St Peter's College v The Queen
[2016] NZHC 925
•6 May 2016
NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME(S), ADDRESS(ES), OCCUPATION(S) OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF ANY COMPLAINANT(S)/PERSON(S) UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS - AND INCLUDING THE COMPLAINANTS OVER 18 - WHO APPEARED AS A WITNESS [OR NAMED WITNESS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE] PROHIBITED BY S 204 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011
FURTHER INTERIM SUPPRESSION ORDERS PURSUANT TO S 205
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 AS DESCRIBED IN [44] OF THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT CONTINUE UNTIL 5.00 PM, 9 MAY 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY
CRI-2016-425-000006 [2016] NZHC 925
BETWEEN ST PETER'S COLLEGE
Appellant
AND
THE CROWN Respondent
Hearing: 3 May 2016 Appearances:
E L McWatt for Appellant
M-J Thomas for CrownJudgment:
6 May 2016
JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J
Introduction
[1] St Peter’s College is appealing the District Court’s decision declining an application for permanent name suppression of both the defendant and the school. The school’s boarding hostel was the employer of the defendant, Mr Wallace, who was convicted of supplying cannabis to persons under the age of 18 who were students at the school. Judge Farnan found that the undue hardship test was not met
under ss 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 to warrant suppression
ST PETER'S COLLEGE v THE CROWN [2016] NZHC 925 [6 May 2016]
orders as sought. Furthermore, even if that test had been satisfied, the principles of open reporting counted against the granting of name suppression.1
[2] On appeal, the school again seeks the following orders:
(a) suppression of the defendant’s name and occupation;
(b)suppression of the school’s name, the school’s hostel’s name “St Peter’s College Hostel Limited” and any information which could lead to the identification of St Peter’s College and its involvement in this matter;
(c) suppression of the name, address and any information leading to the identification of the 10 student victims involved in the defendant’s offending; and
(d)suppression of information outlining the nature of the offending as it relates to the 10 student victims involved.2
[3] In appealing the decision, the school raises the following grounds for appeal:
(a) the District Court should have accepted that suppression of the victims’ addresses, for identification purposes, extended to their place of residence during the school term, namely the St Peter’s College Hostel;
(b)the District Court gave insufficient regard to the interests of the victims and the undue hardship they would likely suffer if the school’s name was published;
(c) the District Court also gave insufficient regard to the interests of all other students attending the school, particularly boarding students,
1 New Zealand Police v Wallace [2016] NZDC 1728.
2 Which counsel clarified was no more than suppression of any detail of the offending which might identify the victims in some way, and which, in my view, is covered by the existing suppression orders in relation to victims.
and the undue hardship they would likely suffer in the event the
school’s name was published;
(d)the District Court gave insufficient regard to the victims and the undue hardship they would likely suffer in the event the defendant’s name and occupation was published; and
(e) the District Court gave insufficient regard to suspicion likely to be cast on all the school students, particularly boarding students, and the undue hardship those students would likely suffer in the event the defendant’s name and occupation is published.
The current suppression orders
[4] All 10 victims received permanent name suppression from the District Court. Seven victims automatically attracted permanent suppression pursuant to s 204 of the Act. Section 204(1) provides automatic name suppression of the name, address and occupation of a complainant who was under 18 years at the time the proceedings commenced. It was agreed that continuing name suppression for the remaining three victims (who were aged 18 at the time the proceedings commenced) was appropriate and this was granted by the Court. However, much wider suppression orders have continued in the interim, to allow the school to pursue this appeal.
The law applying to name suppression
[5] Sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act govern the Court’s
power to grant name suppression.
[6] In relation to suppression of the defendant’s name, s 200 states that a Court may make an order forbidding the publication of that name if it is likely to cause extreme hardship for the defendant,3 or cause undue hardship to the victim.4 The defendant has accepted that there will not be extreme hardship caused if his name
and occupation is published. The basis on which name suppression is sought for the
3 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 200(2)(a).
4 Section 200(2)(c).
defendant is because it could cause undue hardship to the school’s students, who
were the victims of the offence.
[7] In relation to suppression of the name of St Peter’s College and the name of the College Hostel, the provisions of s 202 are relied on. They include that a Court may order suppression of the name, address or occupation of any person connected with the proceedings,5 if the Court is satisfied that publication would likely cause undue hardship to the victim or connected person,6 or lead to the identification of another person whose name is suppressed.7
[8] While it might initially appear surprising that a school can avail itself of the name suppression provisions, I accept there is precedent for this. In the recent decision of R v Burrett,8 Nation J accepted that the term “person” as used in s 202(1) could include a school or company, as did Judge Cunningham in the District Court in Police v X,9 particularly taking into account the wide definition of “person” in s 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999.
[9] The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed the two step enquiry as to whether name suppression should be granted.10 The first step is to establish whether the relevant threshold test in ss 200 or 202 has been satisfied, that is, whether it is likely that publication would cause undue hardship to the relevant person or persons.
[10] Varying explanations of the meaning of the term “likely”, as used in these sections, have been advanced. In Wallis v New Zealand Police, Venning J discussed these definitions and concluded that a likely risk means a “real and appreciable” risk, and that encompassed both a risk that was more than a mere possibility and a risk
that was a real risk that could not be readily discounted.11
5 Section 202(1)(c).
6 Section 202(2)(a).
7 Section 202(2)(d).
8 R v Burrett [2016] NZHC 636.
9 Police v X [2013] DCR 497.
10 D v New Zealand Police [2015] NZCA 541 at [10].
[11] The definition of “undue hardship” for the purpose of the threshold test was discussed in Beacon Media Group Ltd v Waititi.12 Gilbert J adopted the Oxford English Dictionary definition of hardship being the quality of being “hard to bear; hardness; rigour; severity; painful difficulty”,13 and undue hardship involved hardship that was “excessive or greater than the circumstances warrant”.14
[12] In explaining when the threshold of undue hardship was met, he said:15
…The public interest in open justice and freedom of expression will only yield in the case of a defendant in criminal proceedings where it can be shown that the harm likely to be suffered as a result of publication is extreme and excessive. By contrast, victims, witnesses and others connected with the proceedings or the defendant need only show that they are likely to suffer undue hardship as a result of publication of their details in connection with the proceedings. “Undue hardship” is therefore something more than the hardship that would normally attend publicity surrounding criminal proceedings but less than “extreme” hardship. This is the balance Parliament has struck between the competing public interest in open justice and freedom of expression and the right of an individual to be protected from harm likely to result from publication.
[13] Therefore, the first step in deciding whether to grant name suppression as sought is to ask whether there is a real and appreciable risk that St Peter’s College students and the victims will suffer difficulty that is disproportionate compared with what is normally expected from the publicity surrounding criminal proceedings which may include “distress, embarrassment, and other adverse personal and
financial [effects].”16
[14] If that threshold is met, the second stage requires the court to balance other relevant considerations in the exercise of its discretion. The open justice principle must be considered at this stage, notwithstanding that the threshold has been crossed. As explained by the authors of Adams on Criminal Law:17
The second stage is a discretionary assessment of the competing interests of the appellant and the public, taking into account such matters as whether the
12 Beacon Media Group Limited v Waititi [2014] NZHC 281 at [17].
13 At [24].
14 At [26]
15 At [22].
16 D v New Zealand Police, above n 10, at [11].
17 Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at
[CPA200.01].
defendant has been convicted, the seriousness of the offending, the views of the victims and the public interest in knowing the character of the offender.
[15] Only if the Court finds that there will likely be undue hardship that outweighs the public interest in open justice, should name suppression be granted in respect of St Peter’s College and the defendant.
Test on appeal
[16] The appeal of the District Court’s decision on whether the threshold question has been satisfied should be dealt with in accordance with the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar.18 If my assessment of fact and opinion differs from that of the District Court decision, then I should not defer to the District Court’s decision. In that regard I have an application to receive further evidence on that issue. If I accept that further evidence should be
admitted, then I am determining whether the threshold test has been met on a broader range of evidence than that before the District Court.
[17] If I find that the threshold test is met, then the appeal is against the exercise of a discretion at the second step. In that regard, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of the discretion unless the appellant can show the Court failed to take into account some relevant matter, took into account some irrelevant matter or that the
Judge was plainly wrong.19 Again, though, if further evidence is admitted which is
relevant to the exercise of the discretion, it would be appropriate to consider the exercise of the discretion afresh.
Application to admit further evidence
[18] The appellant seeks leave to introduce new evidence, being 10 affidavits from a number of the victims’ parents, one from the school principal, one from the school’s hostel’s director of boarding and one from one of the victims. Four of the affidavits are simply updated versions of affidavits previously filed, including the affidavit of the school principal and the school’s director of boarding. The balance
of the affidavits, as the principal explains, were not able to be filed in time with the
18 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [16].
District Court for the 3 February 2016 hearing, largely due to time constraints because, it was “not until 25 January 2015, that [the school] first became aware name suppression for both Mr Wallace and the school was going to be revisited by the Court at the sentencing hearing on 3 February 2016”. Counsel was immediately instructed but the school was only able to get hold of a limited number of witnesses before its application and supporting affidavits were due for filing with the Court on
29 January 2015. She explains that the school simply did not have enough time to make contact with, and file evidence from, everyone who wished to voice their concerns.
Discussion
[19] The standard test for the admission of further evidence is that it be relevant, credible and cogent, and also that it be “fresh evidence” in the sense that it is evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been called at the earlier hearing. However, the overriding criterion is always what course will serve the best interests of justice.20
[20] The evidence filed is largely from parents of the victims outlining what has happened to their sons in the aftermath of the conviction and sentencing of the defendant and explaining what risks they see of further harm being caused by publication of Mr Wallace’s name and of the school and the hostel where the offending took place.
[21] In the present case, I am satisfied that the evidence is “fresh” in the sense that it updates the Court on what has happened to the victims both post-conviction and post-sentencing of Mr Wallace. To the extent the evidence deals with issues prior to the hearing on 3 February 2016, I also accept the principal’s explanation that the school acted with reasonable diligence to provide evidence from key affected parties for that hearing and that it was impracticable at that time, even with reasonable
diligence, to submit all the evidence that is now before the Court.
20 R v Bain [2004] 1 NZLR 638 (CA) at [22].
[22] For both those reasons, I am satisfied it is appropriate to admit the further evidence and to take account of it in deciding whether the suppression orders sought should be granted.
The appellant’s submissions
[23] With reference to the affidavits of the victims’ parents, the school principal and the director of boarding, the appellant outlines the adverse effects that the offending, and the subsequent Court process, has had on the victims. These include:
(a) a decline in academic achievement and a failure to obtain sufficient
NCEA credits;
(b)changes to personality including becoming withdrawn, unconfident, unmotivated and unsocial;
(c) expressing guilt and a sense of responsibility for Mr Wallace’s
imprisonment;
(d)exhibiting anti-social behaviour such as absconding, consuming alcohol, substance abuse and general misbehaving;
(e) expressing fear for their safety following threats made by Mr Wallace and/or his associates;
(f) being ostracised by other students and members of the community;
and
(g)displaying a general inability to move on from this matter and accept that Mr Wallace is the maker of his own misfortune.
[24] The school submits that in light of what the victims have already endured and the concerns their parents have outlined, it is likely the harmful effects already experienced by the victims will continue and intensify in the event the defendant and/or the school is publicly identified.
[25] In particular, the school notes the relatively small pool of students from which the victims come from. While the school roll is nearly 400, there are only
17 senior male students boarding at the school and six of the 10 victims are still attending the school. The concern is if St Peter’s College and/or Mr Wallace is publicly identified, these students are at real risk of identification and this would have a negative impact on them by:
(a) exacerbating the feelings of guilt already experienced by the victims
following Mr Wallace’s conviction and imprisonment;
(b)exacerbating the personality changes and behavioural issues which have already occurred for most of the victims;
(c) further ostracising the victims from their fellow students and peers; (d) stymieing the victims’ ability to move on from this matter;
(e) exacerbating fears for personal and family safety following the threats that have been made;
(f) negatively impacting on what is their final year of school and the achievement of NCEA credits;
(g)negatively impacting on those who have enrolled at local tertiary institutes; and
(h)negatively impacting on victims who are either looking for employment or have recently obtained employment but are still subject to a three month trial period.
[26] Furthermore, there is a concern that those students not involved will be at risk
of being wrongly identified and “tarred with the same brush”.
[27] The affidavits acknowledge that local gossip exists and students have faced
queries about whether they are involved in the “drugs issue”. A local businessman
has also referred to the issue and asked whether it should affect him offering work experience and placements to students of the school. However, the appellant says that this is localised gossip and cannot be compared with the effects that widespread publication through the media would have. It is pointed out that the majority of the victims come from out of town and there is unlikely to be the same level of knowledge of this matter in their hometowns. Publication of the school’s name or the defendant’s name would increase this level of knowledge and place the victims under scrutiny by their hometown peers.
[28] Counsel for the school also pressed upon me that the orders it sought in relation to the school, its hostel, and the defendant, all needed to be considered as a package to ensure no undue hardship to the victims or the school students generally. It would not be sufficient just to suppress the name of the school and the hostel, as publication of the defendant’s name would be likely to identify the school, particularly through the use of the internet. However, when pressed, the school accepted that if, in the interests of open justice, it was considered appropriate to publish the defendant’s name, then it would nevertheless seek to have the school and the hostel’s name suppressed.
[29] In addressing the exercise of the discretion, assuming the undue hardship test had been satisfied, the school submitted that this was a case where the presumption of open justice should be displaced, as damage which was “out of the ordinary and disproportionate to the public interest”,21 was likely to occur based on the affidavit evidence. In saying that, the appellant said that:
The evidence of their parents and those responsible for their development is that publication will have disproportionate consequences on these victims’ development. In contrast to any public interest advanced in knowing the identity of this defendant, the consequences of publicity will be negative for these young victims. While we cannot know for sure as to the extent of the possible harm, the harm caused to date is a strong indicator of likely future harm.
[30] Finally, the appellant said that the exercise of the discretion should also take account of the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Act, which is to “avoid
21 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) at [42].
unnecessary stress to victims”,22 and the provisions of the Victims Rights Act 2002, where s 28 is of particular relevance. That section deals with the requirement to obtain the victims’ views on an application for an order prohibiting permanent publication of the name of an offender. The appellant says this section clearly affords the victims’ views significant weight, and those views should also be taken into account in determining the issue of permanent suppression of the defendant’s name.
[31] The appellant also submitted that the suppression orders made under ss 202 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act in respect of the 10 victims should extend to suppression of the identity of St Peter’s College Hostel at 129 Kakapo Street, Gore as an “address” of the victim. This is because the hostel is essentially a second residential address for the victims and, to better ensure the protection of the victims’ identity, both the home and boarding address of the victims should be encompassed in the orders suppressing publication of the victims’ addresses, pursuant to those sections.
Respondent’s submissions
[32] The respondent emphasises that the starting point is the principle of open reporting.23
[33] In terms of the first threshold test, the respondent acknowledges that the victims may have suffered, and will possibly continue to suffer, some form of hardship from the offending, but that undue hardship will not result if the prisoner’s name and occupation, and the school’s name and details are published. The victims are already adequately protected through permanent name suppression of their names and addresses from the effect of publicity associated with the Court proceedings.
[34] In any event, the likely consequences of publication do not amount to “something more than hardship”. Publication of the defendant’s name and occupation and the school’s name and details will not lead to identification of the
victims given the unchallenged suppression order protecting them, which provides
22 Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill 243-1 (2010).
adequate measures against members of the public, tertiary institutions and future employers identifying the victims to the offending.
[35] Even if the Court decides that there is a real and appreciable risk of undue hardships to the victims if publication is allowed, the appellant would still have to satisfy the Court that the Judge erred in exercising her discretion not to order the suppression sought. In Lewis v Wilson & Horton, it was held that compelling reasons or very special circumstances must be shown before the presumption of open
reporting can be displaced.24
[36] In this case, the respondent says there is a “high public interest in this case” which favours the presumption of open reporting. Furthermore, as was said in Hughes v R, the discretion to prohibit publication should be exercised sparingly; as an exception to the general rule that the community is entitled to know the identity of people coming before the Court; and in cases involving serious offences with the
utmost caution.25
[37] Here the offending was serious. It involved a significant breach of trust where the defendant, who was a dormitory supervisor and hostel manager, supplied and offered to sell cannabis to 10 students over a one year period. It involved vulnerable victims who were aged 15 to 17 years at the time of the offending. Thus, any hardship that may be suffered by the victims in the event that the defendant’s name and occupation, and the school’s name and details are published, is outweighed by the high public interest in dealing with such offending openly. In addition, publication will ensure that suspicion is not cast unfairly on other boarding schools in the Southland area.
[38] For these reasons, the District Court Judge’s decision should be upheld and
the appeal dismissed.
24 Lewis v Wilson & Horton, above n 21 at [42].
Will there be undue hardship to the victims or connected persons?
[39] One of the difficulties in the present case is distinguishing between hardship which has arisen as a consequence of being a victim in the criminal process from hardship that may result from publication which does or could identify the school and therefore, by default, put a focus on the victims and other pupils of the school.
[40] Much of the affidavit evidence outlined the hardship already being suffered by the victims. Examples include:
(a) one of the victims now has an ongoing problem with drugs and has recently failed a drug test;
(b) several victims feel guilty for Mr Wallace’s imprisonment;
(c) some of the victims’ academic achievement has suffered; and
(d)some of the victims have been the subject of threats from Mr Wallace, or from persons associated with him.
[41] The general theme of the affidavits from the parents of the victims is that publication which will identify the school, either directly or as a consequence of identifying Mr Wallace, will exacerbate these problems and re-victimise the students.
[42] There is no doubt the students have suffered undue hardship as a consequence of the offending and its aftermath. It is not easy to identify how much any further hardship which is likely to be endured by the victims will be attributable to existing factors, or to the fact of publication, which, while not identifying them individually, will put the spotlight back on their school, their classmates, and themselves.
[43] I do not consider that some of the factors identified in the affidavits will be exacerbated by publication (for example, threats from the defendant and his associates which were related to disclosure of the offending and the subsequent conviction). I also consider that some of the evidence incorrectly assumes that the victims will be individually identified. For example, one mother says “I can only
imagine what it would be like for my son if the general public comes to know [about his matter] and he ends up being labelled a ‘drug user’”. Another victim, with a distinctive surname, comments that if Mr Wallace’s name or occupation were to be published, he could “quite easily be identified by members of the public” because his family name is distinctive. Such an assumption is clearly erroneous as his name cannot be published.
[44] However, I do accept that publication will give rise to a renewed round of attention on the school and its students. That means that students at the college and, more particularly, boarding students will be the subject of wider scrutiny than that which has already occurred as a result of local knowledge of the issue. That will cause renewed distress as the school and the students, whether they are victims or not, fend off enquiries about the offending and whether they are implicated in it. For the victims that will likely cause undue hardship.
[45] Furthermore, I accept that the school, and the balance of its pupils, as connected persons, will also suffer hardship. They will (as they have already been) be the subject of speculation and questioning. However, many schools have had to deal with publicity about anti-social, or even criminal, behaviour in their midst. That can bring hardship, as the reputation of the school may be tarnished and students who were not involved in the activity may be the subject of questions about such activities at the school, and their involvement in it. However, I do not consider such hardship falls into the category of undue hardship. As I have said, it is a normal consequence of Court proceedings arising out of criminal activities which have occurred in connection with a school.
[46] In summary, I have accepted that there is a real and appreciable risk of undue hardship to the victims as a consequence of publication of the defendant’s name, and of the school and hostel’s name, for the purposes of s 200, but I do not consider there is a risk of undue hardship under s 202(2)(a) to the school and its students generally.
Exercise of the discretion
[47] As I have found that the threshold test of s 200(2)(c) has been met, I must then consider whether to exercise my discretion to order name suppression in light of that finding and in light of all other relevant considerations.
[48] At this stage of the enquiry, I must weigh the competing interests of the victims, to have the name of the defendant and the school suppressed, against the public interest in receiving this information under the principles of open reporting and open justice. As Duffy J said in Hughes v R, “s 200 does not displace the
presumption in favour of open reporting”.26
[49] In this case, I approach the exercise of the discretion in relation to suppression of the defendant’s name separately from suppression in relation to the school, although having regard to the submission that identifying the defendant will lead to identification of the school, through use of the internet. This is because, when offending is serious, there needs to be particularly strong countervailing factors to justify suppressing a defendant’s name. The factors need not be as strong to justify suppression of the name of a connected person.
[50] In this case there is no doubt that the defendant’s offending was serious. It involved an element of grooming and an abuse of the trust which was reposed in him by the school, the parents and the pupils. It is therefore in the public interest to know the defendant’s name and the nature of his offending. While the school submitted that, should the defendant ever apply to work in a school again, his offending would be revealed in the vetting process, and this was sufficient protection, I accept the respondent’s submission that that is not the only forum in which the public has an interest in knowing about Mr Wallace’s offending. This is the kind of offending which could be replicated in more informal situations, for example, as the coach of a sports team or in the workplace. The principle of open justice allows a defendant to be named, and his or her actions made public, so that people can make the appropriate enquiries and satisfy themselves that the risks which led to that offending will not recur in any other dealings they have with the defendant.
[51] Thus, while I take note of the victims’ concerns that naming the defendant could lead to enquiries, particularly on the internet, which would lead to identification of the school by individuals, and therefore the kind of scrutiny of the school and its students which gives rise to the hardship complained of, I consider that the public interest in knowing the defendant’s identity is particularly important in this case because of the kind of offending.
[52] I therefore consider that, in the exercise of my discretion, it is appropriate that
the defendant’s name is not suppressed and that it is able to be published.
Publication of the name of the school and hostel
[53] The more difficult balancing exercise arises when considering whether to allow publication of the name of the school and the hostel. The suppression of these two names is considered together as they are interlinked and the same consequences arise from the publication of each of them.
[54] I consider there is a public interest in knowing the context of the offending, because it occurred in a school. That interest is intensified when the school provides boarding facilities and where families entrust the care of their children to the school for prolonged periods of time. However, publication in the media could lead to a loss of reputation of the school and criticism of those involved in the school’s administration, whether or not that is justified. It will also, as I have found, lead to the pupils experiencing renewed enquiries and speculation as to who was involved in the offending and that will impact on the victims, despite their individual identities remaining suppressed.
[55] There is considerable tension between these competing considerations. In R v Burrett,27 which involved serious sexual offending against younger children, including handicapped children, by Mr Burrett who was a school bus driver, and a school caretaker connected with two different schools, those competing interests came down in favour of suppression of the names of the schools and the bus company.
[56] There the Court agreed that speculation regarding whether certain children had been victims of the offending would be likely to increase if the name of the school was published. It was also accepted that publication could cause undue hardship to staff and students associated with one of the schools because it:28
… could suggest to members of the public that the school, in some way, unwittingly or otherwise, created an opportunity for this offending to occur. It cannot be assumed that those who would see publication of the school’s name would necessarily study the information as to the offending with the care necessary to recognise the reality that the offending did not occur when these children were at the school, and the school had nothing to do with the employment of Mr Burrett as the driver of the bus.
[57] However, I consider there are distinctions between the circumstances in Burrett and in the present case. In Burrett, the offending was of a much more significant nature, against even more vulnerable victims. Furthermore, in neither case was the offender employed by the school in a role where he had direct responsibility for the welfare of the students. In the present case, there is a more direct relationship between the school and the offending, because it occurred at the school’s hostel and was perpetrated by someone employed to have a direct responsibility for the welfare of students in the hostel. I also consider that, with responsible reporting, it will be made clear that the school has dealt swiftly and properly with the matter as soon as it came to its attention.
[58] In any event, reputational issues for a school should not play a particularly large role in decisions on applications to suppress the names of schools except where the reputational loss is likely to be significantly disproportionate to the school’s connection to the offending. Here, responsibly, the application was advanced primarily on the basis of concerns for the victims, not on the basis of concerns for the school’s reputation.
[59] Finally, I address the submission that publication of the students’ term time address, being the school’s hostel, is prevented by operation of the suppression orders made in relation to the victims’ identity, including their addresses. I do not agree. The suppression orders made in relation to the victims are designed to protect their individual identities. Publication of their home addresses could, of course, lead
to their identification. The reference to “address” in s 204 should be read in light of the purpose of the section which is to protect the individual’s identity. It will be a question of fact in each case whether publication of an address connected with the victim (such as a school or workplace) would also be publication of an identifying particular of the individual. Here the home address is clearly protected. However, the hostel houses a considerable number of students and I do not consider identifying the hostel as the venue for the offending reveals the identity of the individual victims.
Conclusion
[60] Having regard to all these matters, including: the expectation that a defendant’s name will be published when the offending is serious, the likelihood of publication of the defendant’s name leading to the school’s name being uncovered in any event, the evidence that the local community is already aware that the school had a “drugs issue”, and the principles of open justice, I have decided that name suppression should not continue for the defendant or for the name of St Peter’s College or the boarding hostel at the school, notwithstanding the views of the victims and the further hardship they may be exposed to.
[61] However, in order to give the school time to advise the victims that interim suppression will be lifted, lifting of all the interim suppression orders, will be deferred until 5.00 pm on Monday, 9 May 2016.
Solicitors:
Harrison Stone, Auckland
Preston Russell Law, Invercargill
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