Taylor v Attorney-General

Case [2023] NZHC 2718


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2017-485-802

[2023] NZHC 2718

BETWEEN

ARTHUR WILLIAM TAYLOR

Plaintiff

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Defendant

Counsel:

Plaintiff self-represented

S M Kinsler and D M A Wiseman for Defendant

Judgment:

28 September 2023


JUDGMENT (No 4) OF ISAC J

[Costs]


Introduction

[1]                  In this proceeding Mr Arthur Taylor brought wide ranging claims against the Department of Corrections in relation to his treatment as an inmate between June 2011 and March 2018. The claims were almost all advanced as breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and included allegations of inadequate standards of detention, failures to provide appropriate opportunities for rehabilitation, and an occasion where he was said to have been assaulted by prison staff and transferred to another prison unlawfully. Mr Taylor sought a host of declarations and public law damages totalling

$1.45 million.

[2]                  My substantive judgment of 30 November 2022 addressed Mr Taylor’s claims in six chapters, following the way in which the parties had approached the case at

TAYLOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2023] NZHC 2718 [28 September 2023]

trial.1 Overall, Mr Taylor succeeded wholly or in part on some of his claims but failed entirely in respect of others.

[3]                  The Attorney-General now seeks costs against Mr Taylor. It is submitted that Mr Taylor enjoyed very limited success in the context of his claim. Ultimately, it is said, the judgment represented a substantially worse outcome for Mr Taylor compared to a Calderbank offer made to him by the defendant in a letter of 18 February 2022. Despite the offer, Mr Taylor elected to persevere with his claims in a lengthy contested civil trial, resulting in significant unnecessary costs to the defendant. The Attorney- General submits that on a realistic appraisal it was the substantially successful party, and seeks costs totalling $204,178.16. That figure represents scale costs on a 2B basis, with uplifts in relation to certain steps:2

(a)$12,625.42, representing 2B costs for Chapters One, Two, Four and Six up until 18 February 2022 when the Calderbank offer was made;

(b)$76,699.38, representing 2B costs with a 50 per cent uplift for Chapters One, Two, Four and Six for the period after the Calderbank offer; and

(c)$114,853.36, representing 2B costs with a 50 percent uplift across the duration of the litigation for Chapter Five.3

[4]The Crown also seeks to recover disbursements of $54,078.85.

[5]                  Mr Taylor opposes the costs application, saying that the sums sought are excessive, unjustified, and designed to have a chilling effect on prospective plaintiffs. He says that any costs award should reflect both the considerable public interest in the proceeding, and the various issues that he was successful on. Mr Taylor denies acting


1      Taylor v Attorney-General (No 3) [2022] NZHC 3170 (re-issued on 5 December 2022).

2      No claim is made for costs in respect of Chapter Three, in which Mr Taylor successfully challenged the ban of the Truth newspaper in Auckland prison in 2011 as an unjustified…

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Taylor v Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 2718
Case
[2023] NZHC 2718
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

Arthur William Taylor brought claims against the Attorney-General for alleged breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, related to his treatment as an inmate between 2011 and 2018. Taylor sought a variety of declarations and damages totaling $1.45 million. The court found Taylor had succeeded wholly or in part on some claims but failed entirely in others. The Attorney-General sought costs against Taylor, arguing that Taylor had limited success and that his persistence in pursuing claims led to unnecessary costs. Taylor opposed the costs application, asserting that his claims had a significant public interest and that he was successful on various issues. The court found that awarding costs to the Attorney-General would not be in the interests of justice, considering Taylor's success in establishing breaches of fundamental human rights and the circumstances of his self-representation.

The court considered the principles governing costs in litigation, including the discretionary nature of costs awards, the general rule that costs follow the event, and the possibility of increased or indemnity costs in exceptional circumstances. The court also noted the importance of a realistic appraisal of the overall success of each party in determining costs. The Attorney-General argued for a costs award based on a holistic appraisal of the litigation, emphasizing the defendant's success in opposing most of Taylor's claims. However, the court held that Taylor's partial success, particularly in establishing breaches of fundamental human rights, warranted a different approach. The court also highlighted that Taylor's self-representation, due to his former lawyer's failure to act, should not disadvantage him in the costs determination. The court concluded that awarding costs to the Attorney-General could deter individuals from bringing claims for breaches of the Bill of Rights, undermining its protections.

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Background

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