IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2017-485-297 [2018] NZHC 2846
UNDER Section 290 of the Companies Act 1993 BETWEEN
SPIDER PROPERTIES LIMITED Applicant
AND
BODY CORPORATE 68792
Respondent
CIV-2017-485-234
BETWEEN LUXE ONE LIMITED Applicant
AND BODY CORPORATE 68792
Respondent
Counsel: Mr John Dallas for the applicant in CIV-2017-485-234
Mr Alwyn O’Connor for respondent in both proceedings
Judgment:
2 November 2018
COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE JOHNSTON [On the papers]
[1] This judgment addresses costs in these two proceedings which were heard together in mid 2017.
[2] In both, the applicants, Spider Properties Ltd and Luxe One Ltd, sought orders setting aside statutory demands served by Body Corporate 69792 based on unpaid levies – Spider and Luxe being owners of units in the unit title complex connected
with BC 68792.
SPIDER PROPERTIES LIMITED v BODY CORPORATE 68792 [2018] NZHC 2846 [2 November 2018]
[3] The applications were heard by Smith AJ on 25 July 2017. They were clearly complex as there was extensive affidavit evidence before the Court, deponents were required for cross-examination and the submissions were detailed. Both applications were dismissed in a judgment dated 31 October 2017, at the conclusion of which the Associate Judge said:
[175] The Body Corporate is entitled to costs. In accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Body Corporate 162791 v Gilbert,1 it may be that those costs should be reasonable costs on an indemnity basis, together with full disbursements. If counsel are unable to agree, costs memoranda may be filed. Any memorandum from the Body Corporate is to be filed and served within 15 working days of the date of this judgment. Spider may file and serve a memorandum in reply within 10 working days of its receipt of the Body Corporate’s memorandum.
[4] Nothing happened.
[5] Some eleven months later the Court has received a memorandum from counsel now engaged for BC 68792 seeking a formal order quantifying costs. These are sought on a 2B basis (though fractionally less than scale costs are sought against Spider). I am proceeding on the assumption that Mr O’Connor’s memorandum has been properly served on those acting for Spider and Luxe.
[6] The application is unopposed by Spider. However, on behalf of Luxe,
Mr Dallas has filed and served a memorandum in response. Luxe opposes any order for costs on three grounds:
(a) the Body Corporate’s memorandum was not filed and served within the
15 day period specified by Smith AJ;
(b) the applicant is now “grossly out of time”;
(c)the statutory demands which were the subject of the applications in the first place expired without BC 68792 commencing winding up proceedings.
1 Body Corporate 162791 v Gilbert [2015] 3 NZLR 601, [2015] NZCA 185 at [74]–[78].
[7] The merits of the competing positions can be summarised very briefly. On the one hand BC 68792 as the successful party in the proceedings was entitled to its costs. Its failure…
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- Case
- [2018] NZHC 2846
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred on the entitlement of the Body Corporate to its costs and whether the delay in filing the costs memoranda was justified. The applicants argued that the delay was unjustified and should result in the Body Corporate losing its entitlement to costs. They raised three grounds for opposing the costs: the Body Corporate did not file and serve the costs memoranda within the specified 15-day period; the Body Corporate was grossly out of time; and the statutory demands had expired without winding up proceedings being commenced.
The court considered the arguments from both sides. The Body Corporate provided an explanation for the delay, citing administrative changes and other distractions, but this was deemed insufficient to justify the eleven-month delay. The applicants argued that the delay had effectively concluded the litigation and they should be allowed to move on with their affairs. The court found that the delay was so extreme that it amounted to a waiver of the Body Corporate's entitlement to costs. Associate Judge Johnston exercised his discretion and declined to make an order fixing costs in favour of the Body Corporate against either applicant.
No specific final orders were made by the court, as it declined to make an order fixing costs in favour of the Body Corporate.
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