Tanya Felicity Dunstan v Attorney-General

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 37/2022
 [2023] NZSC 39
BETWEEN

TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN
Applicant

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Respondent

Court:

Glazebrook and O’Regan JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
H T N Fong and N D White for Respondent

Judgment:

21 April 2023

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for recall of this Court’s judgment of 21 September 2022 (Dunstan v Attorney-General [2022] NZSC 111) is dismissed.

BThe applicant must pay the respondent costs of $1,500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. Ms Dunstan applies for recall of this Court’s decision refusing her application for leave to appeal in Dunstan v Attorney-General (the leave decision).[1]  The leave decision concerned an application by Ms Dunstan to challenge directions given by Goddard J in the Court of Appeal.

Background

[1]Dunstan v Attorney-General [2022] NZSC 111 (Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ) [Leave decision].

  1. Ms Dunstan had filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal,[2] concerning a High Court decision of Jagose J striking out an application for judicial review.  The High Court judgment related to a District Court direction that Ms Dunstan’s application to begin a private prosecution be rejected.[3]  Ms Dunstan then applied for security for costs to be dispensed with, leading to Goddard J making a direction that the respondents were not required to participate in the appeal (the participation direction).[4]

    [2]Ms Dunstan’s appeal has since been allowed: Dunstan v Auckland District Court [2022] NZCA 477.

    [4]Leave decision, above n 1, at [2].

  2. Additionally, Ms Dunstan had sought to appeal a High Court decision of Powell J to the Court of Appeal.[5]  Related to this, she requested a transcript of the hearing of the Powell J decision, which Goddard J refused (the transcript refusal).[6]

    [6]Dunstan v Neill CA248/2021, 17 June 2021 (Minute No 4) (Goddard J).

  3. Ms Dunstan applied for leave to appeal to this Court against both the transcript refusal and the participation direction.  On the participation direction, this Court found that the criteria for leave were not met.  The appeal related only to the particular circumstances of Ms Dunstan’s case and there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice.[7]  On the transcript refusal, this Court found that it did not have jurisdiction, as this direction was part of a matter where leave to appeal had been declined by the Court of Appeal.[8]

Applicable law

[7]Leave decision, above n 1, at [14].

[8]At [15].

  1. The general rule is that a judgment, once delivered, must stand for better or worse, subject to appeal.[9]  A decision to recall a judgment will only be made in exceptional circumstances.[10]  A recall application cannot be used to relitigate the reasons provided in the leave judgment.[11]  Nor can it be a means of collateral attack on a decision.[12]  Recall will be appropriate where some procedural or substantive error has occurred that would result in a miscarriage…

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Details
Case
[2023] NZSC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tanya Felicity Dunstan v Attorney-General, the applicant, Ms. Dunstan, sought recall of the Supreme Court of New Zealand's decision to deny her leave to appeal. The case was heard by Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ, with the applicant representing herself and the Attorney-General represented by H T N Fong and N D White. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for recall and ordered the applicant to pay costs of $1,500 to the Attorney-General.

Ms. Dunstan applied for recall of the Supreme Court's decision in Dunstan v Attorney-General, which denied her leave to appeal against two decisions of Goddard J in the Court of Appeal. The first was a direction that respondents were not required to participate in the appeal (the participation direction), and the second was a refusal to provide a transcript of the hearing of a High Court decision (the transcript refusal). The Supreme Court dismissed the application for recall, finding that none of the grounds provided by Ms. Dunstan justified recall. The Court found that the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal allowing Ms. Dunstan's appeal was not relevant to the grounds on which the Supreme Court had declined leave. The Court also found that the new evidence provided by Ms. Dunstan had no relevance to the matters addressed in the leave judgment. The Court concluded that there were no proper grounds for recalling the leave judgment.

The legal issues the Court was required to decide were whether the applicant had identified any procedural or substantive errors that would result in a miscarriage of justice and whether the recall application could be used to relitigate the reasons provided in the leave judgment or as a means of collateral attack on a decision. The Court found that the applicant had not identified any such errors and that the recall application could not be used for those purposes. The Court applied the general rule that a judgment, once delivered, must stand for better or worse, subject to appeal, and that a decision to recall a judgment will only be made in exceptional circumstances. The Court also found that the recall application could not be used to relitigate the reasons provided in the leave judgment or as a means of collateral attack on a decision.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for recall and ordered the applicant to pay costs of $1,500 to the Attorney-General. The Court found that none of the grounds provided by Ms. Dunstan justified recall and that there were no proper grounds for recalling the leave judgment. The Court applied the general rule that a judgment, once delivered, must stand for better or worse, subject to appeal, and that a decision to recall a judgment will only be made in exceptional circumstances. The Court also found that the recall application could not be used to relitigate the reasons provided in the leave judgment or as a means of collateral attack on a decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established