Southern Receivables Limited v Arambasic
[2013] NZHC 2157
•19 August 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-1373 [2013] NZHC 2157
BETWEEN SOUTHERN RECEIVABLES LIMITED Plaintiff AND
ODISEJ ARAMBAŠIĆ
Defendant
Hearing: 19 August 2013 Appearances:
S M Dwight for Plaintiff
Odisej Arambašić, Defendant in personJudgment:
19 August 2013
ORAL JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE BELL
Solicitors:
Cavell Leitch, Addington Christchurch, for Plaintiff
Odisej Arambašić, Auckland, Defendant
SOUTHERN RECEIVABLES LIMITED v ARAMBAŠIĆ [2013] NZHC 2157 [19 August 2013]
[1] In this proceeding Southern Receivables Ltd is suing Mr Arambašić for
$31,443.94 plus interest, as the amount payable by Mr Arambašić for his ANZ Visa Gold credit card debt. Southern Receivables Ltd is suing as assignee of the debt. It has applied for summary judgment.
[2] The matters to be considered are these:
(a) The application by Mr Arambašić for an adjournment at the start of
the hearing;
(b)
A procedural question – whether the ANZ Bank as assignor should be added as a party to the proceeding;
(c)
Whether the fact that Southern Receivables Ltd sued Mr Arambašić
twice in the District Court gives him any defence to the present
proceeding; (d)
Whether the complaint by Mr Arambašić that a process-server, when
serving an earlier District Court proceeding, assaulted his son gives him a defence in this proceeding; and (e)
The merits of the case, in particular the defences raised by Mr
Arambašić on the merits that there is no contractual relationship
between him and Southern Receivables Ltd and that Southern
Receivables Ltd has not adequately proved its claim.
[3]
The
case for Southern Receivables Ltd is that in May 2000 Mr Arambašić
applied to the ANZ for a Visa Gold credit card. It says that the bank issued him with a credit card, subject to a credit limit of $28,000. It was also subject to the bank’s standard conditions for the operation of its Visa Gold credit card which included terms as to minimum monthly payments, paying over-limit amounts, and the right of the bank to charge fees and interest in the event of a default.
[4] Southern Receivables Ltd’s evidence is that the last payment Mr Arambašić made on the credit card account was in August 2009. On 26 May 2010 the outstanding balance owed on the credit card was $31,443.94. Interest is said to have accrued on that sum at 19.95 per cent per annum.
[5] Southern Receivables Ltd also says that in November 2009 the bank entered into an agreement with Receivables Management (NZ) Ltd (which I understand to be the holding company for Southern Receivables Ltd) and with Southern Receivables Ltd under which debts owed to the bank would be assigned. I shall refer to some of the terms of the agreement later. For present it is enough to say that the agreement provided for ANZ to nominate debts for assignment and on payment of a price to the bank, a debt was assigned to Southern Receivables Ltd. Southern Receivables Ltd says that the debt for Mr Arambašić was assigned to it on 27 May 2010. It says it has given notice of the assignment to Mr Arambašić and has brought this proceeding to enforce the debt.
[6] This matter was started as a summary judgment proceeding in this court in March 2013. Southern Receivables Ltd had earlier started proceedings in the Auckland District Court but those have been discontinued. It will be necessary to refer to those proceedings later.
Mr Arambašić’s adjournment application
[7] In this proceeding Mr Arambašić filed a notice of opposition. The matter was
called in the summary judgment list on 30 April 2013. It was called again on 6 June
2013. On that date directions were given for this matter to be heard at 10:00am on
19 August 2013.
[8] When the matter was called on 6 June 2013, Mr Arambašić confirmed that he wanted to rely on the matters set out in his amended notice of opposition. Throughout, Mr Arambašić has appeared for himself. In anticipation of the hearing, the plaintiff prepared written submissions, a bundle of authorities and a casebook. The plaintiff’s lawyers arranged for those documents to be couriered both to the court and to Mr Arambašić. The documents sent to the court were received on
8 August 2013. This morning, at the start of the hearing, Mr Arambašić applied for an adjournment. He produced a courier package of documents which had not been opened. He asked for an adjournment, saying that he had only received that package of documents this morning. I found that surprising, because court documents had found their way successfully to court on 8 August 2013, whereas Mr Arambašić was contending that he had only received them on the morning of 19 August 2013.
[9] In the circumstances, I adjourned the hearing until 2:15pm this afternoon. I invited Mr Arambašić to open the package and familiarise himself with its contents, in particular the written submissions of counsel for the plaintiff and the casebook. The matter was then heard, beginning at 2:15 this afternoon.
[10] In submissions in reply, counsel for the plaintiff advised that she had caused enquiries to be made of the courier company. She tendered a copy of a document received back from the courier company. That record from the courier company shows that the documents were delivered to Mr Arambašić’s address on 8 August
2013. In the circumstances, Mr Arambašić has had from 8 August 2013 to 19 August
2013 to prepare for the hearing. Any disadvantage he has been under, for not having prepared for the hearing, has been the result of his failure to open the courier package and familiarise himself with the contents. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there has been no injustice to him in conducting the hearing at 2:15pm on 19 August 2013.
[11] Mr Arambašić referred to the document tendered by counsel. The record from the courier company referred to the documents being signed for by a side door. Mr Arambašić then challenged the plaintiff to produce a copy of his signature. That is not necessary. It is only necessary for the plaintiff to ensure that the documents are delivered to Mr Arambašić’s address for service. I am confident that the documents did reach his home address in Blockhouse Bay Road on 8 August 2013.
Does the ANZ Bank need to be joined?
[12] The next question is a procedural matter – whether the ANZ bank, as assignor, needs to be added to the proceeding under s 52(4)(b) of the Property Law Act 2007:
52 Further provisions about assignments
...
(4) The assignor must be joined in any proceeding brought by the assignee against the debtor if— ...
(b) there has been an assignment only in equity of all or part of a thing in action.
[13] The distinction has to be drawn between assignment of a thing in action which would be recognised in equity even if it may not be effective at law and an assignment that is effective at law as well as in equity. The requirement for an effective assignment of a thing in action which would satisfy the statute is set out in s
50(1) of the Property Law Act 2007:
50 How thing in action assigned
(1) The absolute assignment in writing of a legal or equitable thing in action, signed by the assignor, passes to the assignee—
(a) all the rights of the assignor in relation to the thing in action;
and
(b) all the remedies of the assignor in relation to the thing in action; and
(c) the power to give a good discharge to the debtor.
[14] To see whether the assignment is effective in law as well as in equity, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the agreement to assign the debt of November 2009 and the arrangements that the parties made for the assignment to take effect.
[15] The agreement is between the ANZ National Bank (now known as the ANZ Bank) as assignor, and Receivables Management NZ Ltd and Southern Receivables Ltd. For this decision I will treat Receivables Management NZ Ltd and Southern
Receivables Ltd as one and the same. The agreement is an agreement to assign debt
– that is, it sets out contractual provisions under which debts held by the ANZ Bank were to be assigned to Southern Receivables Ltd in the future. For present purposes, important provisions of the agreement are clauses 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4:
2.1 Assignment of Debt
(a) In the event that ANZ determines to assign to a third party all or any part of a debt that it determines, acting reasonably, satisfies the criteria, ANZ must assign that debt to SRL and SRL must (and RML will procure that SRL does) subject to clause 2.1(b) accept the assignment of that debt in accordance with the terms of this agreement.
(b) If SRL determines, acting reasonably, that the criteria are not satisfied in relation to a nominated debt, SRL may decline to accept an assignment of that nominated debt.
(c) Nothing in this agreement limits or restricts ANZ’s right to determine (in its complete discretion) whether to assign all or any part of a debt.
(d) Nothing in this agreement limits or restricts the parties’ rights in
relation to debts that do not satisfy the criteria.
...
2.3 Payment of purchase price
(a) SRL agrees to pay (and RML agrees to procure SRL to pay) to ANZ the purchase price for each nominated debt for the immediately preceding month in clear and immediately available funds before
4:00pm on the 10th and 20th of each month.
(b) In the event of a disputed debt, S R L agrees to pay (and R M L agrees to procure S R L to pay) to ANZ the purchase price as determined by ANZ in accordance with clause 2.3(a) pending resolution of that dispute.
2.4Assignment effective - with effect on and from payment of the purchase price
(a) ANZ transfers and assigns absolutely to S R l the assigned property; (b) S R L accepts the assignment of the assigned property and agrees to
assume, perform and comply with the assumed obligations as if
originally named as a party in the relevant credit documents, and all references in the credit documents to ANZ shall be read and
construed as if they were references to SRL; and
(c) S R L shall enjoy all the right and benefits of ANZ under the relevant credit documents.
[16] In short, the ANZ Bank could determine whether it would assign certain debts – usually debts payable under personal loans and credit cards – that satisfied certain criteria set out in the agreement. It would then notify Southern Receivables Ltd of the debts it intended to assign. Southern Receivables Ltd had the right to reject those debts in accordance with clause 2.1(b). Those it did not reject and which it was not entitled to reject it had to pay for, and upon payment then the debt was assigned, as provided in clause 2.4.
[17] Mr Fleming, a director of Southern Receivables Ltd also explained it in his affidavit:
6ANZ emails SRL a spreadsheet each month containing particulars of each debt that it nominates for assignment. Sometimes hundreds of debts are assigned at once in this way. Following receipt of ANZ’s email containing the spreadsheet of nominated debts in accordance with 2.3 S R L pays ANZ the agreed purchase price of the nominated debts.
...
8Clause 2.4 provides that upon S R L’s payment of the purchase price the parties agree that the assignment would take effect, with ANZ transferring and assigning absolutely to S R L the assigned debt. ANZ asserts no further ownership or interest in the debt from that point.
9In this case, the debt owed by the defendant was nominated for assignment, within the May 2010 spreadsheet from ANZ. ...
10 The assignment was effected on or about 27 May 2010 upon S R L
paying the agreed purchase price for the debt.
[18] As recognised by Mr Fleming, assignment occurred at the time that Southern Receivables Ltd paid for debts which had been notified to it by schedules sent by the ANZ Bank and which it had not rejected. The question here is whether the arrangements described by Mr Fleming in his affidavit and as set out in the agreement and supporting documentation, amount to an assignment in writing within s 50(1) of the Property Law Act 2007. It is clear that the agreement of November
2009 is not, by itself, enough to constitute an assignment. It is merely an agreement to assign. By that agreement the parties have set out their contractual arrangements under which debts will be assigned in the future.
[19] When ANZ submitted a schedule of debts proposed to be assigned, that also was not, by itself, enough to constitute an assignment in writing, because assignment did not take effect at that time. Southern Receivables Ltd still retained the right to consider the schedule and to reject debts if it could do so in terms of clause 2.1 of the agreement to assign.
[20] Accordingly, assignment was only complete once Southern Receivables Ltd paid for the debts to be assigned to it. The act of receiving a payment from Southern Receivables Ltd is not an action in writing by ANZ Bank Ltd.
[21] I accept on the authorities that no particular words are required for an assignment – that is, standard words of conveyance are not required. Informal words are perfectly adequate to effect an assignment. For example, if an assignor were to write on paper to an assignee “This debt is now yours.” those would be effective words of an assignment under s 50(1), even though they are not the words that conveyancing lawyers would use.
[22] The matter I have considered is whether the fact that the assignment is completed by payment is enough to take the matter outside s 50(1) of the Property Law Act. In the end, I have accepted Ms Dwight’s submission that it would not be correct to look at the payment in isolation from the other documents. In this regard, she has cited Re Universal Management Ltd.1 That case is not on all fours. It is a case under s 130 of the Property Law Act 1952. The court indicated that in determining the substance of a transaction it is permissible to look not only at the terms of the documents but also the surrounding circumstances.
[23] Ms Dwight also referred me to Bishop v Financial Trust Ltd.2 That case concerned the giving of notice under s 130 of the Property Law Act 1952. The issue was that a notice of assignment had been given before the assignment actually took place. The Court of Appeal was prepared to take a broad view and to accept that notice given ahead of an actual assignment could nevertheless be effective notice of
the assignment.
1 Re Universal Management Ltd [1983] NZLR 463 (CA) at 470.
2 Bishop v Financial Trust Ltd [2008] NZCA 170.
[24] These cases are guidance that a narrow approach is not to be taken. I bear in mind that this is essentially a commercial transaction arranged between commercial people, where lawyers would not normally be engaged and the niceties of conveyancing would not normally be expected. The transaction can be looked at in the round - that is, the agreement for assignment of debt, the submitting of the schedules by the ANZ bank, followed by the payment cumulatively, constitute an assignment which has been carried out in writing. Accordingly, I find that the assignment of the debt in this case was effective under s 50(1) of the Property Law Act 2007. Because it was effective under s 50(1) the requirements of s 52(4)(b) are not triggered and it is not necessary to join the ANZ Bank as a party to this proceeding. I also note that a manager of the ANZ Bank has sworn an affidavit in support of the plaintiff ’s claim which gives helpful evidence. It is clear that the ANZ Bank affirms that it has assigned the debt to Southern Receivables Ltd and does not make any claim to be the creditor itself. I am satisfied that there is no reason to require the ANZ Bank to be joined.
Earlier proceedings in District Court
[25] Mr Arambašić objected that Southern Receivables Ltd had earlier sued him in the District Court. In fact it had sued him twice in the District Court. The first proceeding was in the Auckland District Court under CIV-2010-004-2135. That proceeding was started in September 2010 but was discontinued in January 2011. The discontinuance apparently occurred by operation of law, because of a failure by Southern Receivables Ltd to file a notice of pursuit of proceeding on time.
[26] The second proceeding by Southern Receivables Ltd in the District Court is CIV-2011-004-1402. That proceeding was started in November 2011 but was discontinued on 15 March 2013. That was the same date as when the plaintiff began this proceeding in this court.
[27] The complaint from Mr Arambašić comes down to this. He says that the plaintiff has discontinued against him twice in the District Court, so the plaintiff should not be allowed to come against him again, especially in this court.
[28] I have given the reason why Southern Receivables Ltd could not continue with its first proceeding. It says that it elected to abandon the second proceeding in the District Court because there had been a series of delays in the District Court and it wanted to avoid any further delay. It says that Mr Arambašić had raised matters in defence in the District Court which it considered lacked merit, but it felt that having to go to a hearing would involve it in disproportionate cost. It decided the matter could be decided on affidavit evidence alone and it also said, somewhat spuriously, that it considered that Mr Arambašić would not accept the judgment of the District Court and would appeal to this court in any event.
[29] I do not want to be understood to be endorsing those explanations. I am concerned that this proceeding has been brought in this court. The claim is for only some $31,000. It is a debt-collecting proceeding. The District Court has jurisdiction for ordinary civil proceedings - including debt-collection proceedings such as this - for sums up to $200,000. I am satisfied that the District Court does have jurisdiction to give summary judgment.3 I cannot see why this proceeding could not have been the subject of a summary judgment proceeding in the District Court instead of in this court.
[30] I do regard the fact that the plaintiff has brought this proceeding in this court as having caused added difficulties for Mr Arambašić. He is a litigant in person. Apparently he is unable to afford a lawyer. As part of its response to steps Mr Arambašić has taken, Southern Receivables Ltd has taken the point that he has not complied with the rules in certain respects – for example, by not adducing evidence by duly sworn affidavits and by relying on hearsay statements and “will say” statements which have not been properly sworn.
[31] I can understand the difficulties of Mr Arambašić in having to cope with the procedures of this court. I regard him as having been at a disadvantage in opposing this proceeding in this court. I can accommodate that by taking a liberal approach and accepting the evidence he would want to rely on. I do that on the basis that if objections to non-affidavit evidence were to be sustained, it would be necessary to
adjourn the matter to allow evidence to be adduced in proper form. I am conscious that that would add to the costs of all parties and would be undesirable.
[32] While I regard the fact that Southern Receivables Ltd has made matters more difficult for Mr Arambašić by bringing the proceeding in this court instead of in the District Court, I cannot find that this was so severe a departure from normal procedure as to amount to an abuse of process. Ms Dwight has referred me to relevant authorities which indicate that it is open to a litigant to begin a proceeding in the District Court, to discontinue that proceeding, paying costs if necessary, and then to start a fresh proceeding in the High Court. She has cited authorities such as Portside Apartments Ltd v Breakers Gisborne Ltd and McKeown Group Ltd v
Russell.4 Southern Receivables Ltd has been inefficient in the way it has gone about
trying to recover this debt from Mr Arambašić. It has incurred higher costs by bringing three proceedings, including one in this court. And it has done so in a way which has caused added difficulties to Mr Arambašić. Nevertheless its proceeding is still regular and I cannot regard it as abusive. Instead, I can address the matter with my decision as to costs, which I will deal with at the end of this decision.
Assault on Mr Arambašić’s son
[33] The next matter raised by Mr Arambašić is that when he was sued in the District Court a process-server instructed by Southern Receivables Ltd came to his home to serve him. He was not present, but his son was. He alleges that as a result of actions by the process-server his son suffered an injury. He laid a complaint of assault with the Police. These are the matters where he has relied on unsworn statements by his son, and by another witness.
[34] I prefer to deal with this matter, not by taking the technical point that he has not provided sworn evidence, but instead by looking at the merits of the matter. I consider whether, even if those matters set out in those unsworn statements were adduced as evidence, they would still give any defence to this proceeding.
[35] This proceeding is a claim for debt. Southern Receivables Ltd is saying that it is entitled to recover amounts payable to the ANZ Bank under a credit card. In a claim for a debt such as that, it is no defence for defendants to say that the plaintiff has also injured them. In this case it is not Mr Arambašić who has suffered the alleged injury, but his son. If there has been an assault then any claim for that assault would be by the son, not by Mr Arambašić. Even if Mr Arambašić himself had suffered the injury, his remedy would be a counterclaim. A counterclaim, in law, would not amount to a defence to an application for summary judgment. In saying that, I am setting out the rule that counterclaims operate as separate claims – that is, they are swords, not shields and they do not provide a defence to a claim. In this case any complaint about the actions of the process-server, even if attributable to Southern Receivables Ltd, would not amount to a defence to a claim for payment of the debt.
[36] Accordingly, I conclude that the complaint as to the actions of the process- server in another proceeding does not give Mr Arambašić any grounds to dispute liability for the debt claimed by Southern Receivables Ltd.
Does Mr Arambašić have a defence on the merits?
[37] Mr Arambašić has not adduced any evidence himself as to the merits of the claim. I understand him to be saying two things. First, he says that there was no contractual relationship between him and Southern Receivables Ltd. Second, he is putting the plaintiff to proof. In his affidavit in opposition he has said: “I say that the plaintiff has no evidence to back up its claim”.
[38] On the first question, Mr Arambašić is correct that there is no contractual relationship between himself and Southern Receivables Ltd. But that shows a misunderstanding of the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff’s claim is that there was a contractual relationship between the ANZ Bank and Mr Arambašić. That contractual relationship arose out of the arrangements made for the operation of the credit card. The credit card enabled Mr Arambašić to use credit extended by the ANZ bank under the credit card facility. Under that contractual relationship the ANZ bank had the right to sue Mr Arambašić himself if he did not comply with the terms of that facility
and did not repay the amount of the debt on time. That right of the ANZ bank to sue Mr Arambašić is also something that the ANZ bank is entitled to transfer to other people. The ANZ bank’s claim against Mr Arambašić is what the law calls a “thing in action”. A “thing in action” is something that can be transferred by one person to another. What the ANZ bank has done in this case is that it has transferred that claim to Southern Receivables Ltd. The law recognises that that assignment was valid. Under that assignment Southern Receivables Ltd is entitled to make a claim against Mr Arambašić, relying on the terms of the contract between the ANZ bank and Mr Arambašić. In other words, the absence of a contractual relationship between Mr Arambašić and Southern Receivables Ltd does not stand in the way of Southern Receivables Ltd suing him.
[39] Second, Mr Arambašić has contested the adequacy of the evidence given by Southern Receivables Ltd against him. In a summary judgment application, the onus is on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the defendant has no defence to the claim. It is open to a defendant to take the course taken by Mr Arambašić which is to refuse to give any evidence on the merits of the case but to oppose the proceeding and say that the evidence adduced is not adequate to show that there is a defence. It is, however, a course that most defendants in summary judgment applications do not take. Most of the time defendants who oppose do provide evidence as to the merits of a claim by a plaintiff.
[40] It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence. The part of the evidence that Mr Arambašić has focussed on is the evidence of the ANZ Bank as to the opening of the credit card account.
[41] The ANZ Bank witness is Mr Mark Beams. He is the manager external agencies (asset recovery management team). He had no direct dealings with Mr Arambašić, at the time the credit card account was opened. He had nothing to do with the opening of the credit card account. Mr Beams is in the position of a bank officer who has had to examine bank records to establish what has happened and has endeavoured to describe what has happened by reference to those records and also to bank procedures.
[42] Mr Beams says that the credit card account was opened on 12 May 2000. He has put in evidence a copy of a screen printout from the bank’s time management system, showing that such an account was opened in May 2000 by Mr Arambašić. From his knowledge of the bank’s systems, he says that for that document to be established through the client management system, Mr Arambašić would have completed an account application form. He says that the account application form would have provided the data for the document attached as Exhibit A to his affidavit. Unsurprisingly, he says that the member of the bank’s staff who entered the data cannot be ascertained. He notes that it is some 12 years ago, and he says that the application form itself can no longer be accessed. Mr Beams says that the forms used by the bank containing an acknowledgement by the customer to be bound by the bank’s terms and conditions. He makes the point that Mr Arambašić would not have been able to open or operate the account unless he had signed the application form. Mr Beams says, by reference to the bank’s systems, that the bank credit card would not have been sent out to the customer until the customer had complied with the formalities for opening the facility.
[43] Clearly, Mr Beams is not giving first hand evidence. His evidence is hearsay as to the documents. Nevertheless I regard the evidence he gives as being admissible hearsay by reason of s 19 of the Evidence Act 2006. The records attached to Mr Beams’ affidavit are business records, as business records are defined in s 16 of the Evidence Act 2006. A business record is, amongst other things, a document made in the course of business and is part of a record of that business. Under s 19, hearsay statements containing business records are admissible under three alternative conditions. I regard each of those conditions as satisfied. I accept that the people who supplied the information to compose the record would be unavailable as witnesses. Those are the staff members who would have prepared the documents. I accept that they cannot readily be identified, and would not be available as that term is used in the Evidence Act.
[44] Next, I do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by requiring those people to attend to give evidence. In view of the lapse of time they could not reasonably be expected to have remembered any of these matters from their first-
hand memory. It would also give rise to undue expense and delay if those people were required to attend to give evidence.
[45] Accordingly I accept the statements made by Mr Beams in his affidavit.
[46] Mr Arambašić attacks this evidence. He takes the point that as his signed application form cannot be produced to the court then Southern Receivables Ltd cannot establish that he did enter into the credit facility with the bank.
[47] Mr Arambašić has not given any evidence taking issue with any of the matters set out in Mr Beams’ affidavit. The matters set out in Mr Beams’ affidavit are sufficient to satisfy me that Mr Arambašić did open a Visa Gold credit card account with the ANZ Bank, and that the terms on which he operated that credit card were subject to the bank’s normal terms for the operation of Gold credit cards. The Visa card statements attached to his affidavit show that Mr Arambašić did operate the account, and that the last payment he made was in August 2009. The fact that the last payment was made in August 2009 is relevant. It means that for limitation purposes, time started to run from that payment under s 25 of the Limitation Act
1950. Accordingly, this proceeding is within time and is not subject to a limitation defence.
[48] I accept on the basis of those records that as at May 2010 Mr Arambašić did owe the bank $31,443.94 on his Visa Gold credit card. I also accept the bank’s evidence that interest runs on that sum at 19.95 per cent per annum.
Result
[49] In the absence of any evidence from Mr Arambašić addressing these matters, I find that Southern Receivables Ltd has shown that Mr Arambašić does not have any defence to the claim in this proceeding. Accordingly, Southern Receivables Ltd is entitled to judgment for the amount claimed, plus interest at the contractual rate down to the date of judgment. I give judgment accordingly.
[50] For costs Southern Receivables Ltd recognises that when a plaintiff brings a proceeding in this court which could be brought in the District Court, costs are awarded in this court on the District Court scale. The plaintiff does not seek any higher award. However, this matter needs to be looked at in the round. I do not regard the fact that the plaintiff brought this proceeding in this court as satisfactory. While it is unsatisfactory, it has not amounted to an abuse of process.
[51] When summary judgment is available in the District Court I regard it as bearing extra hard on a defendant to be sued for some $31,400 in this court. This is an appropriate case for the court to mark its disapproval of the plaintiff having sued for $31,400 in this court. I mark that disapproval by reducing the costs that would otherwise be awarded on the District Court scale by 50 per cent.
………………………………..
R M Bell
Associate Judge
2