - [2019] NZHC 219

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NAPIER REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA AHURIRI ROHE

CRI-2019-441-16

[2019] NZHC 219

BETWEEN
TEINA LIAM TEDDY

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Hearing (via AVL): 9 May 2019

Counsel:

N M Graham for Appellant M M Mitchell for Crown

Judgment:

9 May 2019

ORAL JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

Introduction

[1] On 26 February 2019, Mr Teddy was sentenced by Judge Rea in the Hastings District Court1 in respect of two charges of driving while his licence was suspended.2 The Judge declined an application for relief from mandatory disqualification and sentenced Mr Teddy to 50 hours’ community work on each charge, such terms imposed concurrently. He was also disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of one year.

[2] Mr Teddy appeals his sentence on the ground that the Judge erred in declining an application pursuant to s 94 of the Land Transport Act 1998 (the Act).

1 New Zealand Police v Teddy [2019] NZDC 7591.
2 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(c) and 32(4); maximum penalty two years’ imprisonment or a fine of $6,000, and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver licence for at least one year.

TEDDY v R [2019] NZHC 219 [9 May 2019]

[3] The Crown’s position is that there was no error in the District Court’s exercise of discretion.

The offending

[4] On 26 November 2018, Mr Teddy was served with a suspension notice for a period of three months for excess demerit points. At the time of his suspension, he held a learner driver licence.

[5] On 10 January and 19 January 2019, Mr Teddy was stopped by police whilst riding a Harley Davidson motorcycle. Both were routine traffic stops. On both occasions, he gave the explanation that he did not know he was suspended.

District Court decision

[6] In brief sentencing notes, the Judge referred to Mr Teddy’s previous convictions for driving-related offences, noting that he had been granted relief under s 94 back in 2015 and had then gone on to breach his sentence of community work.3 He said:4

On this occasion, you are back on two separate occasions, driving when you knew you were not supposed to be, and you want the same consideration. That would simply leave you and others to conclude that you can drive whenever you like because when you turn up to Court, they will not disqualify you any further. That is not going to happen.

Approach to appeal

[7] This appeal is brought under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. An appeal against sentence is an appeal against a discretion and must only be allowed if the Court is satisfied that, for any reason, there was an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should have been imposed.5 The focus is on the final sentence and whether that was in the available range, rather than the exact process by which it was reached.6

3 New Zealand Police v Teddy,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Teddy v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Teddy v The Queen [2019] NZHC 219
Case: [2019] NZHC 219
Decision Date: 9 May 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Teina Liam Teddy appeals against his sentence for driving while his licence was suspended. The appeal was heard by Churchman J in the High Court at Napier. The appeal concerns the sentencing decision of the District Court Judge, who declined an application under s 94 of the Land Transport Act 1998 (the Act) for relief from mandatory disqualification and sentenced Teddy to 50 hours' community work on each charge, such terms imposed concurrently, and disqualified him from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of one year. The appeal raises the issue of whether the District Court Judge erred in declining an application pursuant to s 94 of the Act.

The court examined the relevant law and found that, under s 94, a court may substitute a community-based sentence for a disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence if it considers it would be inappropriate to order the offender to be disqualified. The court must consider the circumstances of the case, the effectiveness or otherwise of a previous order of disqualification made in respect of the offender, the likely effect on the offender of a further order of disqualification, and the interests of the public. The court must also consider the gravity of the offence and the fact that the offender would otherwise have been liable to disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence.

In this case, the court found that the District Court Judge did not err in declining the application under s 94. The court found that Teddy had previously been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence and had also been granted relief under s 94, which he failed to take advantage of. The court found that Teddy's track record did not give the court much confidence that, if he were, for the second time, to be granted an indulgence under s 94, it is likely that his offending would cease. The court also found that Teddy's issues with driving were not confined to licensing matters, as he had previous convictions for driving with excess breath alcohol and careless driving. The court found that a further period of disqualification would not cause Teddy any insurmountable difficulty in continuing his employment, and there was no evidence of any special hardship likely to occur as a result of disqualification. The court found that deterrence, both general and specific, was a relevant public interest.

For the reasons given, the appeal is dismissed.

Orders