Taylor v Commissioner of Inland Revenue

Case [2024] NZSC 44


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 145/2023
 [2024] NZSC 44
BETWEEN

GRAHAM HERBERT TAYLOR
Applicant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE
Respondent

Court:

Glazebrook, Kós and Miller JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
A B Goosen for Respondent

Judgment:

30 April 2024

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is dismissed.

B        The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. Mr Taylor seeks leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal[1] declining his application for an extension of time to appeal a judgment of the High Court.[2]

    [1]Taylor v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2023] NZCA 515, (2023) 31 NZTC ¶26-014 (French and Wylie JJ) [CA judgment].

  2. The District Court had delivered a default judgment for unpaid tax and interest and penalties.[3]  Mr Taylor says that he was not served with the proceeding.  An application to have the judgment set aside on that ground was declined in the District Court, and the High Court declined an extension of time for a late appeal on the ground that the appeal had no merit.[4] 

    [3]Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Taylor DC Auckland CIV-2016-004-2079, 24 February 2022 (Judge Harrison).

    [4]HC judgment, above n 2, at [17].

  3. Mr Taylor’s appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court was five working days out of time.[5]  The Court of Appeal observed that the delay was short and had occasioned no prejudice to the respondent.  However, the Court declined the extension for the reason that the appeal against the District Court’s default judgment was “clearly hopeless”.[6]  Under s 109 of the Tax Administration Act 1994 a tax assessment may be challenged only in proceedings under that Act.[7]  Mr Taylor did not follow that procedure.  As a result, he could not dispute the assessments in the District Court debt recovery proceeding that the Commissioner then took against him.

    [5]CA judgment, above n 1, at [5].

    [6]At [6] citing Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801 at [39(c)].

    [7]Save for limited circumstances where judicial review proceedings may be available: Tannadyce Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 158, [2012] 2 NZLR 153 at [58]–[61] per Blanchard, Tipping and Gault JJ.

  4. Nothing raised by Mr Taylor suggests the Court of Appeal was wrong on this point of law.  It follows that there was no miscarriage of justice (as that term is used in a civil context).[8]  Nor is there any question of general or public importance.[9] 

    [8]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 74(2)(b); and Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd (in liq) [2006] NZSC 60, (2006) 18 PRNZ 369 at [5].

    [9]Section 74(2)(a).

  5. The applicant also filed these proceedings out of time.  In these circumstances, there is no point in granting an extension of time.[10]

    [10]Almond v Read, above n 6, at [39(c)].

  6. The application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is dismissed.  The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

Solicitors:
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Taylor v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2024] NZSC 44
Case
[2024] NZSC 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Taylor v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Mr Taylor sought leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal which declined his application for an extension of time to appeal a judgment of the High Court. The High Court had earlier dismissed Mr Taylor's appeal against a default judgment for unpaid tax and interest and penalties. Mr Taylor contended that he was not served with the proceedings, a claim that was rejected by the District Court and subsequently the High Court. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was five working days out of time, and the Court of Appeal declined the extension on the basis that the appeal against the District Court's default judgment was "clearly hopeless". The court noted that Mr Taylor did not follow the prescribed procedure for challenging a tax assessment as provided under the Tax Administration Act 1994.

The Supreme Court considered whether there was any basis to grant leave to appeal. It was noted that nothing raised by Mr Taylor suggested the Court of Appeal was wrong on this point of law, and thus there was no miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the matter did not raise any question of general or public importance. The Supreme Court also noted that Mr Taylor's application for an extension of time was itself out of time, and therefore there was no point in granting an extension of time.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal and ordered Mr Taylor to pay the respondent costs of $2,500. This decision reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and procedures when challenging tax assessments. The court's ruling also underscores that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as a miscarriage of justice or a question of general or public importance.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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