Spring v Browne - [2023] NZHC 1173

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV 2021-404-000992

[2023] NZHC 1173

UNDER the Defamation Act 1992

IN THE MATTER OF

a claim for injurious falsehood

BETWEEN

MARC ROBERT SPRING

Plaintiff

AND

CORY DAVID BROWNE

First Defendant

GLENN CHARLES TULLOCH

Second Defendant

Hearing: 20 & 21 March 2023

Appearances:

M R Spring, Plaintiff in person J D Evans for the Defendants

Judgment:

17 May 2023

JUDGMENT OF TAHANA J

This judgment was delivered by me on 17 May 2023 at 4.00pm Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………
Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors/Counsel:
Hayman Lawyers, Wellington Copy to:
Mr Spring (Plaintiff)

SPRING v BROWNE [2023] NZHC 1173 [17 May 2023]

Introduction

[1] On 14 February 2020, Mr Marc Spring undertook a search on the motor vehicle register (MVR) maintained by the New Zealand Transport Authority (NZTA). Mr Spring accessed the MVR via the MotorWeb site using login details provided to him by Corporate Cars Ltd1 (Corporate Cars). The search was of a vehicle (REDACTED), which a Mr Matthew Blomfield had been seen driving.

[2] The MVR search disclosed that the vehicle was registered in the name of Mr Blomfield’s wife. Mr Spring shared the results of that search with the liquidator of a company in which Mr Blomfield has interests.

[3] Upon receiving a complaint from Mr Blomfield and making enquiries with Mr Spring, NZTA stopped Corporate Car’s access to the MVR and notified Mr Spring that the search was not for an authorised purpose.

[4] In March 2020 Mr Blomfield phoned the first defendant, Mr Cory Browne (a director2 of Corporate Cars). NZTA had informed Mr Blomfield that the search was by Corporate Cars. Mr Blomfield also complained to the police, and in July 2020 a Constable Warren telephoned the second defendant, Mr Glenn Tulloch, the other director of Corporate Cars.

[5] In September 2020, Constable Warren obtained a search warrant and this was executed at Mr Spring’s address. Constable Warren then obtained a written statement from Mr Tulloch in November 2020.

[6] Mr Spring says that the statements, made by Mr Browne (to Mr Blomfield) and by Mr Tulloch (to Constable Warren), that Mr Spring was not authorised to access the MotorWeb system on 14 February 2020 were false. The defendants say they told the truth – they had not authorised Mr Spring to use the MVR for an unauthorised purpose. Further, Mr Tulloch says the statements to Constable Warren are subject to qualified privilege.

1 Named Clearance Cars Ltd from 21 April 2020.
2 Mr Browne was a director of Corporate Cars from December 2014 to March 2015 and became a director again from 27 March 2019 to 3 May 2021.

[7] Mr Spring claims that the defendants are liable in tort for injurious falsehood by reason of their statements and seeks:

(a)declarations that each of Mr Browne’s and Mr Tulloch’s statements were false;

(b)special damages ($150,000 against Mr Browne, and $250,000 against Mr Tulloch);…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Spring v Browne

Details

AGLC: Spring v Browne [2023] NZHC 1173
Case: [2023] NZHC 1173
Decision Date: 17 May 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Marc Robert Spring filed a claim against Cory David Browne and Glenn Charles Tulloch for injurious falsehood. The crux of the dispute revolves around statements Browne and Tulloch made regarding Spring's unauthorized access to the Motor Vehicle Register (MVR) on 14 February 2020. The plaintiffs claim that these statements were false and malicious, leading to pecuniary damage. The defendants, on the other hand, argue that their statements were truthful and, in any case, protected by qualified privilege.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether Browne and Tulloch made false statements to third parties and, if so, whether those statements were made maliciously. Additionally, the court had to determine whether Tulloch's statements to the police were protected by qualified privilege. To establish the tort of injurious falsehood, Spring needed to demonstrate that the defendants made a false statement about him to a third party, that the statement was made maliciously, and that it either caused special damage or was calculated to cause pecuniary damage.

The court found that Browne's statement to Matthew Blomfield that he had not authorized Spring's search of Blomfield's vehicle was not false. While Spring argued that Browne omitted to mention his own login credentials, the court ruled that Browne reasonably believed he was being asked if he authorized the specific search, to which the answer was no. Additionally, the court was not convinced that Browne acted maliciously as there was no evidence he intended to harm Spring. Regarding Tulloch, the court concluded that his statements to Constable Warren on 6 July 2020 and 11 November 2020 were not false because they aligned with Tulloch's understanding of the questions asked and the context of the inquiry. The court also determined that Tulloch's statements were subject to qualified privilege, as they were made in response to a police investigation.

The court dismissed Spring's claims against both Browne and Tulloch, finding that Spring failed to prove the necessary elements of the tort of injurious falsehood. The defendants were declared the successful parties and would ordinarily be entitled to costs on a category 2B basis, along with disbursements. If the parties could not agree on the costs, they were directed to file concise memoranda for the court to fix the costs.

Orders