Solicitor-General v Siemer HC Auckland CIV 2009-404-6747

Case

[2010] NZHC 177

26 February 2010

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2009-404-006747

IN THE MATTER OF     an application by Her Majesty's Solicitor-

General in respect of alleged contempt of court

BETWEEN  THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR NEW ZEALAND

Applicant

ANDVINCENT ROSS SIEMER Respondent

Hearing:         By memoranda

Appearances:  Ms M Laracy for Applicant

Mr Siemer in person

Judgment:      26 February 2010 at 12 noon

JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[re Costs]

This judgment was delivered by me on 26 February 2010 at 12 noon, pursuant to Rule

11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington
Copy to:

Mr V Siemer, Auckland

SOLICITOR-GENERAL FOR NEW ZEALAND  V VINCENT ROSS SIEMER HC AK CIV-2009-404-006747

26 February 2010

[1]      In  this proceeding the Solicitor-General sought  an order that Mr  Siemer  be committed to prison because he remained in contempt of specific directions made by Winkelmann  J  in  R  v  Bailey  HC  AK  CRI  2007-085-7842.  Those  orders  were addressed specifically to  Mr Siemer and required him to remove from the internet sites    and    an  article  that  revealed  details about  the  outcome  of  pre-trial  hearings  that  Winkelmann  J  had  conducted  in  the Bailey proceeding.

[2]      The Solicitor-General’s  application was set down for hearing before me  on Monday 16 November 2009.   When the case was called, counsel for the Solicitor- General advised me that there had been a number of developments over the previous few days.  These included discussions between the Solicitor-General’s office and Mr Siemer that had resulted in Mr Siemer deleting several portions of the article that he had placed on his websites regarding the  Bailey  pre-trial matters.   Counsel for the Solicitor-General  advised  me  that  the  Solicitor-General  took  the  view  that  the information on the websites no longer contravened the orders that Winkelmann J had made.  For that reason, and provided Mr Siemer was prepared to sign an undertaking not to breach the suppression orders in the future, the Solicitor-General would seek leave to discontinue the proceeding.

[3]      I then adjourned the hearing briefly so that I could consider the article in its edited  form.   Having  done  so,  I  held  residual  concerns  that  the  deletions  that  Mr Siemer  had  made  to  the  article  were  not  sufficient  to  prevent  the  article  from remaining in breach of the suppression orders that Winkelmann J had made.  When the  hearing  resumed,  I  raised  my  concerns  with  counsel  for  the  Solicitor-General. She advised me in response that the Solicitor-General was satisfied that the article no longer contravened the orders that Winkelmann J had made.  She also confirmed that Mr Siemer had signed a written undertaking not to breach the suppression orders in the future.  This was in the following terms:

I, Vincent Ross [Siemer], undertake:

1.That I understand the scope and meaning of the suppression order of Her Honour Winkelmann J (as set out in the re-issued decision of Her Honour dated 7 October 2009 in the matter of R V Bailey and others (CRI  2007-085-007842  and others)), as agreed by the  Solicitor-

General in discontinuing proceedings today based on the current form of the article; and

2.That I will not breach the order referred to above, and that I will not be a party to a breach, in any form.

[Vince Siemer] 16/11/09

[4]      The court has a vital interest in ensuring that its orders are obeyed.  It was for that reason that I raised the issue of the adequacy of the deletions with counsel for the Solicitor-General.   Once she confirmed the Solicitor-General’s satisfaction with the  situation,  however,  I  did  not  take  the  matter  further. I  granted  the  Solicitor- General leave to discontinue the proceeding and reserved the issue of costs.  That is the issue that I am now required to resolve.

[5]      The Solicitor-General submits that he is entitled to an award of costs because

of the circumstances that led to the proceeding being issued and the manner in which

it came to be resolved.  Mr Siemer disagrees.  He contends that the Solicitor-General acted improperly in bringing the proceeding, and that there was no legal basis for it.

He also submits that the Solicitor-General was the party who elected not to continue the proceeding.  For that reason, and in accordance with the usual principles that the Court applies in such cases, Mr Siemer argues that he ought to be entitled to recover from the Solicitor-General the disbursements that he has incurred in defending the application.

General principles

[6]      As   counsel   for   the   Solicitor-General   points   out,   the   fundamental   rule governing costs is that  they are  at the discretion  of the  Court:   r 14.1.   There  is a presumption, however, that a party who discontinues a proceeding will pay costs to the  other  party  up  to  the  discontinuance:  r  15.23.   That  presumption  may  be displaced  if  the  circumstances  render  a  different  outcome  just  and  equitable: Coromandel   Heritage   Protection   Society   Inc.   v   Thames   Coromandel   District Council HC HM CIV 2007-419-1649 11 February 2008 Stevens J.

[7]      Where a discontinuing plaintiff has achieved all that it set out to achieve in issuing the  proceeding the presumption may be displaced. In those  circumstances

the plaintiff may be entitled to costs as if it was a successful party:  Carmel College

Auckland Ltd v North Shore City Council HC AK CIV 2007-404-5894 Venning J.

[8]      Generally speaking, however, the Court will not speculate on the merits of a case  that  it  has  never  heard.   The  merits  of  a  case  will  only influence  the  Court’s decision  in  relation  to  costs  upon  a  discontinuance  in  exceptional  cases  where  the merits are clear.

[9]      In order to evaluate the arguments advanced by both parties it is necessary to set out the background to this proceeding in greater detail.

The background to the proceeding

[10]     The narrative begins on 8 September 2009, when Winkelmann J released her judgment dealing with pre-trial issues in the  Bailey  case. Nine days later, on 17

September 2009, Mr Siemer published an article on both and in which he made reference to several matters referred to in the judgment.   He did so notwithstanding the fact that the Judge had directed that the judgment  was  to  be  suppressed  from  publication  to  protect  the  position  of  the accused in the event that the matter proceeded to trial.

[11]     On  18  September  2009  the  Solicitor-General  wrote  to  Mr  Siemer  requiring him  to  remove  the  article  from  the  websites. In  that  letter  the  Solicitor-General indicated that he would consider issuing contempt proceedings if Mr Siemer did not act immediately.

[12]     On 23 September 2009 Mr Siemer wrote to the Solicitor-General and said:

Dear Mr Collins,

I   am   in   receipt   your   letter   dated   18   September   2009   (your   ref: SOL115/1823).

Please refer me to the law which forbids publishing public court rulings as you have demanded.

I do recognise that Justice Winkelmann ordered her public ruling suppressed, but I consider under these circumstances there is  no  lawful  basis  for  the Judge to contravene her very public duty to open and transparent justice in

such a manner.  This is particular[ly] so given the very broad implications on

so many accuseds in this case, as well as the tremendous public importance and interest.   Add to this the enormous ongoing financial cost of the court

proceedings themselves to the New Zealand taxpayers.

Please advise:

1)     Why the New Zealand public should not be informed as to the Judge’s conclusions regarding the appropriateness of police and judicial actions in the massive ‘terrorist’ raids and arrests which captivated the nation two years ago?

2)     What  law  prevents  the  New  Zealand  public  from  being  duly informed?

3)     What   law   prevents   me   from   disseminating   this   important information?

In conclusion, I am no legal scholar but it seems s14 of the Bill of Rights Act

1990 clearly permits me sharing this information with the public.  Moreover,

I can think of no conceivable reason why this information should not be publicly  shared  in  an  egalitarian  society  where  transparency  regarding  the

actions of public officials is supposedly valued.  However, I am open to your

attempts to convince me otherwise with sound legal grounds.

Sincerely,

Vince Siemer

[13]     The Solicitor-General then applied to Winkelmann J for an order directing Mr Siemer to remove from all websites over which he had any control any commentary or description of the judgment that she had issued in Bailey.  Mr Siemer filed a notice of opposition to the Solicitor-General’s application but did not appear at the hearing of the application.   He explained in his notice of opposition that he would   be   away   from   New   Zealand   until   19   October   2009,   and   sought   an adjournment of the hearing so that he could participate.

[14]     On  9  October  2009  Winkelmann  J  declined  to  adjourn  the  application  and instead  determined  it  in  Mr  Siemer’s  absence: Solicitor-General  v  Siemer  High Court  Auckland  CIV-2009-404-6243,  9  October  2009.   In  granting the  orders  that the Solicitor-General sought Her Honour said:

[16]     I considered Mr Siemer’s request that this application be adjourned

to enable him to attend the hearing but I did not grant the adjournment.  Mr

Siemer  is  in  breach  of  the  existing  suppression  order.     He  is  obliged  to comply  with  that  order  whether  or  not  I  make  the  order  sought  by  the Solicitor-General.  Moreover there is some urgency in the disposition of this application.  For the reasons discussed above it is important that Mr Siemer’s publication  of  the  material  be  removed  from  the  sites  and  as  soon  as possible.

[17]     I  therefore  make  an  order  directing  the  respondent,  Vince  Ross Siemer,  to  remove  from  all  websites  over  which  he  has  any  control,  all extracts from, commentary on and description of the judgment of this Court made on 8 September 2009.   He has 48 hours from the communication to him of this order to bring himself into compliance with it.   Mr Siemer has asked  that  communication  with  him  occur  through  his  email  address. I direct that service of the order on him be effected by way of email.  Service is deemed to be effected 24 hours after the email is sent to him.

[15]     I interpolate to say that   the   Solicitor-General   also   seeks   costs   in   the proceeding that Winkelmann J determined.  The Registry is to refer CIV-2009-404-

6423 to Winkelmann J, together with copies of the memoranda that have been filed

in relation to the issue of costs in this proceeding.   The issue of costs in CIV-2009-

404-6423 is then to be determined by Winkelmann J.

[16]     The Solicitor-General duly served the orders on Mr Siemer by way of e-mail, but  Mr  Siemer  failed  to  remove  the  articles  from  the  websites.  As  a  result,  the Solicitor-General filed the present proceeding on 14 October 2009.

[17]     The  proceeding  was  called  before  Keane  J  on  30  October  2009,  when preliminary applications  by Mr  Siemer  were  due  to  be  heard.   Mr  Siemer  did  not attend that hearing but advised the Court in a memorandum that the matter was in the hands of his lawyer.  A substantive hearing date of 10 November 2009 was fixed.

[18]     On 10 November 2009 neither Mr Siemer nor his counsel appeared when the proceeding  was  called.   A  warrant  for  Mr  Siemer’s  arrest  was  issued  and  he  was brought  to  Court. Later  that  day  his  counsel,  Mr  Orlov,  filed  a  memorandum indicating  that  he  would  accept  instructions  to  act  on  behalf  of  Mr  Siemer  if  the proceeding was adjourned to 16 November 2009.  On that basis the proceeding was allocated a firm fixture date on 16 November 2009.

[19]     On 11 November 2009 Mr Siemer deleted some material from the article and advised the Solicitor-General that he had done so. The following day Crown counsel advised Mr Siemer that the Solicitor-General did not consider that the changes went

far  enough  to  prevent  the  article  from  contravening  the  orders  that  Winkelmann  J had  made. Over  the  next  three  days  Mr  Siemer  made  further  deletions  from  the article. These  were  ultimately  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  Solicitor-General  that  the article no longer breached the suppression orders that Winkelmann J had made.   It was   in   that   context   that   the   Solicitor-General   sought   and   obtained   leave   to discontinue the proceeding.

To whom should costs be awarded?

[20]     I  have  no  doubt  that  the  Solicitor-General  was  justified  in  issuing  the proceeding. By  the  time  he  did  so  Winkelmann  J  had  issued  her  supplementary judgment.  Mr Siemer was therefore clearly on notice that any failure to remove the offending material from the website would amount to defiance of the court’s orders. His  continued  defiance  of  the  Court’s  orders  left  the  Solicitor-General  with  little option but to issue the present proceeding.

[21]     The Solicitor-General only sought leave to discontinue the proceeding after Mr Siemer had removed the offending portions of the article from the websites.  That occurred within the days immediately leading up to the hearing.  Once that occurred there was no further point to the proceeding continuing.   The Solicitor-General had always made it clear that his objective was to ensure that the material was removed from the websites.

[22]     I take the view this is an exceptional case in which the Court can have regard

to the merits of the case in determining the issue of costs.  The merits of the present case   undoubtedly   favoured   the   Solicitor-General.         The   Solicitor-General   also achieved  all  that  he  set  out  to  do  in  issuing  the  proceeding.   For  that  reason  it  is appropriate that an award of costs be made in his favour.

Should the Court award increased or indemnity costs?

[23]     The court has the power to order increased or indemnity costs under r 14.6(3)

and (4)(a) and (b).  They provide as follows:

(3)      The court may order a party to pay increased costs if—

(a)the  nature  of  the  proceeding  or  the  step  in  it  is  such  that  the  time required  by  the  party  claiming  costs  would  substantially  exceed  the time allocated under band C; or

(b)the party opposing costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—

(i)     failing  to  comply  with  these  rules  or  with  a  direction  of  the court; or

(ii)     taking  or  pursuing  an  unnecessary  step  or  an  argument  that lacks merit; or

(iii)    failing,    without    reasonable    justification,    to    admit    facts, evidence, documents, or accept a legal argument; or

(iv)    failing,  without  reasonable  justification,  to  comply  with  an order for discovery, a notice for further particulars, a notice for interrogatories,  or  other  similar  requirement  under these rules;

or

(v)     failing,  without  reasonable  justification,  to  accept  an  offer  of settlement whether in the form of an offer under rule 14.10 or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding; or

(c)     the proceeding is of general importance to persons other than just the parties and it was reasonably necessary for the party claiming costs to bring it or participate in it in the interests of those affected; or

(d)some other reason exists which justifies the court making an order for increased  costs  despite  the  principle  that  the  determination  of  costs should be predictable and expeditious.

(4)      The court may order a party to pay indemnity costs if—

(a)the   party   has   acted   vexatiously,   frivolously,   improperly,   or unnecessarily in commencing, continuing, or defending a proceeding

or a step in a proceeding; or

(b)the party has ignored or disobeyed an order or direction of the court or breached an undertaking given to the court or another party; or

...

[24]     I have no doubt that the manner in which Mr Siemer has conducted himself would warrant an order that he pay increased costs.  He clearly failed to comply with directions of the court in terms of r 14.6(3)(b)(i) and his opposition to the application lacked merit in terms of r 14.6(3)(b)(ii).   In addition, the proceeding was of general importance to the accused in the Bailey case and it was also important generally in terms of the administration of criminal justice.

[25]     I do not, however, consider that an award of increased costs would adequately deal with the situation that has arisen in the present case. Mr Siemer has openly  defied the orders  of  the  court  in  the  knowledge that the Solicitor-General would inevitably respond by bringing contempt proceedings.  The stand that he took in relation to the validity of the court’s orders was untenable.  In those circumstances

I am satisfied that indemnity costs are justified under r 14.6(4)(a) and (b).

[26]     Counsel for the Solicitor-General  has  submitted  that  indemnity  costs  of

$38,281.40  should  be  awarded  together  with  disbursements  of  $898.68  and  travel expenses totalling $3,310.87.   Presumably the amount claimed for counsel’s time is recorded  in  time  records  that  the  Solicitor-General  has  kept. Before  making  an award  of  costs  I  direct  that  the  Solicitor-General  is  to  file  a  further  memorandum setting out  the  basis  on  which  the  claim  for  time  spent  has  been  calculated.   That memorandum  is  to  be  filed  and  served  within  seven  days.   Mr  Siemer  is  then  to respond within seven days thereafter.   I will then make a final determination based on the material filed.

Mr Siemer’s request for a transcript of the hearing

[27]     Following the hearing before me, Mr Siemer filed a memorandum in which

he sought a transcript of the hearing.   Given that this matter is now at an end, I do not consider that it is appropriate to put the state to the further expense of preparing a

transcript.  I therefore decline to direct that one be prepared.

Lang J

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

1