IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-005301 [2013] NZHC 2301
IN THE MATTER OF an appeal against the decision of the
District Court at Manukau
BETWEEN
GURPREET SINGH and MEENA SINGH Appellants
AND
GLENN DOUGLAS RUTHERFORD and
WENDY KAREN JOLLY Respondents
Hearing: 28 August 2013 Counsel:
D M O'Neill for the Appellants
M R T Colthart for the RespondentsJudgment:
5 September 2013
JUDGMENT OF DUFFY J
[Reasons re Refusal of Application for Leave to Appeal]
This judgment was delivered by Justice Duffy on 5 September 2013 at 11.00 am, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
Counsel: D M O’Neill, Hamilton
M R T Colthart, Auckland
SINGH v RUTHERFORD and JOLLY [2013] NZHC 2301 [5 September 2013]
[1] The respondents were unsuccessful in their application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The reasons for the refusal of leave now follow.
[2] The respondents’ application for leave to appeal identified four issues. They were:
(a) Whether the correct measure of any loss suffered by the plaintiffs is diminution of value of the plaintiffs’ property, or loss of profit arising from the plaintiffs’ operation of the orchard at the property;
(b)If the loss of profit is the correct measure, whether the failure by the appellants to establish on the balance of probabilities the amount of loss of profit at trial justified the dismissal of the appellants’ claim;
(c) Whether the High Court on appeal ought to attempt to assess damages based on evidence given at trial, when the trial Judge has been unable to do so; and
(d)Whether, in the circumstances, the High Court ought to have referred the matter back to the District Court to assess damages.
[3] This case has a tortured history. The full details are to be found in the judgments of Wylie J: see Singh v Rutherford [2012] NZHC 3801, [2012] NZAR
323 and in the judgment from which the respondents now seek leave to appeal: see
Singh v Rutherford [2013] 1276, 31 May 2013.
[4] In short, the appellants chose to reduce their claim to enable them to commence proceedings in the District Court. One of their claims was that the respondents had breached a contractual warranty as to the size of the canopy hectares of a lemon and kiwifruit orchard. The District Court found that there was a clear difference between the warranted size of the orchard and the actual size, but found that the appellants had not relied on the warranty when they purchased the orchard. Thus, they failed in their claims for loss. On appeal to this Court, Wylie J found that the warranty was enforceable, and that the breach meant that the appellants could
claim for their loss. The proceeding was sent back to the District Court to determine loss and to quantify damages. The District Court found that the appellants had not proved that they had suffered any loss. The judgment was appealed to this Court…
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- Singh v Rutherford [2013] NZHC 2301
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- [2013] NZHC 2301
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
Duffy J considered the legal tests for the grant of leave to appeal, which were set out in Waller v Hider and Snee v Snee. The respondents argued that their proposed appeal raised a matter of general legal importance regarding the correct measure of damages for a breach of a contract for sale and purchase. However, Duffy J found that this argument did not raise any new significant issues of general importance that warranted the attention of the Court of Appeal. The respondents also argued that the trial Judge was unable to assess damages and that this Court on appeal ought not to attempt to assess damages based on the evidence before the trial Judge. However, Duffy J found that this Court was entitled to come to its own conclusions based on the material presented before it. The respondents argued that once this Court found that the appellants had suffered loss, the appropriate outcome was to refer the proceeding back to the District Court. However, Duffy J found that this ground of appeal raised nothing that met the tests for the grant of leave to appeal. Finally, the respondents argued that their private interest in the matter warranted a second appeal. However, Duffy J found that a party's alleged inability to meet the cost of a damages award did not constitute a ground warranting a second appeal.
Duffy J concluded that none of the respondents' arguments in support of the proposed grounds of appeal met the legal tests for the granting of leave to appeal. The refusal of leave to appeal was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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