Smith v Accessible Properties New Zealand Limited

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA453/2018
 [2019] NZCA 38

BETWEEN

ESMERALDA MONICA SMITH
Applicant

AND

ACCESSIBLE PROPERTIES NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Respondent

Court:

French and Miller JJ

Counsel:

M J Sharp for Applicant
O J Grant for Respondent

Judgment:
(On the papers)

8 March 2019 at 10.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for special leave to appeal is declined.

BThe applicant must pay the respondent costs for a standard application for leave to appeal on a band A basis with usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by French J)

Introduction

  1. Ms Smith applies for special leave under s 120 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) to appeal a decision of Woolford J in the High Court.[1] 

  2. Ms Smith is a former tenant of the respondent, Accessible Properties New Zealand Ltd.  In 2017, Accessible Properties gave Ms Smith 90 days’ notice of its intention to take possession of the rented premises, following testing that revealed levels of methamphetamine contamination at the property.  On the expiry of the 90 days, Accessible Properties obtained a possession order from the Tenancy Tribunal.[2]

    [2]Accessible Properties New Zealand Ltd v Smith NZTT Tauranga 4104292, 11 December 2017.  We note that Mrs Smith later applied for a re-hearing and the Tenancy Tribunal declined to grant one in Accessible Properties New Zealand Limited v Smith NZTT Tauranga 4104292, 22 December 2017.

  3. Ms Smith appealed the Tenancy Tribunal decision to the District Court.  The appeal was unsuccessful.[3]  Ms Smith then exercised her right of appeal on a question of law under s 119 of the Act to the High Court.

    [3]Smith v Accessible Properties New Zealand Ltd [2018] NZDC 704.

  4. In his decision, Woolford J made the following key findings:[4]

    (a)Section 51 of the Act entitles a landlord to give 90 days’ notice of termination without having to supply a reason.[5]

    (b)The only specific provision in the Act empowering the Tenancy Tribunal to declare the notice of no effect was s 54 of the Act (notice issued in retaliation of tenant exercising any right, power, authority or remedy conferred on the tenant by the tenancy agreement or any Act or any complaint by the tenant against the landlord relating to the tenancy) which did not apply on the facts.[6]

    (c)The Tribunal did not have jurisdiction under either s 78(1)(f) or under ss 77 and 85 of the Act to make an order that it was harsh and unconscionable for Accessible Properties to give Ms Smith 90 days’ notice of termination.[7]

    (d)In order to decide the case, it was not necessary to determine whether the methamphetamine testing of the property was unlawful as claimed by Ms Smith.[8]

    (e)If it had been necessary, Woolford J would have found it was not unlawful because Ms Smith had consented to the testing and in any event non-invasive testing for methamphetamine could properly…

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Details
Case
[2019] NZCA 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Smith v Accessible Properties New Zealand Limited involved Esmerelda Monica Smith, a former tenant, who sought leave to appeal a decision by Woolford J in the High Court. Smith was the tenant of a property owned by Accessible Properties New Zealand Ltd, a respondent in this case. The dispute arose when Accessible Properties gave Smith notice of its intention to terminate the tenancy due to methamphetamine contamination discovered at the property. The notice was given in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which allows a landlord to give a 90-day notice of termination without specifying a reason. Following the expiry of the notice period, Accessible Properties obtained a possession order from the Tenancy Tribunal. Smith appealed this decision to the District Court and subsequently to the High Court, but her appeal was dismissed by Woolford J. Smith then sought special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tenancy Tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside terminations of tenancies as being harsh and unconscionable, and whether landlords have the right to carry out methamphetamine testing of tenanted properties without tenant consent. The Court of Appeal examined these issues closely, considering whether they raised a seriously arguable question of law of general or public importance. The Court found that the Tenancy Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to set aside terminations of tenancies under the Act, as the statutory power to give notice was distinct from any contractual power under the tenancy agreement. Furthermore, the Court held that landlords have the right to conduct non-invasive methamphetamine testing as part of their general inspection rights, and that terminations of tenancies based on such testing results could not be set aside as being harsh and unconscionable. The Court concluded that the appeal did not raise a seriously arguable question of law and declined the application for special leave to appeal.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed Smith’s application for special leave to appeal the High Court decision. The Court found that the Tenancy Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to set aside terminations of tenancies as being harsh and unconscionable, and that landlords have the right to conduct non-invasive methamphetamine testing as part of their inspection rights. The Court also noted that the specific issue of whether the testing was done without consent was a fact-specific finding not open to appeal. Consequently, Smith was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs for the standard application for leave to appeal on a band A basis with usual disbursements.

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