IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2025-409-4
[2025] NZHC 1549
IN THE MATTER of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 AND
IN THE MATTER
of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017
BETWEEN
BRIAN JAMES SQUAIR and VICKI ANN SQUAIR
First Plaintiffs
SMI PROJECTS LIMITED (in receivership) Second Plaintiff
AND
BRIAN PHILIP CRIBB
First Defendant
WAIPARA TRUSTEES LIMITED
Second DefendantCRIBB FARMING LIMITED
Third Defendant
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
P J Dale KC for Plaintiffs
T Mijatov, P M Smyth and E Farrell for Defendants
Judgment:
12 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
(costs on abandoned application for summary judgment)
SQUAIR v CRIBB [2025] NZHC 1549 [12 June 2025]
[1] When this proceeding was commenced, the plaintiffs brought an application for summary judgment. The application was opposed, and the defendants also sought security for costs.
[2] By the time the security for costs application was heard, the plaintiffs had abandoned the application for summary judgment. The defendants were successful in obtaining an order for security for costs and were awarded costs in respect of that application.1
[3] Mr Mijatov, counsel for the defendants, has drawn to my attention that I have not yet dealt with his clients’ application for costs on the abandoned summary judgment application.
[4]Mr Mijatov, in respect of costs on the abandoned application, submitted:
Departure from the abandoning party paying costs is not warranted. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment knowing from the outset the issues were complex and would raise factual disputes, a point their solicitor raised in pre-commencement correspondent.
[5] Mr Mijatov submitted that abandonment after receiving the defendants’ evidence in opposition, invites the inference that the plaintiffs’ assessment was that summary judgment was, or remained, inappropriate.
[6] To the extent that Mr Mijatov’s submission; “[d]eparture from the abandoning party paying costs is not warranted” is suggested to reflect the law on an unsuccessful application for summary judgment, I must disagree. The topic is discussed in McGechan on Procedure.2 The leading decision is NZI Bank Ltd v Philpott.3 The general rule is that costs on an unsuccessful application for summary judgment by a plaintiff should be reserved in the absence of some fault on behalf of the plaintiff. The authors of McGechan on Procedure note that under the High Court Rules, costs in respect of interlocutory applications are required to be fixed and paid in the absence of special circumstances when they are determined (r 14.8), however, applications for
1 Squair v Cribb [2025] NZHC 827.
2 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR12.12.08].
summary judgment are expressly exempt from this rule under r 14.8(3). However, special circumstances are not required to depart from the Philpott principle.
[7] In Apostolatos v NZI Co Ltd, costs were awarded because, in the view of the Judge, the plaintiff should have realised at…
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- AGLC
- Squair v Cribb [2025] NZHC 1549
- Case
- [2025] NZHC 1549
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs should be liable for costs incurred by the defendants due to the abandonment of the summary judgment application. Counsel for the defendants argued that the plaintiffs should bear the costs of the abandoned application, suggesting that the plaintiffs' decision to seek summary judgment despite knowing the issues were complex amounted to fault warranting such an outcome. The defendants further contended that the principles governing discontinuance of proceedings should apply analogously to the withdrawal of a summary judgment application.
Associate Judge Lester considered the general rule that, in the absence of fault, the party who abandons an application for summary judgment should not be liable for the costs of the application. The judge acknowledged that while there may be circumstances where an application for summary judgment should not have been brought in the first place, this case did not present such clear-cut evidence. The judge found that the merits of the claim regarding the deposit were not so unbalanced as to deem the application for summary judgment unreasonable from the outset. Consequently, the judge decided that the general rule applied, and the plaintiffs were not liable for the costs of the abandoned summary judgment application.
The court ordered that costs in respect of the withdrawn application for summary judgment be reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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