IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2021-404-1316
[2023] NZHC 2891
UNDER the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and the Land Transfer Act 2017 IN THE MATTER
of an application to recall a decision by Venning J dated 6 September 2023
BETWEEN
GLENN MICHAEL SOROKA and FLYING
CROSS TRUST LTD as trustees of the FLYING CROSS TRUST (in liquidation) Applicants
AND
LOUISE CLARE MEREDITH
Respondent
Hearing: (On the papers) Judgment:
16 October 2023
JUDGMENT OF VENNING J
Application to recall judgment
This judgment was delivered by me on 16 October 2023 at 3.45 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
Solicitors: Craig Griffin Lord, Auckland
McVeagh Fleming, Auckland
Counsel: K W Fulton, Auckland
Copy to: Applicants
SOROKA v MEREDITH [2023] NZHC 2891 [16 October 2023]
[1] In a judgment delivered on 7 September 2023 the Court dismissed Mr Soroka’s application to amend the Tomlin order (more correctly to amend the terms of the settlement agreement) and also dismissed his interlocutory application for declarations.1
[2] Mr Soroka, who continues to represent himself, has filed an application seeking to have the judgment recalled. The application is opposed by both the respondent and also the liquidators of Flying Cross Trust Limited (in liquidation) (FCT).
[3] As advised in a minute issued on 6 October 2023,2 the application is to be dealt with on the papers.
[4] The principles regarding recall are well settled. Recall is provided for by r 11.9, High Court Rules 2016. The leading statement remains that of Wild C J in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2):3
Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled - first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.
[5] That approach was confirmed and applied by the Supreme Court in Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd.4
[6]Mr Soroka appears to rely on two of the above grounds, namely:
(a)counsel’s failure to direct the Court to a relevant legislative provision; and
1 Soroka v Meredith [2023] NZHC 2510.
2 Minute of Venning J, dated 6 October 2023.
3 Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 at p 633.
4 Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 122.
(b)the existence of another “very special reason”.
Failure to refer to a relevant legislative provision
[7] Mr Soroka notes that there was no reference by counsel during the…
Continue reading Soroka v Meredith
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Soroka v Meredith [2023] NZHC 2891
- Case
- [2023] NZHC 2891
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the Court had to resolve included whether the judgment could be recalled based on the failure of counsel to direct the Court's attention to a relevant legislative provision and whether there existed any other "very special reason" justifying the recall of the judgment. Soroka argued that there was a failure to refer to a relevant legislative provision and that there was another "very special reason" for recall. The Court, however, dismissed these grounds. It held that there was no necessity for counsel to explicitly reference specific rules, and that the judgment was dismissed on the merits, not because it was incorrectly brought. The Court also rejected Soroka's attempt to revisit the substantive merits of the decision and the suggestion that being a litigant in person constituted a "very special reason" for recall.
The Court concluded that the application for recall was dismissed with costs awarded to both the liquidators and Meredith for the memorandum filed in opposition. The Court further instructed that there should be no need for further cost submissions other than a calculation of costs on a 2B basis, in line with the previous judgment. The Registrar was tasked with fixing the costs on a 2B basis as previously confirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.