Stringer v Craig

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA290/2020
[2020] NZCA 294

BETWEEN	JOHN CHARLES STRINGER Appellant
AND	COLIN GRAEME CRAIG First Respondent HELEN RUTH CRAIG Second Respondent ANGELA MARIA STORR Third Respondent KEVIN ERIC STITT Fourth Respondent STEPHEN DYLAN TAYLOR Fifth Respondent

Court:	French and Collins JJ
Counsel:	Appellant in person Respondents in person
Judgment: (On the papers)	16 July 2020 at 9 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for an extension of time to appeal under r 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 is granted.
BThere is no order for costs.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by French J)

Introduction

Mr Stringer wishes to appeal a decision of Palmer J in the High Court which dismissed his defamation claim against the respondents.[1]
[1]Stringer v Craig [2020] NZHC 644.
The time for filing the appeal expired on 6 May 2020. However, it was not filed until 22 May 2020. The respondents did not consent to the notice being filed out of time and Mr Stringer then filed an application for an extension of time under r 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
The application for an extension of time is opposed.

Our view

We are satisfied that in the interests of justice the application should be granted. The delay of 12 working days is short. Contrary to submissions made by the respondents, we consider there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, namely confusion and difficulties regarding filing due to the COVID-19 lockdown. The delay of 12 working days has not caused the respondents any prejudice. The prejudice they identify in submissions of having to defend the appeal and accrue costs is not prejudice caused by the delay.
As regards the merits of the proposed appeal, we note that Palmer J considered the defamation claim was misconceived.[2] However, while the appeal may appear weak, we are not in a position to say with the necessary degree of certainty that it is in the “hopeless” category so as to warrant declining an extension of time.[3]
[2]At [3].
[3]Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801 at [39].
The application for an extension of time is accordingly granted.
In the event the application was successful, Mr Stringer sought costs for the payment of the filing fee and expenses. He says the respondents were given an opportunity to consent to the application by Brown J but remained unreasonably obdurate. We acknowledge the point, but Mr Stringer is self-represented and not entitled to an award of costs.

Outcome

The application for an extension of time to appeal under r 29A is granted.
We make no order for costs.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Charles Stringer appealed against a decision of the High Court dismissing his defamation claim against several respondents. The appeal was not filed within the specified time frame, and the respondents opposed the application for an extension of time. The Court of Appeal had to determine whether to grant the extension of time and if costs should be awarded to the appellant for the filing fee and expenses. The Court found that the delay was due to confusion and difficulties caused by the COVID-19 lockdown and that the delay did not prejudice the respondents. Although the appeal may appear weak, the Court could not say with certainty that it was hopeless. The Court granted the application for an extension of time but did not award costs to the appellant as he was self-represented.

The Court of Appeal considered the factors relevant to granting an extension of time, including the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and whether the respondents were prejudiced. The Court was satisfied that the delay of 12 working days was short and that there was a reasonable explanation for the delay. The Court also found that the respondents were not prejudiced by the delay. The Court noted that while the appeal may appear weak, it could not say with certainty that it was hopeless, and therefore, the application for an extension of time should be granted. The Court did not award costs to the appellant as he was self-represented, and such costs are not generally recoverable.

The outcome of the appeal was that the application for an extension of time to appeal was granted, and no order was made for costs. The appellant was granted leave to appeal the High Court decision, but the appeal remains weak, and the Court did not make any findings on the merits of the appeal. The Court's decision highlights the importance of considering the factors relevant to granting an extension of time, including the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and whether the respondents were prejudiced. It also highlights the importance of considering whether the appeal is in the "hopeless" category, which may warrant declining an extension of time.

No further orders were made by the Court, and the appeal will proceed on the extended time frame. The Court's decision confirms that while the delay was due to the COVID-19 lockdown, it was still necessary for the appellant to demonstrate a reasonable explanation for the delay. The Court's decision also confirms that the respondents were not prejudiced by the delay and that the appellant was not entitled to an award of costs as he was self-represented. The outcome of the appeal is that the appellant has been granted leave to appeal the High Court decision, but the appeal remains weak, and the Court did not make any findings on the merits of the appeal.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established