| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 121/2022 [2023] NZSC 16 |
| BETWEEN | MICHAEL RAWIRI TAIA |
| AND | AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 5 AND SOUTHLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | T L Hovell for Applicant |
Judgment: | 9 March 2023 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicant must pay the respondents costs of $2,000.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Mr Taia, a solicitor, was found guilty of six charges of misconduct, and two of unsatisfactory conduct, by the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal in 2017, 2020 and 2022 respectively.[1] Penalties imposed included supervision, censure, suspension, fines and, finally, an order that he be struck off.
[1]Auckland Standards Committee 5 v Taia [2017] NZLCDT 29; Auckland Standards Committee 5 v Taia [2020] NZLCDT 39; and Auckland Standards Committee 5 v Taia [2022] NZLCDT 17.
In its 2022 decision, the Tribunal observed:[2]
Our current findings of misconduct on two charges arise from a number of grave shortcomings. Our finding of unsatisfactory conduct contributes to our concerns that Mr Taia has a lax approach, lacks candour, and treats the proper interests of clients and regulatory bodies with disdain. These concerns relate to fundamental duties of a member of the legal profession. They would cause concern for members of the public as to character and performance of a practitioner who exhibited such conduct.
Mr Taia’s response to these charges (and to the underlying complaints and issues) has been determinedly one of avoidance. He has not engaged with these disciplinary processes in any usefully substantive manner. His energies seem to have been reserved for self-protective purposes. He has not prioritised the needs of clients, let alone regulatory bodies, in a manner that gives us any confidence in his future professional dealings.
…
Threads that emerged in earlier matters have woven into a fabric that reveals his practise as unreliable, insufficiently concerned about his clients, unresponsive and unhelpful. In this case, he left the N’s in the lurch and failed to resolve the matter for them. Attempts to scaffold his practise through supervision failed because of his own lack of candour. In short, we find he lacks the essential attributes of honesty, trustworthiness and integrity. We have formed the unanimous view that Mr Taia’s conduct demonstrates he is not a fit and proper person to practise as a lawyer.
[2]Auckland Standards Committee 5 v Taia [2022] NZLCDT 17 at [27], [28] and [34].
In July 2022 a notice of appeal was filed in the High Court against all three decisions. At a case management conference on 23 August 2022 Campbell J declined adjournment and directed filing of applications to appeal the 2017 and 2020 decisions out of time and any application for waiver of security for costs by 20 September 2022. Those directions were not complied with.
In October 2022 Powell J extended time for compliance with the first direction (to 25 October…
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- Case
- [2023] NZSC 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In this case, the Supreme Court of New Zealand considered the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an application for leave for a leapfrog appeal in light of the fact that the High Court proceedings had been struck out. The court held that even if there were jurisdiction for this Court to entertain an application for leave for a leapfrog appeal, leave could not be granted unless the proposed appeals satisfied the leave criteria specified in s 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 and met the exceptional circumstances test set out in s 75(1) of the Act. The court found that neither of the proposed appeals was capable of meeting the s 75 requirement, making it unnecessary to consider whether either of the proposed costs appeals was capable of meeting the former, s 74 requirement. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal direct to this Court was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents costs of $2,000, being the sum sought.
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