IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2018-485-341
[2021] NZHC 1466
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016; Part 30 of the High Court Rules; the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908; and the Common Law IN THE MATTER
of an application for judicial review and/or declaratory judgments
BETWEEN
RORE PAT STAFFORD
Applicant
AND
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
First Respondent
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Second Respondent
FIRE AND EMERGENCY NEW ZEALAND
Third Respondent (discontinued)
KĀINGA ORA-HOMES AND COMMUNITIES
Fourth Respondent
NELSON MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD
Fifth Respondent
HOUSING NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Sixth RespondentRADIO NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Seventh Respondent (discontinued)
NELSON MARLBOROUGH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Eighth Respondent
STAFFORD v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2021] NZHC 1466 [21 June 2021]
TRANSPOWER NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Ninth Respondent (discontinued)
Hearing: 10-13 August 2020 Counsel:
K S Feint QC, M Smith and H Irwin-Easthope for Applicant
J R Gough, S M Kinsler and W I Gucake for First Respondent D L Laurenson QC and R L Roff for Second Respondent
V E Casey QC, R Brown and G Dawson for Fourth and Sixth Respondents
Judgment:
21 June 2021
JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J (FINAL ORDERS)
[1] In my judgment dated 2 March 2021 ([2021] NZHC 335) I asked the parties for further submissions on three matters. Memoranda were subsequently filed. There was little agreement amongst the parties on those matters, and so a further judgment is now required.
[2] To avoid the need to set out the complex background again, however, this judgment should be read in conjunction with the earlier one.
[3]The first two things about which I sought further input were:
(a)costs (as to which I had indicated a preliminary view that they should lie where they fall); and
(b)whether the Court should make declarations reflecting the observations in [185](d) and (e) of the judgment, namely that:
(d)Ministers were able to, and should have, advised Crown entities that they were expected to notify Mr Stafford in a timely way of any proposed disposals within the Spain award area; but in any event
(e)the Crown entities themselves, having been advised of the nature and history of Mr Stafford’s claim, are obliged—in Kāinga Ora’s case by dint of its own statute, but otherwise as a matter of general good faith arising in the particular and unusual circumstances of this case—to notify Mr Stafford in a timely way of any proposed land disposals within the Spain award area.
[4]I also asked for Mr Stafford’s further comment on:
(a)Why the revised Land Protection Mechanism (LPM) should include long-term (20 years or more) leases;
(b)Who should be responsible for making any further urgent application to the Court (Mr Stafford or by the Attorney-General);
(c)whether the costs of any such application should be reserved or whether Mr Stafford’s should be paid by the Crown on an indemnity basis; and
(d)whether the revised LPM should be expressly made subject to any relevant statutory requirements, powers or functions.
[5] I begin by setting out…
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- Case
- [2021] NZHC 1466
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first considered whether it should issue declaratory relief to reflect its findings that Ministers should have advised Crown entities to notify Stafford of any proposed disposals and that the Crown entities themselves should do so as a matter of good faith. The court concluded that while these findings were expressions of principle, they were not suitable for declaratory relief as they did not relate to the vindication of legal rights. Instead, the court believed the relationship between the Crown and Stafford was more complex than a simple declaration could capture.
Regarding costs, the court ruled that costs should lie where they fell between all parties. Although Stafford did not succeed on his primary claim, the court found that the proceeding raised an issue of considerable public importance, which justified a refusal or reduction in costs against the Crown. The court also noted that the delays in decision-making were not in the Crown's favor in terms of costs.
Lastly, the court examined the revised LPM. The court found that including long-term leases within the LPM might not impede the ultimate return of the land to Stafford and that the Crown did not need to seek court permission to sell land within the award area. However, the court noted that Stafford should be the applicant for any interim relief, and the Crown agreed to cover his filing fees and reserve the costs of any unsuccessful interim application until the conclusion of the substantive proceeding.
In summary, the court ruled that no specific declarations would be made, costs would lie where they fell, and the revised LPM was appropriate to protect Stafford's interests in the Spain award area.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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