Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd

Case

[2021] NZHC 1708

8 July 2021

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2018-409-000643

[2021] NZHC 1708

BETWEEN

KARLIE MARGARET SMITH

Plaintiff

AND

CLAIMS RESOLUTION SERVICE LIMITED

First Defendant

AND

GRANT SHAND BARRISTERS AND SOLICITORS

Second Defendant

Hearing: 29 June 2021

Appearances:

M Smith for Plaintiff

A Barker QC and G Davis for First Defendant A Darroch for Second Defendant

Judgment:

8 July 2021


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN


This judgment was delivered by me on 8 July 2021 at 4.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

SMITH v CLAIMS RESOLUTION SERVICE LTD [2021] NZHC 1708 [8 July 2021]

The application

[1]    The plaintiff brings this proceeding as a representative action.1 She seeks orders and/or directions:

(a)approving the content of a draft opt-in consent form; and

(b)approving the content of a draft letter to eligible opt-in group members whose contact details have been provided by the first defendant, Claims Resolution Service Ltd (CRS), to counsel for the plaintiff;

(c)approving the content of a draft social media post;

(d)that CRS:

(i)remove material from two Facebook pages it says CRS controls and have the potential to mislead eligible opt-in group members about the proceeding and/or the consequences of opting-in to the proceeding; or

(ii)that CRS be required to publish a statement on both Facebook pages correcting such material as is found to have the potential to mislead eligible opt-in group members about the proceeding and/or about the consequences of opting into the proceeding; and

(e)that all parties are required to seek the Court’s prior approval to any public statements they intend to publish during the opt-in period about the proceeding and/or about the consequences of opting-in to the proceeding.

[2]    CRS and the second defendant, Grant Shand Barristers and Solicitors (Shand), have, separately, filed notices in opposition to the application.


1      Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd [2019] NZHC 127 [Leave Judgment] and Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Smith [2020] NZCA 664.

Preliminary matter

[3]    The plaintiff no longer wishes to continue as the representative plaintiff. A replacement is being identified. Counsel agree I should decide this application as that is happening. As the opt-in period is in its last month, and some matters arising should be dealt with quickly, I have agreed to proceed in that manner.

[4]    This change of circumstances will need to be reflected in the opt-in consent form when it is approved.

Opt-in consent form

[5]    The plaintiff was required to submit for prior approval of the Court a draft opt- in consent form.2 A draft is attached to the application. The plaintiff has proposed changes to the draft to accommodate matters raised by CRS and Shand. There are still unresolved issues.

GCA existing or new website

[6]    Shand argues the form should not provide links to the plaintiff’s lawyers’ website (GCA Lawyers). It wants a website created for all relevant documents. Its concern is that potential participants receive only necessary and accurate information to make an informed decision whether to opt-in and, it says, the GCA Lawyers’ website has contained unbalanced material.

[7]    I do not consider that for a case of modest size and complexity it is necessary for a new website to be created. Furthermore, the opt-in period is well advanced and, I understand, the website posts that Shand was concerned about have been removed. I consider that adequately addresses the relevant concern.3


2      Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd [2019] NZHC 1013 at [23] and confirmed in Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2019-409-643, 19 March 2021, at [10] [Minute].

3      Cooper v ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZHC 3116 at [20].

Claims Resolution Services Ltd v Pfisterer4

[8]    All parties agree reference should be made to this judgment. In Pfisterer, Hinton J considered some of the same issues that will arise in this proceeding. Prior to judgment the case was advertised on the GCA Lawyers’ website as being “highly relevant” and having a “direct bearing” on this proceeding.

[9]    There are before me two proposed statements to be included in the form dealing with Pfisterer. I prefer the statement at [17] of CRS’s submissions. It is to be adopted.

[10]   Shand submits the form should include a summary of the Pfisterer judgment and a copy of the judgment should be available. I do not consider a summary is necessary. A copy of the Pfisterer judgment should be made available on the GCA Lawyers’ website. The form should, therefore, state the judgment is available from that website. It can conveniently be added to what is now para 9 of the form beginning, “Copies of relevant documents, including …”.

Class action or representative action

[11]   CRS objects to the use of the term “class action” and the connotations that carries with it. It submits the term “representative action” should be used. For consistency with the opt-in notice that has already been approved and published, the term “representative action” is to be used.

Providing legal advice but no lawyer

[12]   CRS raises a concern that the form provides legal advice but states that a person does not become a client of GCA Lawyers by opting-in to the proceeding. In addition, CRS advances “the more fundamental objection” of how the representative proceeding could proceed in circumstances where the solicitor for the representative plaintiff is not also acting as the solicitor for members of the representative group, or at least


4      Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Pfisterer [2021] NZHC 1088.

working with solicitors for those members. CRS says recipients of the form should be encouraged to seek their own legal advice before opting-in to the proceeding.

[13]   These submissions misunderstand the nature and purpose of the form. It is intended to present in an unbiased manner the relevant facts so that eligible opt-in group members are informed both of the proceeding and their rights in respect to it.5 Engaging GCA Lawyers is not a group member criterion. The form states that recipients may choose to engage GCA Lawyers or some other lawyer for legal advice. If GCA Lawyers offers advice, then of course obligations will arise from that. Furthermore, the form advises recipients six times to seek legal advice.

References to settlement

[14]   CRS contends it is incorrect the form refers to a settlement of the representative proceeding binding members of the representative group. CRS submits that absent some mechanism, such as a further agreement between the plaintiff, GCA Lawyers and members of the representative group, a member will not be bound to a settlement of the proceeding.

[15]   This submission appears to be contrary to Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross where the Supreme Court said, “[i]t is also clear that the representative plaintiff can settle on behalf of the class.”6 While that case was proceeding on an opt-out basis, it appears the distinction was not regarded as material. Notably, the Supreme Court expressed the view that Court approval of a settlement or discontinuance should be a condition of giving leave to bring a proceeding on an opt- out basis7 and where a proceeding is brought on an opt-in basis consideration should be given to making Court approval a term of giving leave under r 4.24(b) of the High Court Rules 2016.8


5      Lenthall v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [2020] FCA 423 at [31] and [41].

6      Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [82] referring to David Foskett The Law and Practice of Compromise (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996) at [4-11].

7 At [83].

8 At [83].

References to costs

[16]   CRS submits references to group members not being liable to pay costs is simplistic when the liability for costs is closely related to issues of funding and security for costs. It accepts if adequate security is provided it is likely group members will not be liable for costs in the proceeding but how this proceeding is to be funded has yet to be determined and the issue of liability for costs is uncertain. In support of the submission, Mr Barker QC referred to Hedley v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd where a representative order was made on the basis members of the represented group were to be jointly and severally liable for costs awarded against the representative plaintiff in favour of any defendant.9

[17]   Mr Smith accepts opting-in will not of itself protect members with pre-existing proceedings with CRS from costs in those proceedings. As far as this proceeding is concerned, he submits Hedley is distinguishable on its facts and that, in any event, in Hedley Master Venning noted the starting point for costs on a representative order is that the representative plaintiff is liable for party-party costs and the represented parties are not.10 Mr Smith also submits it is enough that if and where the issue of costs arises it can be the subject of legal advice from GCA Lawyers and that the draft form flags costs as a possible issue.

[18]   I do not consider the draft form adequately addresses the issue of party-party costs. I note in his judgment of 9 May 2019, Gendall J was not prepared to, “publicise predictions as to funding and costs at this point.”11 That was because it was not known how many people had joined the proceeding and to what extent external funding had been secured and its terms. The Court of Appeal agreed with him.12 Those uncertainties remain. In addition, CRS has already commenced claims and may commence counterclaims against group members to recover outstanding fees. This, too, may have costs consequences.


9      Hedley v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd (2000) 15 PRNZ 210 (HC).

10 At [32].

11     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, above n 2, at [15].

12     Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Smith, above n 1, at [40].

[19]   A statement such as, “Class members in a class action are not individually responsible for legal costs associated with bringing the class action”, has the potential to mislead. I do not consider it is an answer to this concern that if and where the issue of costs arises it can be the subject of legal advice. The eligible group members are required to make a decision now whether to opt-in to the proceeding, not at some future time when costs have become an issue. I also do not accept the submission that the issue is adequately flagged elsewhere in the form.

[20]   I consider the form can state that generally party-party costs are the responsibility of the representative plaintiff but should also state that this is a matter for the Court to determine and may be dependent upon factors including the funding arrangement secured and its terms. If it is intended that members of the representative group will be asked to contribute to costs this should be stated.

Treatment of damages

[21]   The draft form refers to an entitlement of group members to share in Court- awarded damages. CRS submits this is misleading as even if the plaintiff’s claim is successful it is very unlikely to result in an award of damages in favour of members of the representative group. There will be, in all likelihood, a need for a stage two hearing addressing in individual cases issues of breach, reliance and loss. This was recognised and accepted by the Court of Appeal when affirming the representative order.13

[22]   The plaintiff’s response is it is clear group members’ entitlement to damages is subject to the satisfaction of conditions. I was referred to para 7(a) and (c) of the draft form. I do not agree. I consider the words, “although you may have to satisfy certain conditions before your entitlement arises”, in para 7(a), does not adequately alert the reader that such “conditions” may include a stage two hearing with all the implications that will involve in terms of costs, uncertainty of result, time and effort. Nor do I consider references in the form to the taking of legal advice is an adequate protection when the issue is not plainly identified. Paragraph 7(c) addresses another matter entirely.


13     Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Smith, above n 1, at [36].

[23]   I consider the draft form should be amended to make clear that any entitlement group members have to damages may be dependent upon the result of a stage two hearing involving a consideration of the individual circumstances of their case.

CRS counterclaims

[24]   The plaintiff accepts the draft form should include a neutral reference to the possibility that CRS may pursue counterclaims against a subset of group members. I agree this is appropriate. However, I do not consider what has been proposed (para 7(c) of the draft form) is entirely neutral. It assumes a hypothetical that CRS may set off what is owed to it against damages owed to a group member. As the Pfisterer case shows, group members may have no such entitlement.14 The paragraph should be amended to reflect this.

Way forward

[25]   The matters I have identified may require reconsideration of the wording and structure of the draft form. I would expect necessary changes can be made promptly and that counsel will cooperate in this regard. I will direct the plaintiff to submit a re- drafted form addressing the matters identified.

Draft letter to former clients

[26]   Gendall J directed the Court approved opt-in consent form be sent to 178 identified CRS clients within the representative group.15  The plaintiff has submitted a draft letter to accompany the opt-in consent form to those CRS clients. CRS does not object to a covering letter but says what has been submitted for approval goes further than is necessary. CRS has proposed a redacted version of the  draft letter.  Mr Smith did not object to a redacted version if the Court considers that appropriate.

[27]   In my view, the letter prepared by CRS is appropriate and should be used except in two respects. The letter should, for consistency, refer to representative action


14     Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Pfisterer, above n 4.

15     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, above n 2, at [19(b)(ii)].

throughout (rather than class action) and the letter should contain a paragraph 2(c) which reads:16

The High Court has considered it appropriate that we provide such people with a notice containing information about the representative proceeding.

Draft social media advertisement

[28]   The plaintiff seeks approval of a draft advertisement for social media. It is intended the advertisement will appear on the Facebook and Neighbourly platforms until 29 July 2021. CRS and Shand object to the draft advertisement.

[29]   CRS argues the Court has already approved the advertising process following application by the plaintiff. It is opposed to a further round of advertising. In addition, both CRS and Shand argue the advertisement is worded too broadly and does not take into account the limits of the approved group criteria; specifically, that the group is defined as clients of CRS who received a costing prepared by Mr Stephen Betts.

[30]   The question of advertising has been the subject of judgments of this Court and the Court of Appeal.17 It was also the subject of several minutes of the Court.18 CRS has provided GCA Lawyers with contact details of the 178 clients that satisfy the eligibility criteria of the representative group. The opt-in period is well advanced. The opt-in notice approved by the Court has been advertised and will, I understand, be advertised further in accordance with what the Court has approved. The question arises, what is the need for further advertising?

[31]   There are two affidavits of Peter Ellis, a solicitor at GCA Lawyers, filed in support of the application. In his second affidavit, Mr Ellis refers to an intention to co-ordinate further advertising in regional newspapers to coincide with publication of


16 See Cooper v ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd, above n 3, at [17] and [18].

17 Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, above n 2.

18 Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2018-409-643, 20 May 2019 [Minute]; Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, CIV-2018-409-643, 2 May 2019 [Minute]; Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Smith (CA), above n 1; Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2018-409-643, 12 February 2021 [Minute]; Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, above n 2, and Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2018- 409-643, 29 March 2021 [Minute].

social media advertisements, but that does not explain why further advertising is required.

[32]   There is a need to balance the interests of eligible opt-in group members in receiving notice of the representative proceeding (and their rights in relation to it), and the interests of the defendants to avoid reputational damage from such widespread advertising of litigation against them. In the absence of evidence there is a need for further advertising, I am not prepared to approve the draft social media advertisement.

CRS maintenance of inappropriate social media content

[33]   The plaintiff says CRS has made posts to two websites it controls of material that has the potential to mislead eligible claimants about the proceeding and/or the consequences of opting-in to the proceeding. To understand this application, some background is required.

[34]   After the plaintiff was granted representative status there was a hearing to set certain terms of the proceeding.19 Gendall J refused an application by the plaintiff to advertise her action on the Shand website and the CRS Facebook page.20 The plaintiff appealed that finding in the Court of Appeal.21

[35]   The Court of Appeal had before it evidence of posts to the CRS Facebook page which the plaintiff considered misleading. The Court noted, “the CRS Facebook page is being used to advance [CRS’] interests in this litigation” and:22

We accept the submission for the respondent that CRS’ posts clearly show that it believes it is able to reach potential plaintiffs through the page. We also accept that it is appropriate to use the Facebook page to publish the Court’s- approved opt-in notice to provide a summary of the action alongside the understandably more partisan commentary of it by CRS itself.


19     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd [2018] NZHC 127.

20     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd, above n 2, at [18]; Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd

HC Christchurch CIV-2018-409-643, 20 May 2019 at [8] [Minute].

21     Claims Resolution Service Ltd v Smith, above n 1.

22 At [45].

[36]   Having found the opt-in notice should be posted to the CRS Facebook page, the Court of Appeal referred the matter back to the High Court to determine the details of that publication.23

[37]   The matter came back before Gendall J in this Court. One of the issues arising was whether advertising should occur on a Facebook page newly created following the Court of Appeal’s judgment (the new CRS Facebook page) or on what the Court of Appeal referred to as CRS’ Facebook page which, to that point, had been used to promote the services of several companies. In the hope it aids clarity, I will now refer to this as the ESL Facebook page to distinguish it from the new CRS Facebook page.

[38]   Both Facebook pages are controlled by Bryan Staples, the director of CRS. However the distinction between them is of some importance as the ELS Facebook page was established on 10 May 2012 and has a significant number of followers and “likes”, whereas the new CRS Facebook page was created on 17 February 2021 and has no followers and no likes and very few posts.

[39]   There were memoranda filed by counsel in relation to this issue. With some differences as to the detail, both the plaintiff and CRS reached the position the opt-in notice would be published on the ESL Facebook page.24 However, on 19 March 2021, Gendall J issued a minute directing advertising on the new CRS Facebook page.25 In a joint memorandum, counsel sought clarification of the Court’s order, but Gendall J did not vary it.26 There was no appeal from the order.

[40]   The plaintiff takes issue with 13 posts on the ESL Facebook page dating from 11 March 2019 to 13 January 2021 and three posts on the new CRS Facebook page dated 17 February 2021, 23 February 2021 and 29 March 2021.27 Some posts do not


23 At [46].

24     This was recorded in memoranda of counsel for the plaintiff and CRS dated 12 March 2021 and 15 March 2021 respectively.

25     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2019-409-643, 19 March 2021 [Minute].

26     Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2019-409-643, 29 March 2021 [Minute].

27     Mr Staples deposes that the 29 March 2021 post was in fact posted prior to 29 March 2021 and prior to the commencement of the opt-in period.

directly relate to this proceeding but the plaintiff says when read together the posts advance themes:

(a)this proceeding has a certain number of actual or potential group members and is failing to attract group members;

(b)group members will have a liability for adverse costs in the proceeding;

(c)group members will be liable to pay large legal costs or subject to harsh terms of engagement by GCA Lawyers;

(d)group members will not have control in respect to settlement of the proceeding; and

(e)challenging the integrity of GSA Lawyers and Grant Cameron.

[41]   The plaintiff submits the Court has an important supervisory role in managing representative proceedings in the public interest. This includes rectifying misleading communications to potential group members in order to ensure there is no misunderstanding engendered by such communications as to group members rights, obligations and procedures to be followed. Reliance is placed on decisions of Courts in Canada, the United States of America and Australia, where class action law is more developed.28 The plaintiff submits a judicial response is required to the posts and CRS should not be allowed to continue to publish unrestrained during the remainder of the opt-in period.

[42]   There is no dispute the Court has a supervisory jurisdiction and to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice may make orders for the correction of inappropriate material during the opt-in period. The decision of the Court of Appeal that the opt-in notice should appear on the ESL Facebook page was, at least in part, a


28 Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v Ashland Oil 508 F Supp 720 (W D Ky 1981); Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] FCA 1438 at [24] and [218]; Lenthall v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2), above n 5; Ontario Inc v Pet Valu Canaa Inc. 2013 ONCA 279.

corrective measure.    In Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group, the Court of Appeal said:29

[120] We do not doubt the jurisdiction of this Court to require the distribution of corrective material to existing class members as a condition of the grant of leave, if there is concern that the members have been misled as to a matter material to their decision to opt into or opt out of a class. That must follow from the proposition, which Mr Cooke accepts, that the Court is concerned in the grant of leave not to approve proceedings if to do so would, in substance, sanction an abuse of process.

[43]   The cases to which I have been referred indicate that in the exercise of the Court’s supervisory/protective jurisdiction, corrective orders should be made with circumspection when a communication is inaccurate, intimidating, coercive or made for some improper purpose and where necessary to prevent a real or substantial risk to the fair determination of the proceeding. The exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction is not predicated on breach of an existing order or on the material being defamatory. It is also not restricted to communications between a party and group members, but can include communications by non-parties. It may be exercised in relation to communications made prior to or during the period that prospective group members must elect to opt-in or opt-out of a proceeding. I agree with Mr Smith, the focus should not be upon the staleness of the communication per se, but its potential to influence eligible group members’ decisions.

[44]   CRS argues I should not order the removal of the posts as that issue has already been determined and is res judicata. It submits the existence of the posts was the basis of the plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeal on the issue of whether the proceeding should be advertised on the ESL Facebook page. Mr Barker submits the Court of Appeal made an order requiring publication of the opt-in notice on CRS’ Facebook page expressly recognising that it would appear next to CRS’ partisan posts. Furthermore, Gendall J was aware of the posts when settling the terms of advertising.

[45]   The difficulty with this submission is that ultimately the opt-in notice did not appear on the ELS Facebook page, but on the new CRS Facebook page. As a result, the Court of Appeal’s intention to provide balance to the partisan content of the posts


29     Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group

[2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312. (footnote omitted).

was not achieved. Mr Barker recognises this, but says in response that CRS has complied with the orders the High Court ultimately made.

[46]   I do not accept the submission this matter is res judicata and Mr Barker did not develop that argument. There has not previously been an application before this Court for corrective orders in respect to these Facebook posts. That said, if the plaintiff considered corrective orders were required it could have sought them earlier. Further, the concerns now raised by the plaintiff as to the content of the posts and their potential to mislead eligible claimants are the same concerns she raised in support of applications that the opt-in notice be advertised on ESL’s Facebook page. That application was refused by Gendall J. If the plaintiff did not accept that decision the appropriate course was to appeal.

[47]   As far as the posts pre-dating the Court of Appeal’s judgment are concerned, I agree with Mr Barker that a degree of reality needs to be brought to bear on the issue. Given the age of the posts (many of which date to 2019), their content, and the steps that would be required to locate the posts, I consider there is little likelihood that eligible claimants would have any contact with the posts or be influenced by them during the opt-in period.

[48]   There are two posts to the ESL Facebook page and three posts to the new CRS Facebook page that post-date the Court of Appeal’s judgment that also need to be considered.

[49]   The two posts to the ESL Facebook page are dated 18 December 2020 and  13 January 2021. The first is an opinion piece by Mr Staples concerning a different representative action. The second is a re-post of an article from the Stuff news website concerning a dispute between Mr Cameron and a client unrelated to this proceeding. I do not consider any action is required in respect to these posts given their unrelated subject matter.

[50]   The three posts on  the  new  CRS  website  are  dated  17  February  2021,  23 February 2021 and 29 March 2021. The first is a re-post of an article that appeared on the New Zealand Herald news website concerning an action over fees charged by

Mr Cameron on an unrelated matter but with the added comment “Don’t forget Grant Cameron’s fees”. The second is a re-post of the Stuff article that appeared on the ESL Facebook page on 13 January 2021. There were no added comments to it.

[51]   The 29 March 2021 post expresses Mr Staples’ opinions on Mr Cameron and this proceeding. In my view, it contains statements that may mislead eligible claimants in relation to the number of group members, the costs of the proceeding and their potential liability for costs. The post also intends to suggest Mr Cameron lacks integrity, is pursuing this proceeding for an ulterior purpose and over-charges his clients. The comment added to the 17 February 2021 post advances the same theme in respect to Mr Cameron’s fees.

[52]   The 29 March 2021 post was published immediately prior to the commencement of the opt-in period. I consider it is inappropriate and could well influence an eligible claimant to make a decision not to opt-in to the proceeding. I consider the posts of 17 February 2021 and 29 March 2021 should be removed from the new CRS Facebook page.

[53]   I take this view despite the fact the new CRS Facebook page has no followers. I would not expect an eligible claimant to follow the page. On the other hand, it is not unlikely they might nonetheless visit the new CRS Facebook page when considering whether to opt-in to the proceeding. As there are so few posts on this page it is likely these posts would be seen.

[54]   The plaintiff has also sought an order that all parties are required to seek the Court’s prior approval to any public statements they intend to publish during the opt- in period about the proceeding and/or about the consequences of opting-in to the proceeding. This is obviously directed at CRS. CRS has undertaken not to post on the new CRS page during the opt-in period. There is no evidence it has posted inappropriate material to the ELS Facebook page during the opt-in period. I consider the order sought is unnecessary.

Result

[55]   I do not approve the draft opt-in form as submitted. I require counsel to confer and the plaintiff is to submit an amended form taking into account the matters identified in this judgment.

[56]I approve the letter to accompany the opt-in form as set out in this judgment.

[57]I do not approve the draft social media post.

[58]   I direct that CRS should forthwith remove from the new CRS Facebook page the posts dated 17 February 2021 and 29 March 2021 and is not re-post these to any Facebook page during the opt-in period.

[59]   Costs are reserved. If counsel cannot agree memoranda may be filed which are to be limited to 10 pages.


O G Paulsen Associate Judge

Solicitors:

GCA Lawyers, Christchurch Canterbury Legal, Christchurch Darroch Forrest, Wellington

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