Speed v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour HC Wellington Civ-2011-485-1369

[2011] NZHC 1571

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2011-485-1369

UNDER  the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

IN THE MATTER OF     an application for review

BETWEEN  DOMINIC JAMES SPEED Plaintiff

ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR First Defendant

ANDTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND

Second Defendant

Hearing:         18 July 2011

Counsel:         D A Ewen and J Robertson for Plaintiff

I Carter and J Catran for Defendants

Judgment:      18 July 2011

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J (RECALL OF JUDGMENT)

In accordance with r 11.5, I direct the Registrar to endorse this judgment with the delivery time of 2.30pm on the 18th July 2011.

DOMINIC JAMES SPEED V CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR HC WN CIV-2011-

485-1369 18 July 2011

[1]      Mr Ewen applied for recall of my judgment last Friday.  It was not possible to hear the matter that day but I set the application down for a brief hearing this morning at 9.00am.

[2]      Mr Ewen’s primary ground was that he was entitled to be heard on the application before it was dismissed in accordance with Taito v R[1], and no such opportunity was afforded him.

[1] [2003] 3 NZLR 577.

[3]      Mr Carter filed a submission in opposition arguing that there is no “very special reason” requiring recall.

[4]      In a Chambers hearing this morning, Mr Ewen argued that his point was one of principle.  He simply felt that my treatment of his habeas corpus application was without jurisdiction and, although he implicitly accepted that the substantive argument in support of habeas corpus could not succeed, nonetheless the judgment should be recalled in order to excise my treatment of the habeas corpus application. The application could then be adjourned until after Mr Speed has departed at which point, I presume, the application would be withdrawn.

[5]      While in a different case, Mr Ewen’s argument may have some point, it has no practical benefit to anybody in this case.  Whether Taito would require a hearing in this case where that hearing would be a straight repeat of arguments already traversed and adjudged, I do not know.   But in any event it seems unduly and unhelpfully technical for Mr Ewen to concede the substantive point, yet seek recall anyway. There is, in my view, a certain disproportionality in all of this.

[6]      I would dismiss the application accordingly.

Williams J