IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2014-404-3363 [2015] NZHC 160
UNDER the Companies Act 1993 IN THE MATTER OF
an application for an order that Certificate of Title 215175 vest in the applicants
BETWEEN
NEIL RICHARD SMITH, ELAINE MAVIS SMITH AND DAVID JOHN GRAEME COX as trustees of the NEIL AND ELAINE SMITH FAMILY TRUST Applicants
AND
SOUTHERN BUILDERS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) AND (STRUCK OFF) Respondent
Hearing: 9 February 2015 Counsel:
A M Rutten for the Applicants
No appearance by or on behalf of the RespondentJudgment:
13 February 2015
JUDGMENT OF MUIR J
This judgment was delivered by me on 13 February 2015 at 12 noon, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Rennie Cox, Auckland
SMITH v SOUTHERN BUILDERS LIMITED (IN LIQ) AND (STRUCK OFF) [2015] NZHC 160 [13 February
2015]
[1] This matter was called in the Duty Judge List on 9 February 2015 when orders were sought by the applicants on their originating application to vest in them a property described as 3 Naho Place, Meremere comprised and described in Certificate of Title 215175, South Auckland Land Registry (“the property”).
[2] There was no attendant application for permission to commence proceedings by way of originating application as required by r 19.5 of the High Court Rules. However, to regularise the position I grant that permission.
[3] Nor did accompanying memoranda elaborate, beyond identification of the statutory provisions relied on, on the Court’s jurisdiction to make the order. However, when the matter was called Ms Rutter did provide me with a copy of a decision to which I will subsequently refer and which she suggested I may find helpful.
[4] I minuted the file that I would need to consider the matter further. My decision necessarily proceeds without the benefit of opposing argument.
[5] The applicants are mortgagees of the property. The mortgagor was the respondent now in liquidation and struck off.
[6] Notice of the originating application was served on both the Official Assignee and the former registered office of the company. No steps have been taken.
[7] The application arises out of a notice by the Official Assignee, dated
20 December 2012, disclaiming the property.
[8] The outstanding amount of the mortgage is approximately $160,000 and the value of the property approximately half that.
[9] On 7 November 2014, the respondent purported to enter into an agreement for sale and purchase in respect of the property. That agreement was a nullity on account of the fact that the property had been disclaimed meaning that whatever interest the company in liquidation might have had in the disclaimed property had
vested in the Crown.1 The applicants now wish to sell the property to the same purchasers at the same price.
Jurisdiction
[10] The application was made in reliance on ss 269(5) and (6) of the Companies Act 1993 and s 52(1)(b)(iv) of the Trustee Act 1956. I cannot see how the Trustee Act provision is engaged. It relates to…
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- Case
- [2015] NZHC 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court needed to decide was whether the applicants were entitled to have the property vested in them under the Companies Act 1993 and the Trustee Act 1956. The applicants relied on sections 269(5) and (6) of the Companies Act and section 52(1)(b)(iv) of the Trustee Act. The court found that the Trustee Act provision did not apply as it was concerned with insolvent corporate trustees rather than the registered proprietors of the property. The court considered whether the disclaimer of the property by the company in liquidation extinguished the mortgage or merely terminated the company's liability under it. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate the mortgage or render it a mere shell, and that the mortgage remained a valid security for the amount due at the time of the disclaimer.
The court further reasoned that it was just for the property to vest in the applicants as they held a secured interest and could effect at least a partial recovery from the proposed sale. Any significant delay in vesting the property could risk the sale. The court also noted that disclaimers typically occur when the secured amount exceeds the property's value, making it unlikely that there would be injustice in vesting the property in the mortgagee. The court ordered that the certificate of title vest in the applicants on the condition that the property be sold as soon as reasonably practicable, with the proceeds applied to various costs and the outstanding mortgage amount. The court declined the applicants' request for costs against the respondent due to the latter's lack of status for such an order.
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