Singh v The King
[2025] NZHC 2314
•15 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2025-404-264
[2025] NZHC 2314
BETWEEN NAVJOT SINGH
Appellant
AND
THE KING
Respondent
Hearing: 11 August 2025 Appearances:
S Brickell for Appellant
L J Sullivan for Respondent
Judgment:
15 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF LANG J
[on appeal against conviction]
This judgment was delivered by Justice Lang On 15 August 2025 at 11.00 am Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:…………………………
Solicitors/counsel:
S Brickell, Barrister, Auckland Crown Law, Wellington
SINGH v R [2025] NZHC 2314 [15 August 2025]
[1] Following a trial that lasted eight days in the District Court, a jury found Mr Navjot Singh (Navjot)1 guilty on a charge of common assault.2 On 12 April 2024,
Judge J Bergseng sentenced him to 80 hours community work.3
[2] He now appeals against conviction. He contends that several irregularities that occurred during the trial have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. He therefore asks this Court in its appellate jurisdiction to set aside the conviction and sentence.
[3] Where a defendant has been found guilty by a jury in the District Court, the Court of Appeal is ordinarily the forum in which any appeal against conviction is heard. However, the fact that Mr Singh was found guilty of a category 2 offence means that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered on 27 May 2025.4
Background
[4] On 8 October 2022, the complainants, Mr Sandeep Singh (Sandeep) and Mr Manmeet Singh (Manmeet), were living at an address in Papatoetoe. They had previously lived at an address in Clover Park in a flatting situation with Navjot, Mr Jobanjit Singh (Jobanjit), Mr Tejpal Singh (Tejpal) and Mr Tajinder Singh (Tajinder).
[5] During the course of the evening the complainants were visited by Navjot. Navjot was accompanied by two other men. They were joined some time later by another group of persons, including Jobanjit, Tejpal and Tajinder.
[6] There was a dispute at trial as to the reason why Navjot had gone to the complainants’ flat. However, the Crown alleged that an argument occurred outside the address and this led to an altercation in which Navjot, Jobanjit, Tejpal and Tajinder all assaulted Sandeep and Manmeet in different ways.
1 I propose to refer to the appellant as “Navjot” because of the large number of other persons connected with the proceeding who have the surname, Singh. I refer to those persons by their first names as well.
2 Crimes Act 1961, s 196.
3 R v Singh [2024] NZDC32404.
4 Singh v R [2025] NZCA 192.
[7] After the men left their address, Sandeep went back inside and called the 111 emergency service. The police attended a short time later and observed injuries to Manmeet. Photographs were taken of these.5 Manmeet went to hospital later that evening and was discharged the next day. He had sustained lacerations to his left cheek, bruising to the eyelid, lacerations to his left chest, pain to the chest and a grazed right knee. He complained primarily of pain to the area of his ribs. Sandeep had no visible injuries.
[8] Manmeet and Sandeep made formal complaints to the police following day and at this time further photographs of Manmeet’s injuries were taken.
[9] Navjot, Jobanjit, Tajinder and Tejpal were interviewed by the police following the incident. Each acknowledged having been at the complainants’ address on the evening of 8 October 2022. However, each denied having been involved in assaulting or inflicting violence on Manmeet and Sandeep.
The trial
[10] Navjot, Jobanjit, Tajinder and Tejpal were subsequently charged with assaulting the complainants on 8 October 2023. All were charged as principals. None was alleged to have been a party to offending by the others.
[11] Both complainants gave evidence at trial about the assaults they allegedly suffered at the hands of the defendants. The police officers who were called to the scene also gave evidence and the videotaped interviews that the police conducted with the defendants were played to the jury.
[12] Navjot was the only defendant who elected to give evidence. He explained that he had gone to the complainants’ address with two others rather than by himself because he had locked his car keys inside his room and needed a ride to the address. He said that, on arrival, he and Sandeep had spoken about issues relating to Sandeep’s girlfriend. The conversation then turned to outstanding rental that Sandeep allegedly owed from the period when he had shared the Clover Park flat with Tejpal, Tajinder
5 It appears that these initial photographs were taken by the complainants, not police.
and Jobanjit only. Navjot said he contacted Jobanjit, Tajinder and Tejpal, who wanted to discuss it with Sandeep.
[13] Navjot said that, when the others arrived, they discussed the issue of the outstanding rent with Sandeep and Manmeet for a few minutes before leaving. Navjot said he stayed out of this discussion because the outstanding rent was a matter in which he had no interest. He denied that he assaulted Sandeep or Manmeet at any stage whilst he was at their address. He also said that he did not see any physical altercation between any of the others who went to the address.
[14] Navjot was found not guilty on a charge of common assault that alleged he had scratched Sandeep in the face. He was found guilty on a charge of assaulting Manmeet by hitting him on his body. Jobanjit was also found guilty on a charge of common assault that related to punching and scratching Manmeet.
[15] Tejpal was found not guilty on charges of assaulting Sandeep by punching him in the face and assaulting Manmeet using a rod as a weapon. Tajinder was found not guilty on a charge of common assault relating to an allegation that he had punched Sandeep in the face.
Appellate approach
[16] Navjot brings his appeal against conviction under s 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the Act). A first appeal court must allow an appeal against conviction following a trial by jury if a miscarriage of justice has occurred for any reason.6
[17] A miscarriage of justice will occur where there has been an error, irregularity or occurrence in relation to the trial that creates a real risk that the outcome of the trial was affected.7 A “real risk” will arise when there is a reasonable (that is, a realistic rather than theoretical) possibility that a verdict more favourable to the appellant would have been reached.8
6 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 232(2)(c).
7 Section 232(4)(a).
8 Wiley v R [2016] NZCA 28, [2016] 3 NZLR 1 at [27]–[28].
The appeal
[18] Navjot advances two grounds of appeal. His primary argument flows from the fact that Manmeet and Sandeep both gave evidence that Navjot had hit Manmeet with a metal rod. In their statements to the police neither complainant had mentioned that Navjot used a metal rod to strike Manmeet.
[19] On Navjot’s behalf, Mr Brickell submits that the evidence about the use of the metal rod created a significant issue during the trial given that the complainants had never mentioned it before. It required Navjot’s counsel to cross-examine them about an issue he had not been expecting to arise at the trial. Mr Brickell also submits the evidence may have influenced the jury’s verdict in relation to the charge of common assault on which they found Navjot guilty. He contends there is a real risk that some jurors may have concluded Navjot was guilty on that charge because he struck Manmeet with a metal rod when that was never part of the Crown case.
[20] Secondly, Mr Brickell argues that there is an inconsistency between the jury’s verdict on that charge and those delivered on the remaining defendants. He submits that the inconsistency means that Navjot’s conviction on the charge of assaulting Manmeet is rendered unsafe.
Did Navjot’s evidence about the use of the metal rod lead to an error or irregularity that may have affected the outcome of the trial?
[21] Section 17(1) of the Act requires each charge to relate to a single offence. Mr Brickell contends that, to comply with this requirement, the Crown should have laid a separate charge of assault based on the use by Navjot of the metal rod.
[22] Mr Brickell relies in this context on a clear line of appellate authority that emphasises the need for the Crown to lay separate charges when different acts are relied upon as constituting an offence.9 The use of separate charges guards against the risk that jurors will reach their verdicts on differing factual bases. Following conviction, it also enables an offender to be sentenced on a correct factual basis.
9 Mason v R [2010] NZSC, [2011] 1 NZLR 296 at [11]; White v R [2014] NZCA 241 at [8]; Maher
v R [2020] NZCA 135 at [14].
[23] Mr Brickell’s argument would have obvious merit if the Crown had attempted to rely upon the use of the rod as supporting the charge of assaulting Manmeet. However, that was never the case. For that charge the Crown relied throughout on Manmeet’s assertion that Navjot had punched him.
[24] Importantly, the prosecutor made it clear in her closing address that the jury was not required to reach any verdict on a charge based on Navjot’s alleged use of the metal rod:
In spite of what the defence might suggest, that the men have made up Tejpal choking Sandeep and Navjot cutting him with a rod, for instance, there’s nothing to say that these additional allegations are false, but in any event you’re not required to give verdicts on them because they’re not charged. However, as I’ve mentioned, in relation to the assaults that have been charged I suggest that there can be no doubt that there have been multiple assaults as both men were injured afterwards.
(Emphasis added)
[25]To similar effect, Navjot’s trial counsel referred to the evidence in this way:
You have also heard me cross-examine Sandeep and Navjot’s actions that night and we’ve heard he started by saying that Navjot scratched him on the face and that there was a hit to Manmeet, but out of the blue, never before said in any statements to police, never before commented or to a 111 call, taken for example, he says that Navjot’s also been involved with a rod. A rod has been handed from him from Tejpal. There’s other assertions by the complainants that Jaspinder had the rod. It seems that what the complainants are seeking to do in evidence is incorporate a rod being passed around by everyone and struck with it.
Now Mr Singh doesn’t [face] a charge for that and you might think that that makes sense if in Sandeep’s statement and Manmeet’s statements they never asserted Navjot Singh used a rod. What I suggest this is, is another example of the complainant, Sandeep Singh, in particular, changing his evidence to whatever suits him in order to cast aspersions or create prejudice towards Navjot in a hope that you, members of the jury, will form a negative view of Navjot. What Sandeep doesn’t get to see is the other evidence that you need to explore in the careful attention and your combined common sense you get to give to your considerations.
(Emphasis added)
[26] Mr Brickell accepts that counsel endeavoured to deal with the problem that the evidence created in these passages of their closing addresses. However, he points out that the prosecutor then muddied the waters later in her closing address when she made
the following observation whilst summarising the references in the trial transcript to the evidence the Crown relied upon for each charge:
For charge 5 you must be sure that Navjot Singh assaulted Manmeet Singh by hitting him, and this is at Manmeet’s evidence on pages 138 and 171.
[27] The reference to Manmeet’s evidence at page 138 of the transcript is not problematic because this recorded Manmeet’s evidence-in-chief in which he said that Navjot had punched him. However, the reference to page 171 of the transcript creates an issue because that page records cross-examination of Manmeet that leads on to questions about the alleged use of the metal rod. Mr Brickell submits that this reference may have led the jury to believe that the Crown was relying on this evidence as supporting the charge of assaulting Manmeet.
[28] Mr Brickell also points out that the particulars given in support of the charge were in anodyne terms. They stated only that Navjot assaulted Manmeet “by hitting him on the body”. They did not make it clear that the Crown relied solely on punches and not on Navjot’s use of the metal rod. The question trail was to similar effect.
[29] In those circumstances Mr Brickell submits it was incumbent on the trial Judge to instruct the jury in his summing up that the Crown did not rely upon Navjot’s alleged use of the metal rod as evidence supporting the charge of assaulting Manmeet. However, the Judge did not instruct the jury in this way. His only references to these issues were in the following passages of his summing up:
Charge 5 is the allegation that Navjot intentionally hit Manmeet, and again, if you’re not sure you’d find him not guilty. If you are sure you would find him guilty.
…
Mr Troon submits that Sandeep is an unreliable witness and that this becomes clear when you consider that in the course of his evidence in court, for the very first time, he says that Navjot had a rod. This was not something he’d ever said to the police or at any other time. He says this is an example of Sandeep changing his story to make things worse for Navjot.
[30] The first of these passages is found in the portion of the summing up in which the Judge went through the charge sheet. The second passage falls within the Judges summary of the defence case.
[31] The issue for this Court in its appellate role is whether the evidence about the use of the metal rod created a real risk, as opposed to a theoretical one, that the outcome of the trial may have been affected.
[32] I have concluded that no such risk has been established. First, the wording of the charge and particulars did not suggest the Crown alleged that Navjot assaulted Manmeet using a metal rod. This is to be contrasted with the charge that Tejpal faced. It alleged that he had assaulted Manmeet using a metal rod as a weapon.
[33] Secondly, the issue relating to the rod arose for the first time when the complainants gave evidence. It did not form part of the Crown’s opening address for obvious reasons. Secondly, the prosecutor did not cross-examine Navjot about the alleged use of the rod when he gave evidence. This would have provided the jury with the clear impression that the Crown did not rely on this aspect of the complainants’ evidence to prove the charge relating to Manmeet. Thirdly, the prosecutor made it clear to the jury in her closing address that they were not required to reach a verdict on any charge based on the use of the metal rod. Navjot’s trial counsel then reinforced that fact in her closing address. Finally, it formed a relatively small part of a lengthy trial that traversed many other issues.
[34] I agree that it would have put the matter beyond doubt if the Judge had emphasised in his summing up and question trail that Navjot did not face any charge based on alleged use of the rod. However, he did not refer to the use of the metal rod when summarising the evidence relied upon by the Crown. He also highlighted, in the passage set out above at [29], that Navjot relied on the evidence as suggesting that Sandeep was an unreliable witness. I do not consider there is any reasonable possibility that the jury may have viewed the Judge’s summing up as undermining the way in which counsel had dealt with the issue in their closing addresses.
[35] I am therefore satisfied that any issues arising out of the evidence about the use of the metal rod did not lead to any error or irregularity that may have affected the outcome of the trial. In particular, I do not consider there is a real risk that some jurors may have relied on that evidence in concluding that Navjot was guilty on the charge of assaulting Manmeet. Any such risk remaining is theoretical.
[36]This ground of appeal fails as a result.
Were the jury’s verdicts inconsistent?
[37] The principles relating to this ground of appeal are well established. A conviction may be quashed on the basis that it is unreasonable if the verdict on which it is based is inconsistent with another verdict, or verdicts, given by the jury. Appellate courts exercise caution before intervening in this area. This is because they are reluctant to usurp the jury’s function by substituting their own view of the facts.10 However, an appellate court will intervene when different verdicts given by the same jury constitute “an affront to logic and commonsense”.11 The appellant bears the onus of establishing any inconsistency between verdicts; it is not for the Crown to justify the consistency of verdicts.12
[38] It is rarely, if ever, sufficient for an appellant to succeed on this ground of appeal solely on the basis that a jury reached different verdicts based on the evidence given by the same witness. This reflects the fact that juries are routinely directed that they are entitled to reach different verdicts on different charges and that they may accept all, part or none of the evidence given by any witness.
[39] In this context Ms Sullivan refers me to the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mahupuku v R:13
The Court must take into account the possibility that a properly directed jury conscientiously carrying out its role may find that evidence from the same witness about related offences does on some occasions prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt, and on other occasions does not.
There can be a host of explanations for this, including the level of certainty of the witness and corroborative evidence. The fact that evidence of a sequence of events from a complainant results in some convictions and some acquittals does not mean that the jury has been irrational. It may simply mean that it has taken the onus on the Crown very seriously, and has found even in relation to a complainant that it does not believe is lying, that some charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt and others do not cross that threshold.
10 B (SC12/2013) v R [2013] NZSC 151, [2014] 1 NZLR 261 at [68].
11 At [68].
12 At [68].
13 Mahupuku v R [2015] NZCA 510 at [36]-[37].
[40] An important feature of the present case, as I have already observed, was that the defendants were all charged as principals. This meant the jury was required to examine the evidence relating to each charge and each defendant separately to reach their verdicts. A verdict reached in relation to one defendant had no bearing on the verdict reached in relation to another. Of itself, the fact that the jury was not satisfied the Crown had proved the charges against several of the other defendants therefore provides no assistance on the issue of whether the jury’s verdict on the charge relating to the assault on Manmeet was unreasonable.
[41] In the present case, I accept the Crown’s submissions that there are logical explanations for the differing verdicts that the jury returned. Different levels of corroboration existed for the two complainants. The jury acquitted the defendants on all charges relating to Sandeep. It is noteworthy that there were no photographs of injuries to Sandeep and police officers who attended the scene were unable to describe any injuries he may have suffered. By contrast, the injuries that Manmeet suffered were documented in photographs taken on the night of the incident giving rise to the charges and in police photographs taken the following day when the formal complaints were made. These were consistent with the assaults that he described as well as observations made by police officers who attended at the scene.
[42] In her written submissions for the respondent Ms Sullivan suggests other ways in which the jury’s differing verdicts could be reconciled. I do not propose to summarise these but I accept that there are several possible explanations for the differing verdicts. The short point is that this was not the type of case in which a not guilty verdict in relation to one defendant or charge necessarily meant the same outcome in relation to another was the only possible logical outcome.
[43] Further, I do not accept Mr Brickell’s submission that the verdicts of not guilty that the jury returned for both Navjot (on one charge) and the remaining defendants indicate that they must have disbelieved or rejected the evidence of the two complainants in its entirety. That submission cannot stand alongside the fact that the jury also found Jobanjit guilty on a charge of assaulting Manmeet.
[44] Rather, I accept the Crown’s submission that the differing verdicts reflect the fact that the jury assessed the evidence against each defendant in relation to each charge and came to a considered conclusion as to whether or not the Crown had proved the charge to the required standard. This ground of appeal fails as a result.
Result
[45]The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
Lang J
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