IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2014-485-11493 [2015] NZHC 2482
BETWEEN STRATHBOSS KIWIFRUIT LIMITED
First Plaintiff
SEEKA KIWIFRUIT INDUSTRIES LIMITED
Second Plaintiff
AND
ATTORNEY-GENERAL Defendant
On papers Judgment:
9 October 2015
COSTS JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J
(Issues as to standing, litigation funding arrangements
and security for costs)
[1] I delivered an interlocutory judgment in these proceedings on 8 July 2015, in which I:
·granted the plaintiffs leave to bring the proceedings as a representative action on a funded basis;
· approved the terms of the funding arrangements;
· set a deadline for additional claimants to opt in to the proceedings;
· set the terms for security for costs for the initial stages of the proceedings;
and
· directed further particulars to be provided of the individual claimants’
circumstances.
STRATHBOSS KIWIFRUIT LTD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2015] NZHC 2482 [9 October 2015]
[2] My judgment concluded with the following observation as to costs:1
[95] My provisional view is that I should settle the quantum of costs on these applications, and make them costs in the cause, so that they are payable to the party that is successful in the substantive action. I invite counsel to confer on that issue, and to file memoranda if they would urge a different course, and in any event as to quantum.
[3] Since then, the parties have agreed the quantum of costs at $37,044, together with disbursements of $6,792.47. However, the parties take opposing views as to whether this ought to be payable to the plaintiffs now or, as I provisionally suggested, become the quantification of costs and disbursements for the preliminary stages to which the successful party in the litigation would subsequently become entitled.
[4] The starting position is r 14.8 of the High Court Rules, which provides:
14.8 Costs on interlocutory applications
(1) Costs on an opposed interlocutory application, unless there are special reasons to the contrary,—
(a) must be fixed in accordance with these rules when the application is determined; and
(b) become payable when they are fixed.
(2) Despite subclause (1), the court may reverse, discharge, or vary an order for costs on an interlocutory application if satisfied subsequently that the original order should not have been made.
(3) This rule does not apply to an application for summary judgment.
[5] The provisional view I expressed in my July judgment was on the basis that special reasons might exist, because of the nature of the applications brought by the plaintiffs, that would justify deviating from the usual rule. The plaintiffs have submitted that there are no sufficiently special reasons, so their entitlement to the agreed quantum of costs should apply forthwith.
[6] The plaintiffs’ memorandum cited two decisions where an exception to the
1 Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1596.
standard position provided for in r 14.8 had applied.2 Both decisions related to costs on applications for an interim injunction where the application had been abandoned, but the substantive proceedings remained unresolved. That is a context in…
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- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2482
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue for the court was whether there were special reasons to deviate from the usual rule that costs on interlocutory applications become payable when fixed. The court considered whether the nature of the applications, the involvement of litigation funders, and the extensive opposition warranted deferring the costs' entitlement. The plaintiffs argued that they had succeeded on their applications and that the consistency of costs consequences should be maintained. The defendant contended that both parties achieved some measure of success and that the costs should be deferred until the substantive proceedings are resolved.
The court found that the unusual nature of the applications, which involved significant preliminary steps due to the representative action and funding arrangements, warranted special reasons for deferring the costs' entitlement. The court emphasised the importance of defendants being able to test the terms of funded class actions through reasoned challenges. The court also noted that while there was a connection between the preliminary steps and the substantive outcome, this did not justify a general rule of deferring costs. Consequently, the court ordered that the costs of the interlocutory applications be made costs in the cause, payable by the party that ultimately prevails in the substantive litigation.
The court made no costs order on this determination, leaving the agreed quantum of costs and disbursements to be settled in accordance with the substantive outcome of the litigation.
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