| NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 96/2021 [2022] NZSC 32 |
| BETWEEN | ISAAC KEREHOMA STEVENS |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| Court: | William Young, Glazebrook and O’Regan JJ |
Counsel: | E A Hall for Applicant |
Judgment: | 30 March 2022 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal direct to this Court is declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Following a judge-alone trial, the applicant was found guilty by Judge Edwards of 13 charges involving violence and sexual offending against his then partner.[1] His appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed in the High Court by Cooke J.[2] The Court of Appeal dismissed his later application for leave to bring a second appeal against conviction and sentence.[3] He now seeks leave to appeal to this Court, which we take to be by way of an appeal against the High Court judgment upholding his conviction.
[1]R v Stevens [2019] NZDC 20484 [DC judgment].
[2]Stevens v R [2020] NZHC 3290 [HC judgment].
[3]Stevens v Police [2021] NZCA 340 (Goddard, Venning and Peters JJ) [CA judgment].
If leave is granted, the basis of the appeal would be contentions (to some extent overlapping) that:
(a)the reasons given by Judge Edwards were not adequate; and
(b)in a series of specific respects, the trial was unfair.
Second appeals against conviction are generally provided for by s 237 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Section 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 applies to a proposed direct appeal to this Court from the decision of the first appeal court (the High Court). This means that in addition to satisfying the usual leave criteria,[4] the applicant must also satisfy this Court that there are exceptional circumstances warranting this Court taking the appeal directly.[5] This Court has been slow to allow leave to appeal to it direct where an application for leave to appeal has already been considered and dismissed by the Court of Appeal.[6]
[4]Senior Courts Act 2016, ss 74 and 75(a).
[5]Section 75(b).
[6]See Clarke v R [2005] NZSC 60 at [3].
The most notable feature of these proceedings is that the reasons given by the trial Judge for finding the applicant guilty do not provide, on a standalone basis, an analysis of the case which would enable a reader to understand in any detail the allegations against the applicant. There is no general narrative of events and no charge by charge breakdown of the competing positions of the complainant and applicant. Instead, the reasons proceeded generally on the basis that if the narrative of the complainant were accepted and that of the applicant rejected in relation to the critical elements in the case, convictions would be appropriate,[7] save in relation to three charges, alleging sexual violation, threatening to kill and injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.[8] The trial Judge:
(a)Broadly accepted the…
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- Stevens v The the Queen [2022] NZSC 32
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- [2022] NZSC 32
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court found that the trial judge's reasons, while not providing a detailed narrative or charge-by-charge breakdown, adequately explained the basis for rejecting the applicant's evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence. The Court noted that the trial judge broadly accepted the complainant's evidence and rejected the applicant's evidence for reasons given at reasonable length. The Court held that the trial judge's findings were justified and that there was no miscarriage of justice. Regarding the specific complaints about the trial, the Court found that while it might have been better for the trial judge to adjourn the proceedings, the decision not to adjourn was reasonably open to her given the context. The Court also found that the trial judge's conclusion that there was no evidential foundation for a defence of consent in relation to the sexual violation charge was justified. The Court did not find the other issues raised to provide a basis for allowing a leapfrog appeal.
The application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court was declined. The Court found that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the appeal and that the other issues raised did not justify allowing a leapfrog appeal.
Orders
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