Soon v The King - [2025] NZSC 174

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

SC 89/2025
[2025] NZSC 174

BETWEEN	CHIN KOK SOON Applicant
AND	THE KING Respondent

Court:	Glazebrook, Ellen France and Miller JJ
Counsel:	M T Lennard and N A Mitskevitch for Applicant P D Marshall and O A Jessop Boivin for Respondent
Judgment:	21 November 2025

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Mr Soon seeks leave to appeal his sentence of three years and 10 months’ imprisonment for his leadership role in a large-scale receiving enterprise which dealt in stolen property.[1] He was sentenced on 21 charges of receiving stolen property valued at roughly $3 million and one of failing to carry out obligations in relation to a computer search. Twenty of the receiving charges were representative.
[1]See R v Soon [2024] NZHC 3393 (Radich J); and Soon v R [2025] NZCA 350 (Ellis, Peters and Walker JJ) [CA judgment].
Mr Soon was given no credit at sentencing for what he says are the financial consequences of civil restraining orders made, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, over 15 properties in which he has an interest.[2] He seeks leave to argue that the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold, following its decision in Henderson v R, that civil forfeiture orders are possibly relevant at sentencing only in exceptional circumstances.[3] His properties have not (yet) been forfeited to the Crown but he maintains that the restraining orders have caused loss in the interim. He says the properties have been mismanaged by the Official Assignee and 10 of them have been sold, mostly by the mortgagee. He contends that the resulting loss in value of his property portfolio dwarfs his illicit gains of some “tens of thousands of dollars” from the offending and ought to have been taken into account at sentencing.
[2]See Commissioner of Police v William [2024] NZHC 1140.
[3]CA judgment, above n 1, at [30]–[32] citing Henderson v R [2017] NZCA 605 at [42]–[43].
The Court of Appeal reasoned that civil forfeiture orders made against assets or profits under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 are normally irrelevant at sentencing because they seek to deprive offenders of the fruits of their criminal activity.[4] That distinguishes them from instrument forfeiture orders made under the Sentencing Act 2002, which permit forfeiture of property which was lawfully obtained but then used for criminal purposes.[5] Section 10B of that Act expressly requires that such orders made, or to be made, in respect of property used to commit or facilitate the commission of a qualifying offence must be taken into account at sentencing. It does not provide that civil forfeiture orders, still less restraining orders made in anticipation of forfeiture orders, must be taken into account.
[4]At [31].
[5]See Sentencing Act 2002, s 142N.
The Court left open whether the Official Assignee might owe Mr Soon a duty in connection with the properties.[6] However, it recognised there was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Soon v The King

Details

AGLC: Soon v The King [2025] NZSC 174
Case: [2025] NZSC 174
Decision Date: 21 November 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand recently dismissed an application for leave to appeal from Chin Kok Soon, who was sentenced to three years and 10 months' imprisonment for his role in a large-scale receiving enterprise dealing in stolen property. Mr Soon argues that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that civil restraining orders, made over 15 properties in which he has an interest, are relevant to sentencing only in exceptional circumstances. He contends that the loss in value of his property portfolio due to these restraining orders should have been taken into account at sentencing. The Crown maintains that the appeal has insufficient prospects of success and that Mr Soon does not explain how the restraining orders, which have not yet resulted in civil forfeiture orders, can be taken into account at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal had reasoned that civil forfeiture orders under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 are normally irrelevant at sentencing because they seek to deprive offenders of the fruits of their criminal activity. This distinguishes them from instrument forfeiture orders made under the Sentencing Act 2002. The Court of Appeal recognised that the Official Assignee's conduct might have led to a significant reduction in the value of Mr Soon's portfolio, but found that it was unclear how this breach of duty might play out at sentencing. The Court also noted the difficulty of quantifying economic loss from ongoing restraining orders that have yet to result in forfeiture and may not do so for some time.

The Supreme Court observed that the relevance of proceedings under the 2009 Act at sentencing might be an issue of general or public importance, but accepted the Crown's submission that Mr Soon's appeal has insufficient prospects of success to warrant a further appeal. The Court noted that the offender might encounter difficulty in persuading the court that the alleged mitigating facts were material for sentencing purposes and then in proving those facts on the balance of probabilities. The Court also observed that the issues surrounding the restraining orders could be resolved in civil proceedings and that it was unlikely that the sentencing court would find it appropriate to delay sentencing in the meantime. For these reasons, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders