Sproull v Worksafe New Zealand
[2021] NZHC 902
•27 April 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE
CRI-2021-454-6
[2021] NZHC 902
BETWEEN DANIEL REUEL SPROULL
Appellant
AND
WORKSAFE NEW ZEALAND
Respondent
Hearing: 21 April 2021 Appearances:
A Shaw for Appellant
R C Woods for Respondent
Judgment:
27 April 2021
JUDGMENT OF MANDER J
This judgment was delivered by me on 27 April 2021 at 4 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: .
DANIEL REUEL SPROULL v WORKSAFE NEW ZEALAND [2021] NZHC 902 [27 April 2021]
[1] The appellant, Daniel Sproull, was convicted following a judge-alone trial before Judge Krebs of failing to give all reasonable assistance to WorkSafe New Zealand (WorkSafe) inspectors to enter, inspect, examine, inquire or exercise any other power under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA).1 He was sentenced to a fine of $2,000 on each charge and ordered to contribute to the costs of the prosecution. Mr Sproull appeals his convictions and sentence.
[2] Mr Sproull filed his appeal against conviction some eight days out of time. No prejudice arises to the respondent and leave is granted to file the appeal out of time.
Background
[3] Mr Sproull was a director of three companies that operated dairy farms located in Manawatu. The events that gave rise to the charges relate to WorkSafe’s attempt to engage with Mr Sproull and carry out inspections of premises used by the companies.
[4] In November 2018, Inspector Simon Kuiti of WorkSafe contacted Mr Sproull to arrange a date to inspect one of the premises. In subsequent correspondence Mr Sproull requested a copy of documents confirming Inspector Kuiti’s authority to conduct the inspection. On 19 November, Inspector Kuiti sent an email to Mr Sproull confirming he was an inspector appointed under HSWA and that he held a certificate of appointment.
[5] On 4 December, Inspector Kuiti and another inspector visited the premises to carry out the inspection. They met Mr Sproull and Inspector Kuiti presented his WorkSafe identification to him. However, Mr Sproull advised the inspectors that he would not permit them to enter the property without a search warrant because part of the property was his personal residence.
[6] Further correspondence was entered into between the parties. Mr Sproull sought confirmation of Inspector Kuiti’s appointment as an inspector, and WorkSafe sought to arrange another time for an inspection. In January 2019, WorkSafe provided copies of the Certificates of Appointment for Inspector Kuiti and Inspector Lynda
1 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, s 176.
West. These certificates were signed by the Chief Executive of WorkSafe (the Chief Executive). Following receipt of these certificates, Mr Sproull sought further information, including confirmation of the instructions the inspectors had been given in relation to the proposed inspection. Much of this correspondence was directed to the Chief Executive. Mr Sproull maintained that he would not agree to an inspection proceeding until he had received confirmation of the instructions that had been given to the inspectors, signed by the Chief Executive. Mr Sproull also made Official Information Act 1982 requests to WorkSafe.
[7] On 30 April 2019, WorkSafe advised Mr Sproull that the assessment would proceed on 2 May 2019. However, when Inspectors Kuiti and West arrived at the premises neither Mr Sproull nor any other workers were present to provide them with access. On 16 May, WorkSafe advised Mr Sproull that the assessment would take place on 24 May 2019. Mr Sproull objected to this assessment on the basis that he had Official Information Act requests pending. WorkSafe advised him that his request had no bearing on their visit and arrived at the premises for the purpose of carrying out an inspection on the advised date. Again, neither Mr Sproull nor any other workers were present. Failure to attend or otherwise facilitate the inspection on 24 May was the basis of the first charge.
[8] Following Mr Sproull’s failure to attend at the time of the proposed inspection, Inspector Kuiti wrote to Mr Sproull on 4 June 2019. The letter was addressed to the companies and required Mr Sproull (and Mrs Sproull who was also a director of the companies) to provide a statement to WorkSafe at its offices in Palmerston North on 17 June 2019. Mr Sproull did not attend at the nominated time and date. On 25 June, Inspector Kuiti sought an explanation as to why Mr Sproull had not responded or attended the meeting. Mr Sproull replied that he would not consider the request until he received confirmation the inspectors were authorised to require him to provide a statement. Mr Sproull’s failure to provide assistance to a WorkSafe inspector and his failure to attend the scheduled appointment on 17 June or to otherwise make arrangements to provide a statement to WorkSafe was the subject of the second charge.
The appeal
[9] The appeal puts in issue whether WorkSafe satisfactorily proved at trial that Mr Kuiti and Ms West were WorkSafe inspectors and whether their appointment as such could be validly made by the Chief Executive of WorkSafe. An element required to be proved by the prosecution in respect of each offence was the failure by Mr Sproull to give “all reasonable assistance” to such an officer.
District Court decision
[10] At the judge-alone trial, Mr Kuiti and Ms West each gave evidence of their appointment under s 163 of HSWA. They produced their identity cards, issued under s 164, and produced letters of appointment signed by the Chief Executive of WorkSafe informing them of their appointment as an inspector and issuing them with their identity cards. Each witness confirmed that they had been continuously employed as inspectors by WorkSafe since the date of their respective appointments.
[11] Mr Sproull, who represented himself before the District Court, did not cross- examine any of WorkSafe’s witnesses, nor did he make any submissions in respect of the case against him, contest the evidence of the inspectors’ appointment, or challenge the validity of their appointment.
[12] In reaching his decision in respect of this element of the offence, Judge Krebs observed that WorkSafe operates under HSWA and had a duty to investigate work sites to ensure compliance with the legislation. The Judge referred to the Chief Executive as having the power to appoint investigators to undertake that work under s 163 of HSWA, and that such appointments must be in writing. It was further noted that the regulator must provide each inspector with an identity card which is required to be produced for inspection on request when exercising compliance powers under HSWA. Judge Krebs, after reviewing the evidence provided by Mr Kuiti and Ms West relating to their appointments, concluded that he was satisfied that both were duly appointed and current inspectors under HSWA.
[13] Having recounted the events leading up to the attempted inspection on 24 May 2019, the Judge was satisfied that Mr Sproull was aware of the date and time of the
proposed inspection and that he had failed to fulfil his legal duty as an officer of the companies to attend, assist and cooperate with the inspection. Similarly, the Judge was satisfied that Mr Sproull had failed to fulfil his duty as an officer of the companies when he failed to provide a statement when requested to do so by Inspector Kuiti, and attend the scheduled appointment on 17 June 2019. As a result, both charges were found proved.
Procedural background
[14] Before dealing with the substance of the appeal it is necessary to set out relevant parts of the procedural background, in particular as it relates to issues of disclosure that were raised prior to the hearing. As previously related, Mr Sproull made inquiries of WorkSafe seeking confirmation of the inspectors’ appointments and other information from WorkSafe.
[15] At a pre-trial call of the matter, Judge Rowe directed that the prosecution was to certify by a stipulated date that a list of witnesses and their formal statements had been provided to Mr Sproull and that disclosure was complete.2 By way of a memorandum dated 20 November 2020, Mr Sproull advised the Court that he was not satisfied the prosecution had completed disclosure. He advised that until he had all the documents relating to his case “including the details of delegation which have not been provided”, he did not consider he was in a position to proceed. He recorded that he had made it clear “that delegation is an issue as are the instructions and guidance that the inspector received (as required under his appointment)”.
[16] In response, WorkSafe filed its own memorandum of 23 November 2020, noting that there had been an oversight in not including in the disclosure package provided to Mr Sproull copies of the letters of appointment of the two inspectors. However, it was noted that both documents had been provided to Mr Sproull earlier, back in January 2019. WorkSafe advised apart from those two documents that it acknowledged were subject to disclosure obligations, it was not aware of any further documents that were required to be disclosed.
2 WorkSafe New Zealand v Sproull DC Palmerston North CRI-2019-054-3325, 13 August 2020.
[17] In relation to Mr Sproull’s request for “details of delegation”, WorkSafe stated it was “unsure of the nature of document or documents that are sought”. It went on to note that “the appointment of inspectors is carried out by the Chief Executive of WorkSafe, such that no issue of delegation arises”. WorkSafe accepts that statement was erroneous and the Chief Executive’s authority to appoint inspectors derives from a power delegated by the Board of WorkSafe (the Board) under s 73 of the Crown Entities Act 2004.
[18] On the appeal, WorkSafe applied to introduce documents confirming the delegation by the Board to its Chief Executive. Ms Wood, who appeared on behalf of WorkSafe, made it clear that their introduction was not sought to supplement the proof that was before the District Court for the purpose of the substantive appeal. However, she submitted their existence was relevant to whether any miscarriage had arisen as a result of them not being made available before or at the trial and whether there was any real risk that this omission had created a real risk of affecting the outcome of the trial, or had resulted in the hearing being unfair.3
Did the Judge err in finding the inspectors’ appointment to be valid?
[19] Mr Sproull argues the Judge erred in fact and law in finding the inspectors to have been validly appointed to their positions. In support of that primary contention, Mr Shaw, on behalf of the appellant, referred to s 163 of HSWA, which provides that the power to appoint an inspector is vested in the “regulator”. The regulator is defined in HSWA as meaning WorkSafe.4 He submitted that WorkSafe acts through its constituent Board and that, as a result, the Chief Executive possesses no power to appoint a WorkSafe inspector. Because the prosecution did not adduce any evidence of compliance by the Board with the requirements of s 163, namely, that by notice in writing it appointed either Mr Kuiti or Ms West to be inspectors, there was no proof of any valid appointment of those persons to that position.
[20] Mr Sproull argues the letters from the Chief Executive to Mr Kuiti and Ms West were devoid of any statutory authority and ineffective as providing notice of
3 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 232(4).
4 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, s 16.
an inspector’s appointment. Nor, it was submitted, did the production of those persons identity cards cure the invalidity of their appointments. It follows, on Mr Sproull’s argument, the prosecutor failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that either Mr Kuiti or Ms West had been validly appointed as inspectors under s 163 of HSWA and that consequently their actions and requests in relation to Mr Sproull, as particularised in the two charging documents, lacked any legal authority.
WorkSafe’s response
[21] WorkSafe submitted the District Court was entitled to be satisfied on the evidence before it that the Chief Executive had the appropriate delegated authority to appoint inspectors. It submitted WorkSafe was able under s 73 of the Crown Entities Act to delegate its power to appoint inspectors under s 163 of HSWA to the Chief Executive, and when the Chief Executive purports to exercise such a power, it is presumed under s 74 of the Crown Entities Act that they do so in accordance with their delegated authority.
[22] It followed, in WorkSafe’s submission, that the Certificates of Appointment that were produced at trial could be presumed to be valid by the Court in the absence of there having been any challenge by Mr Sproull at trial to that evidence of appointment.5 Because the Chief Executive’s delegated authority was not contested, the District Court Judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the Chief Executive was acting in accordance with delegated authority when appointing the inspectors.
Analysis
[23] Two issues arise on the appeal. The first is whether the evidence adduced in the District Court was sufficient to prove the element of the charge that required proof beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Kuiti and Ms West had been validly appointed as inspectors. The second is whether the failure to provide the material, namely, minutes of the Board attesting to the delegation of powers to the Chief Executive, including the power to appoint inspectors under s 163 of HSWA and the notice of delegation (the
5 Referring to Department of Labour v Edwards [2007] NZAR 728 (HC).
delegation documents) was an error or irregularity that has given rise to a miscarriage of justice.
The issue of proof before the District Court
[24]Section 163 of HSWA provides as follows:
163 Appointment of inspectors
(1)The regulator may, by notice in writing, appoint any of the following as an inspector:
(a)a public service employee as defined in section 65 of the Public Service Act 2020:
(b)an employee of the State services (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 2020):
(c)a statutory officer:
(d)a prescribed person:
(e)an employee of the regulator:
(f)any other person who the regulator is satisfied—
(i)is suitably qualified and trained:
(ii)belongs to a class of persons who are suitably qualified and trained to exercise any or all of the powers of, and carry out any or all of the duties of, an inspector under relevant health and safety legislation.
(2)An inspector’s compliance powers are subject to any conditions or limitations specified in the notice of the inspector’s appointment.
(3)However, the exercise of a compliance power by an inspector is not invalid merely because it did not comply with the conditions specified in the notice of the inspector’s appointment.
[25] The regulator is defined as “WorkSafe or the relevant designated agency”.6 Section 6 of the WorkSafe New Zealand Act 2013 (WNZA) provides that WorkSafe is a Crown entity for the purposes of s 7 of the Crown Entities Act. That section in turn provides that WorkSafe is a statutory entity as defined in sch 1 of that Act, and
6 Health and Safety at Work Act, s 16, definition of “regulator”.
that the Crown Entities Act will apply except to the extent that it is inconsistent with WNZA.7
[26]Relevantly, s 73(1) of the Crown Entities Act provides:
73 Ability to delegate
(1)The board of a statutory entity may delegate any of the functions or powers of the entity or the board, either generally or specifically, to any of the following persons by resolution and written notice to the person or persons:
(a)a member or members:
(b)the chief executive or any other employee or employees, or office holder or holders, of the entity:
(c)a committee:
(d)any other person or persons approved by the entity’s responsible Minister:
(e)any class of persons comprised of any of the persons listed in paragraphs (a) to (d):
…
[27] Mr Sproull argued that, for the purposes of proving the charges in the District Court, WorkSafe could not rely on the Board’s power of delegation under the Crown Entities Act because it had disavowed, in his memorandum of 23 November 2020, any reliance on any delegation of power to the Chief Executive when responding to the disclosure issues raised by Mr Sproull. However, I do not consider that error impacts on the validity of Judge Krebs’ assessment of the evidence presented before him regarding the appointment of the inspectors and whether the Court erred in finding that element of the charges proved.
[28] WorkSafe is a statutory Crown entity,8 and is the regulator vested with the power to appoint inspectors.9 The governing body of WorkSafe is the Board and it holds the power to appoint inspectors. Section 73(1) of the Crown Entities Act permits a board of a statutory entity to delegate functions and powers to “the chief executive
7 WorkSafe New Zealand Act 2013, s 6(2).
8 Crown Entities Act 2004, s 7, and WorkSafe New Zealand Act, 6(2).
9 Health and Safety at Work Act, s 16.
or any other employee … or office holder” and “any class of persons comprised of any of the persons listed in paragraphs (a) to (d).”
[29]Section 74(2) of the Crown Entities Act provides:
74 Powers of delegate
…
(2)A delegate who purports to perform a function or exercise a power under a delegation—
(a)is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presumed to do so in accordance with the terms of that delegation; and
(b)must produce evidence of his or her authority to do so, if reasonably requested to do so.
[30] Where the Chief Executive exercises a delegated power it is presumed they are doing so in accordance with their delegated authority. In order to rebut this presumption it is necessary to adduce evidence or, at the very least, challenge the validity of the exercise of the power. In this case, Mr Sproull put no questions to the prosecution witnesses and made no submissions to the Court in relation to the Chief Executive’s authority to appoint the inspectors. Nor did Mr Sproull call any evidence himself. Therefore, in the absence of any challenge to the Chief Executive’s power to appoint the inspectors or evidence that might displace the presumption under s 74 of the Crown Entities Act, the appointments remained presumptively valid. There are a number of cases regarding the delegation of powers and statutory presumptions of validity that support that conclusion.
[31] In R v O’Connell the appellant faced charges under the Indecent Publications Act 1963, which could only be commenced by way of leave. 10 The power to grant such leave rested with the Attorney-General but could be delegated to the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner), who in turn could sub-delegate the power to an officer holding a rank not below that of inspector. In the course of the trial, the instrument of delegation from the Attorney-General to the Commissioner was put in evidence. However, no evidence was called in relation to the sub-delegation from the
10 R v O’Connell [1981] 2 NZLR 192 (CA).
Commissioner to a District Commander, who had granted leave in respect of the prosecution.
[32] The instrument of sub-delegation of authority was available in that case but it had not been produced either in the original trial or in the High Court on the first appeal, nor was it produced before the Court of Appeal. In dismissing the appeal the Court of Appeal observed, in relation to cases where the validity of leave to prosecute was challenged:11
… The authorities are not entirely uniform but we consider the position at trial to be:
(1)in the absence of objection on behalf of a defendant the existence of any necessary leave or consent to prosecute will be presumed;
(2)if no evidence of authority is given and the point is raised after the close of the prosecution case leave should ordinarily be given to prove the authority;
(3)if without objection being taken it emerges at the trial that there was in fact no authority the point should be allowed and will be decisive.
[33] Neither the District Court hearing the charges nor the prosecutor had appreciated that any challenge was being made to the District Commander’s authority to grant leave to commence the proceeding. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that in circumstances where a proper instrument of delegation existed and could have been put in evidence had the matter been squarely raised, the trial Court had been entitled to proceed on the basis that the delegation was valid. In the absence of any challenge to the authority of the District Commander to give leave to commence the prosecution, no miscarriage of justice had arisen.
[34] The Department of Labour v Edwards involved a prosecution under the Immigration Act 1987 that could only be commenced “on the information of an immigration officer”.12 The informations had been sworn by a named immigration officer but no evidence was called to prove that the person was such an officer. A District Court Judge ruled that, in the absence of such evidence of authority to lay the information, there was doubt as to whether there had been compliance with the
11 At 197.
12 Department of Labour v Edwards (2006) NZAR 728 (HC).
legislation. That decision was overturned on appeal. Clifford J rejected the proposition that the prosecution was required to call such evidence. After referring to the principles articulated in O’Connell it was held that, in the absence of the defendant having pointed to some defect on the face of the instrument or other evidence that provided a proper foundation for a challenge to its validity, the content of the information was sufficient of itself to establish that it had been laid by an authorised officer.
[35] Finally, in R v Gilchrist the defendant was charged with having knowingly failed to provide information to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.13 A notice had been issued by a senior investigator at the Inland Revenue Department, acting under the Commissioner of Inland Revenue’s delegated authority. The notice itself did not expressly refer to that delegated authority. The appellant sought to have the charges dismissed on the basis that the prosecution had not proved that the investigator had the relevant delegated authority to issue the notice. In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeal held:14
The existence of authority is a question of fact and the absence of a formal statement of delegated authority in the 24 July 2003 letter was of no consequence, as Judge Mackintosh correctly found. The letter purported to be written by an officer of the Department with duly delegated authority, as is clear from both its tone and content. Section 7(3) of the [Tax Administration Act 1994] provides for the delegation of powers by the Commissioner to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary. The powers of the Commissioner may be delegated generally to classes of officers … [the investigator’s] authority was to be presumed from a reading of the letter. Furthermore the specifics of any challenge to the lawfulness of the letter were never articulated by the appellant, at the time or in argument on appeal, save to bluntly question whether the delegation was in force at the time the letter was written. The issue was amply resolved by the Judge in the drawing of reasonable inferences from facts that were proved in evidence before her.
[36] Returning to the circumstances of the present case, the evidence before the District Court were the two letters of appointment from the Chief Executive, together with photocopies of Mr Kuiti and Ms West’s identity cards. In the absence of any articulated challenge made before the Court to the power of the Chief Executive who
13 R v Gilchrist (2006) 22 NZTC 20,043 (CA).
14 At [24]. Tax Administration Act 1994, s 7(3), provided at the time that “every officer purporting to act under any delegation under this section shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to be acting in accordance with the terms of the delegation”.
signed the letters to make those appointments, the District Court Judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the Chief Executive’s power to do so was valid. It follows that the Judge did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence before him to prove that the inspectors had been validly appointed and that this element of the charges had been proved to the requisite standard. Notwithstanding that conclusion, it is necessary to address the second issue to which this appeal gives rise.
Did the error or irregularity relating to disclosure give rise to a miscarriage of justice?
[37] I turn to whether the failure to disclose the delegation documents prior to trial has given rise to a miscarriage of justice.
[38] After the exchange of memoranda between the parties regarding the disclosure issues that Mr Sproull had raised, the matter was placed back before Judge Rowe on 3 December 2020, the day before the defended hearing. In response to Mr Sproull’s application for better discovery, Judge Rowe recorded:15
[7] The second issue is the issue of delegation of the inspectors who are involved in this matter. Section 163 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 provides that the regulator may by notice in writing appoint certain persons as inspectors. An inspector’s compliance powers are subject to conditions and limitations specified in the notice. Ms Woods informs me that the written appointment notices for the inspectors concerned in this case have been disclosed.
[8] The power of delegation is a statutory one. The requirements are contained within the statute. If the notices have been disclosed, then any assessment of the notices, to the extent they are relevant to any issue at trial, can occur at the trial. There is no issue of nondisclosure.
[9] I have directly asked Ms Woods today to confirm that disclosure is complete. She has certified that is the case as an officer of the court. There is nothing on the face of the memorandum that Mr Sproull has filed which leads to any issue of nondisclosure for which I need to make a further ruling.
[39] Ms Woods submitted that, as is apparent from WorkSafe’s memorandum of 23 November 2020, it was unsure of the nature of the further disclosure that Mr Sproull was seeking and that until receipt of his submissions in respect of this appeal it had not recognised that Mr Sproull was disputing the Chief Executive’s authority to appoint inspectors, rather than the appointment of the inspectors
15 WorkSafe New Zealand v Sproull [2020] NZDC 25131.
themselves. That understanding of the position was no doubt reinforced by the approach taken by Mr Sproull at the defended hearing when he did not raise any challenge to the evidence of the inspectors’ appointments.
[40] The representation by WorkSafe in its memorandum of 23 November 2020, when it asserted that “no issue of delegation arises”, may have been illustrative of a level of misunderstanding on the prosecutor’s part as to the issues that Mr Sproull was attempting to raise about the Chief Executive’s authority to appoint the inspectors, rather than whether the inspectors were validly appointed. Nevertheless, in light of Mr Sproull’s specific requests for “details of delegation”, WorkSafe should have provided him with the delegation documents that it now seeks to make available to this Court on the appeal.
[41] It is also apparent that the position taken by WorkSafe before Judge Rowe on the eve of the defended hearing, where the power of delegation is referred to as “a statutory one” and that “[t]he requirements are contained within the statute” was arguably misleading, as it appears to have been accepted by the Court that Mr Sproull was not entitled to make any further inquiry regarding the circumstances of the Chief Executive’s power to appoint inspectors.16 However, having made that observation, I also note that Judge Rowe expressly remarked that any assessment of those letters (which are referred to in his ruling as notices), “to the extent they are relevant to any issue at trial”, could occur at the hearing.
[42] I have closely considered whether the failure by WorkSafe to disclose the delegation documents, which must constitute an error or irregularity in relation to the trial, has created any real risk of affecting the outcome of the prosecution or resulted in an unfair trial. For two reasons, I have concluded that it did not. First, neither WorkSafe nor Judge Rowe’s approach to the issue of further discovery prevented Mr Sproull from raising the issue before Judge Krebs, either by questioning the inspectors about the letters of appointment and their knowledge of the Chief Executive’s authority, or by raising the issue with the Judge directly by submission. In either case the issue of delegation could have been raised and put in issue.
16 At [8].
[43] Second, it is apparent from the delegation documents, which I am prepared to admit for the purpose of this part of the appeal, that their disclosure would not have advanced any argument that Mr Sproull may have wished to have made in respect of the validity of the Chief Executive’s authority. To the contrary, the disclosure would only have confirmed that there was evidence available to WorkSafe that was consistent with the s 74(2) Crown Entities Act presumption. The minutes of the Board that I have viewed, dated 17 March 2016, and the notice of delegation to the Chief Executive, dated 30 March 2016, confirm that the Chief Executive had the authority from the regulator to appoint inspectors.
[44] I am mindful that Mr Sproull was representing himself in the District Court and that because of the discovery he sought from WorkSafe relating to the appointment of the inspectors, and in particular information relating to the issue of delegation, he should have been provided with the delegation documents. However, the reality is that there is no possible causal link between the failure by the prosecutor to provide that material and the outcome of his trial, which was unaffected by that error. In the circumstances, therefore, I do not consider any miscarriage of justice has occurred.
Appeal against sentence
[45] The appeal against sentence was not advanced at the hearing of the appeal. Mr Shaw properly acknowledged that the level of fine imposed could not be considered manifestly excessive.
Result
[46]The appeals against conviction and sentence are dismissed.
Solicitors:
Bytalus Legal, Auckland WorkSafe New Zealand Ltd
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