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Standfast v The Queen

Standfast v The Queen

Case [2019] NZCA 666 19 December 2019

Jurisdiction

Miscarriage of Justice

Real Risk of Prejudice

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA536/2019
[2019] NZCA 666

BETWEEN	JUST STANDFAST Appellant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	11 November 2019
Court:	Courtney, Brewer and Gendall JJ
Counsel:	M Zintl for Appellant M G McClenaghan for Respondent RKP Stewart for NZME Publishing Limited and Stuff Limited
Judgment:	19 December 2019 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to bring a second appeal is granted.
BThe application to adduce further evidence is declined.
CThe appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Gendall J)

Introduction

Just Standfast is a member of the Gloriavale Christian Community (Gloriavale). In November 2018 he pleaded guilty to one charge of sexual conduct with a child under 12 years.[1] On sentencing Mr Standfast, Judge Neave suppressed his identity pending disposition of sexual charges against another member of Gloriavale, AB.[2] After AB’s trial was aborted, Mr Standfast applied for an order continuing suppression of his name pending any retrial. Judge Kellar refused that application.[3]
[1]Crimes Act 1961, s 132(3).
[2]R v Standfast [2019] NZDC 4648 [Sentencing notes] at [46].
[3]Christian v R [2019] NZDC 14897 [Suppression notes] at [49(c)].
Mr Standfast appealed unsuccessfully.[4] He applies for leave to bring a second appeal on the ground that Doogue J erred in concluding that publication of his name and his connection to Gloriavale would not create a real risk of prejudice to AB’ fair trial rights.[5]
[4]Standfast v R [2019] NZHC 2538 [High Court judgment] at [44].
[5]Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 289(2)(b).
Leave for a second appeal must not be given unless this Court is satisfied that:[6]
(a)the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance; or
(b)a miscarriage of justice may have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard.
[6]Section 289(2).
Mr Standfast’s application rests on the risk of a miscarriage of justice.
For leave to be granted for a second appeal there must be an argument reasonably available that the Court below is in error, although not every error will give rise to a miscarriage of justice.[7] In Robertson v Police this Court declined to identify any guiding principles for the application of the miscarriage of justice test in the context of name suppression.[8] The Court considered the assessment was likely to be fact specific and may, in any event, be best left to judges in individual cases.[9] More recently, in Leef v Police, this Court summarised its assessment in Robertson (in relation to the granting of leave) as focused on “the identification of errors that might have genuinely impacted the outcome”.[10]
[7]McAllister v R [2014] NZCA 175, [2014] 2 NZLR 764 at [37]–[38].
[8]Robertson v Police [2015] NZCA 7.
[9]At [57].
[10]Leef v Police [2019] NZCA 467 at [17].
For the reasons that follow, we are satisfied that errors made in the lower Court justify the grant of leave.

Application to adduce fresh evidence

In the High Court…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Standfast v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Standfast v The Queen [2019] NZCA 666
Case: [2019] NZCA 666
Decision Date: 19 December 2019 at 10 am

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Standfast v The Queen involves Just Standfast, a member of the Gloriavale Christian Community, who sought to appeal a decision that suppressed his identity pending the disposition of sexual charges against another member of Gloriavale, AB. The appeal concerns the risk of prejudice to AB's fair trial rights if Standfast's identity and connection to Gloriavale were published. Standfast's application for leave to bring a second appeal was granted, but the application to adduce further evidence was declined. The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The primary legal issue the Court had to decide was whether there existed a real risk of prejudice to AB’s fair trial rights if Standfast’s name and his connection to Gloriavale were published. The Court had to balance this against the principle of open justice. The Court considered whether the District Court Judge had erred in concluding that publication of Standfast’s name and his connection to Gloriavale would not create a real risk of prejudice to AB's fair trial rights.

The Court reasoned that while the District Court Judge had erred in assessing the risk of prejudice, the outcome of the appeal was correct. The Court noted that although there was substantial prejudicial material about Gloriavale already in the public domain, the potential prejudice from further publication could be adequately addressed by directions from the trial judge. The Court concluded that the effect of any additional prejudice would not be such that it could not be managed by the trial judge’s directions.

In conclusion, the application for leave to bring a second appeal was granted, the application to adduce further evidence was declined, and the appeal was dismissed. The Court found that, despite errors in the lower Court's assessment, the outcome was correct and that the risk of prejudice to AB's fair trial rights could be adequately managed by the trial judge’s directions.

Orders