Slade v Police

Case [2020] NZHC 3396


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGANUI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGANUI ROHE

CRI-2020-483-19

[2020] NZHC 3396

BETWEEN

RYAN ANDREW SLADE

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing: 16 December 2020

Counsel:

R J Leith for Appellant

H R Hancock for Respondent

Judgment:

17 December 2020


JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J


[1]    Mr Slade (the appellant) appeals a sentence of six months’ home detention that was imposed in the Whanganui District Court by Judge Smith, along with six months post-detention conditions, two fines of $250 and a disqualification from driving for 25 months.1 This was for a charge of driving whilst disqualified (third or subsequent), two charges of dangerous driving and two charges of failing to stop.2

[2]    He appeals that sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. The appellant says that the Judge failed to account for the five months that he spent on remand in prison and that his home detention sentence should be reduced accordingly, leaving him with one month’s home detention.


1      Police v Slade [2020] NZDC 23832.

2      Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(a) and 32(4) (maximum penalty two years’ imprisonment or

$6,000 fine), 35(1)(b) (maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $4,500 fine), and 52A(1)(a)(ii), 52A(3), 52A(6) and 114(2) (maximum penalty $10,000 fine).

SLADE v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2020] NZHC 3396 [17 December 2020]

[3]    The respondent acknowledges that the Judge did not make any adjustment to reflect the time spent on remand but submits that overall the sentence is not manifestly excessive because the starting point taken by the Judge in respect of the driving while disqualified charge of 12 months, was too low.

[4]    I have concluded that the appeal should be allowed. The Judge does not appear to have given any discount or credit for these five months, and the case law indicates that full credit should be given for pre-sentence time on remand when a sentence of home detention is imposed.

[5]    The starting point taken by the Judge was appropriate and, unless there is an adjustment for the time spent on remand, the end sentence will be manifestly excessive. I now set out my reasons for those conclusions.

Background

Factual background

[6]    At about 10.15 am on 12 July 2020, the appellant was seen driving in a motor vehicle and police conducted a query of the vehicle. The appellant turned down a street 20 kms above the speed limit before overtaking a vehicle. The police activated their sirens and lights to stop him, but he did not stop, accelerating to speeds of over 100 km/ph. He failed to stop and give way at two stop signs. The police lost sight of him. This gave rise to one dangerous driving charge and one failing to stop charge.

[7]    At about 10.58 am the same day, police activated their lights and siren to stop him, but the appellant again did not stop. The police initiated a pursuit. The appellant fled police, reaching speeds of 100 km/ph and…

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Slade v Police [2020] NZHC 3396
Case
[2020] NZHC 3396
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand heard an appeal against sentence brought by Ryan Andrew Slade, who was sentenced to six months’ home detention, six months post-detention conditions, two fines of $250, and a 25-month disqualification from driving. The Whanganui District Court imposed this sentence for Slade's convictions of driving while disqualified (third or subsequent), two charges of dangerous driving and two charges of failing to stop. Slade appealed the sentence, arguing that it was manifestly excessive because the District Court Judge failed to account for the five months Slade spent on remand in prison. The respondent conceded that the Judge did not make any adjustment to reflect the time spent on remand but argued that the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive because the starting point taken by the Judge was too low.

The Court concluded that the appeal should be allowed as the Judge did not give any discount or credit for the five months Slade spent on remand. The Court held that the starting point taken by the Judge was appropriate, but unless there was an adjustment for the time spent on remand, the end sentence would be manifestly excessive. The Court noted that the observations of Simon France J in Longman v Police, which highlighted the important distinction between pre-sentence time spent on electronic monitoring bail as opposed to remand in custody, were relevant to this case. The Court also noted that while there appeared to be a divergence in the manner in which this approach was applied, it preferred the approach taken by Cooke J in Stridom v Police, which held that the five months served by the appellant is effectively the equivalent of a 10-month prison sentence. If Slade served one month of home detention, it would properly account for the time that he spent in custody.

The Court also considered whether the starting point for the lead offence was too low. It found that the starting point of 12 months in respect of the driving while disqualified charge might properly be described as lenient, but it must be considered in conjunction with the cumulative sentences totalling four months for the dangerous driving charges. The Court concluded that the starting point of 16 months’ imprisonment for the three imprisonable driving offences was at the lower end of the range, but still available to the Judge.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, quashed the part of the sentence imposing six months’ home detention, and replaced it with a sentence of one-month home detention, to be followed by six months post-detention conditions. The conditions of home detention and all other terms of the sentence, including the periods of disqualification and the fines, remained unchanged.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Legal Principle Established

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