Tanya Felicity Dunstan v New Zealand Police - [2023] NZSC 58

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

SC 29/2023
[2023] NZSC 58

BETWEEN	TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN Applicant
AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Court:	O’Regan, Ellen France and Kós JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person S K Shaw and M L Clarke-Parker for Respondent
Judgment:	17 May 2023

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B         The application for recusal is dismissed.
C        The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

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REASONS

The applicant has applied for leave to appeal to this Court against a decision of the District Court dismissing her claim against the respondent for malicious prosecution.[1] After she filed the application, the Registrar advised her that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider and determine a direct appeal from the District Court. The application for leave to appeal was therefore not accepted for filing. The applicant sought review of this decision and the Registry therefore accepted her application and referred it to a panel of Judges for resolution.
[1]Tanya Felicity Dunstan v New Zealand Police [2023] NZDC 5173.
This Court’s jurisdiction is governed by the Senior Courts Act 2016. Section 70 of that Act provides as follows:
70 Appeals against decisions of other courts in civil proceedings
The Supreme Court may hear and determine an appeal against a decision made in a civil proceeding in a New Zealand court other than the Court of Appeal or the High Court to the extent only that an enactment other than this Act provides for the bringing of an appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court.
In the present case there is no enactment other than the Senior Courts Act 2016 that provides for the bringing of an appeal against a decision of the District Court to the Supreme Court. So this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal and, consequentially, does not have jurisdiction to grant leave for such an appeal.
The application for leave to appeal is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The applicant also filed an application that Glazebrook, Williams and Kós JJ recuse themselves from any further cases involving her. The application says that she believes that there is an appearance of bias because six applications for leave to appeal to this Court have been dismissed by panels comprised of those three Judges in 2023.
The fact that Judges have ruled against a litigant in previous cases is not an indication of bias or an indication of an appearance of bias.[2] So, there is no basis on which the Judges could or should recuse themselves. The applicant seeks an open court hearing to deal with the recusal application. We are satisfied that no such hearing is required.
[2]Creser v Creser [2015] NZSC 116 at [6]; N v M [2015] NZSC 185 at [4]–[5]; and Prasad v Indiana Publications (NZ) Ltd [2018] NZSC 48 at [4], n 4.
The application for recusal is therefore dismissed.
The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Wellington for Respondent

Details

AGLC: Tanya Felicity Dunstan v New Zealand Police [2023] NZSC 58
Case: [2023] NZSC 58
Decision Date: 17 May 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Tanya Felicity Dunstan v New Zealand Police, the Supreme Court of New Zealand was asked to consider an appeal against a decision of the District Court. The applicant sought to appeal a ruling which had dismissed her case. The Court was required to determine whether it had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as well as whether there was a basis for the recusal of three judges who had previously dismissed her applications. The Court found that there was no jurisdictional basis for the appeal to be heard, as no legislation allowed for an appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court in this instance. The Court also found no basis for the judges to recuse themselves from the matter, as previous rulings against the applicant did not indicate bias or the appearance of bias.

The Court’s reasoning was grounded in the statutory framework governing appeals and the principles of judicial independence. The Court relied on previous cases that established that past rulings by judges do not suggest bias or the appearance of bias, unless there are specific circumstances indicating otherwise. The Court further found that an open hearing on the recusal application was unnecessary, as the application did not meet the threshold for such a hearing. The Court dismissed both the application for leave to appeal and the recusal application. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of $2,500.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

This Court’s jurisdiction is governed by the Senior Courts Act 2016. Section 70 of that Act provides as follows:70 Appeals against decisions of other courts in civil proceedingsThe Supreme Court may hear and determine an appeal against a decision made in a civil proceeding in a New Zealand court other than the Court of Appeal or the High Court to the extent only that an enactment other than this Act provides for the bringing of an appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court. In the present case there is no enactment other than the Senior Courts Act 2016 that provides for the bringing of an appeal against a decision of the District Court to the Supreme Court. So this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal and, consequentially, does not have jurisdiction to grant leave for such an appeal. The application for leave to appeal is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The applicant also filed an application that Glazebrook, Williams and Kós JJ recuse themselves from any further cases involving her. The application says that she believes that there is an appearance of bias because six applications for leave to appeal to this Court have been dismissed by panels comprised of those three Judges in 2023. The fact that Judges have ruled against a litigant in previous cases is not an indication of bias or an indication of an appearance of bias.[2] So, there is no basis on which the Judges could or should recuse themselves. The applicant seeks an open court hearing to deal with the recusal application. We are satisfied that no such hearing is required.[2]Creser v Creser [2015] NZSC 116 at [6]; N v M [2015] NZSC 185 at [4]–[5]; and Prasad v Indiana Publications (NZ) Ltd [2018] NZSC 48 at [4], n 4. The application for recusal is therefore dismissed. The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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