Singh v Immigration and Protection Tribunal
[2018] NZHC 2409
•14 September 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2018-409-000242
CIV-2018-409-000243 [2018] NZHC 2409
UNDER Sections 247 and 249 of the Immigration Act 2009 and under the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 and part 30 of the High Court Rules BETWEEN
RIPUDAMAN SINGH
Applicant
AND
THE IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
AND
THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION
Second Respondent
Hearing: 28 August 2018 Appearances:
R R Ward for the Applicant
No appearance for the First Respondent I Clarke for the Second Respondent
Judgment:
14 September 2018
JUDGMENT OF NATION J
Background
[1] The applicant, Mr Singh, was born in India in 1990. His father, a dentist, left to study and work in the United States. Mr Singh was raised in India by his mother. In late 2011, Mr Singh’s father left the United States and came to New Zealand on a work visa. In September 2013, Mr Singh, his mother and father were granted residency. Mr Singh arrived in New Zealand to join his father in January 2014. During
SINGH v IMMIGRATION & PROTECTION TRIBUNAL [2018] NZHC 2409 [14 September 2018]
mid-2014, Mr Singh went back to India for six months to marry Ms Pushpinder Kaur. He returned to New Zealand in December 2014 with Ms Kaur who was on a work visa.
[2] In November 2015, Mr Singh caused a car crash, leaving him and the other occupants of the other car with serious injuries. In June 2016, he was convicted on three charges of dangerous driving causing injury and one charge of driving with excess blood alcohol. The offences rendered Mr Singh liable to a term of imprisonment of more than three months. As a consequence, he became liable for deportation and was issued with a deportation liability notice.
[3] The Minister of Immigration agreed to suspend Mr Singh’s liability for five years on the condition Mr Singh gained no further convictions in that time. Six months later, Mr Singh was convicted of driving while disqualified. His liability for deportation was reactivated. Mr Singh appealed to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal) against his liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds. On 26 March 2018, the Tribunal dismissed Mr Singh’s appeal.1 Mr Singh now seeks leave to appeal and to judicially review the decision under ss 245 and 249 Immigration Act 2009 (the Act).
The Tribunal’s decision
[4] In his humanitarian appeal, Mr Singh argued that the effects on his parents, through separation from him or return to India, to the detriment of his father’s career, the effect on his wife and the loss of the opportunity to put his difficult past behind him and re-establish himself, gave rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for him to be deported from New Zealand.
[5] In its decision, the Tribunal began by noting the withdrawal of Mr Singh’s counsel. She had appeared for Mr Singh on the first day of hearing in December 2017. Shortly after the resumption of the hearing in February 2018, she advised she no longer represented Mr Singh. The hearing continued.
1 Singh v Minister of Immigration [2018] NZIPT 600371.
[6] In its decision, the Tribunal cited the test as described by the majority of the Supreme Court in Ye v Minister of Immigration.2 The first limb of the test required:
Three ingredients to be established, in sequence:
(a) exceptional circumstances;
(b) of a humanitarian nature; and
(c) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be deported from New Zealand.
[7] The Tribunal also noted that exceptional circumstances “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”.3
[8]In assessing Mr Singh’s circumstances, the Tribunal noted:
(a) Mr Singh has little employment history and no significant qualifications.4 The Tribunal placed little weight on his professed intention to seek employment.5
(b) Mr Singh has lived in New Zealand only since December 2013,6 and has a limited nexus to New Zealand.7
(c) If he is required to return to India, Mr Singh will be separated from his parents (if they elect to remain here). However, Mr Singh is 28 years old and can be expected to be independent.8
(d) The Tribunal acknowledged that there have been challenges in Mr Singh’s life, in terms of his father’s absence during his formative years and his addiction to drugs in 2007-2008.9 However, the Tribunal considered those influences are now a decade or more in the past; and Mr Singh would
2 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 (SC) at [14].
3 Ye v Minister of Immigration, at [50].
4 Singh v Minister of Immigration, above n 1, at [52].
5 At [54].
6 As above, Mr Singh actually arrived in New Zealand in January 2014.
7 At [53] and [55].
8 At [56].
9 At [56].
experience no greater sense of sadness and anguish at being separated from his parents than any other adult.10
(e) If Mr Singh’s parents elect to stay in New Zealand, his father acknowledges that they will be able to, and will, provide some financial assistance to their son to ensure he has accommodation in India.11
(f) Ms Kaur will (undoubtedly) have to accompany Mr Singh because she has no right to remain permanently in New Zealand. The Tribunal considered that she was resourceful, hardworking and well-qualified, and would find employment in due course.12
(g) The Tribunal acknowledged if Ms Kaur returns to India, it will cause her grief and distress (as she had worked hard to make a success of settlement in New Zealand).13 The Tribunal considered Ms Kaur would have family support and the support of her husband in India.14 Ms Kaur may, however, have the ability to apply for residency in New Zealand herself.15
(h) If Mr Singh’s parents elect to remain in New Zealand, they will be separated from their only child. The Tribunal acknowledged that this will cause them sadness and distress.16 However, if they decide to return to India, his father will need to give up a dental practice here. His parents own a home in Chandigarh (in India).
[9] The Tribunal concluded that Mr Singh had not met the very high threshold for “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”17 (and, therefore, it was not necessary for it to go on and consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under s 207). The humanitarian appeal was declined.
10 At [56].
11 At [57].
12 At [57].
13 At [59].
14 At [60].
15 At [61].
16 At [63].
17 At [70].
The legal context
[10] Counsel for the Minister helpfully and comprehensively set out the legal context in which the current applications have to be considered. Mr Singh’s counsel did not disagree with that summary. It is repeated below.
Application for leave to appeal the Tribunal’s decision
[11] Section 245 of the Act sets out the test for granting leave to appeal a decision of the Tribunal. The introduction by Parliament of a leave requirement demonstrates a deliberate intention to limit appeals from immigration decisions.18
[12]The proposed question of law must be both:
(a) capable of bona fide and serious argument; and
(b) by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, a question of law that ought to be submitted to the High Court.
[13] The test for determining whether an issue is one which is of general or public importance or for any other reason should be submitted to the High Court was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Minister of Immigration v Jooste.19 The Court found the test was similar to that applied in Waller v Hider in relation to second appeals:20
Upon a second appeal this Court is not engaged in the general correction of error. Its primary function is then to clarify the law and to determine whether it has been properly construed and applied by the Court below. It is not every alleged error of law that is such importance, either generally or to the parties, as to justify further pursuit of litigation which has already been twice considered and ruled upon by a Court.
18 Guo v Minister of Immigration [2014] NZCA 513 at [11] (referring to Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZCA 23). (The Court of Appeal’s decision in Guo was overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court: Guo v Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 132, [2016] 1 NZLR 248. The Supreme Court did not make any comment on the application of the leave test.) See also Taafi v Minister of Immigration [2013] NZAR 1037 (HC) at [18]; Nabou v Minister of Immigration [2012] NZHC 3365, [2013] NZAR 155 at [6]; and X v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 1647 at [30].
19 Minister of Immigration v Jooste, above n 16.
20 Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA).
[14] This Court considered that the types of questions of law and issues raised are sufficiently important to “justify [the] further pursuit of litigation” in LMN v Immigration and Protection Tribunal.21 Duffy J found the relevant issue must “go beyond the particular circumstances of the applicant” and “suggests the existing law should be revisited by the Court”. This has been subsequently affirmed or applied in numerous High Court judgments.22 Accordingly, the misapplication by the Tribunal of existing law to the particular facts will not qualify and, where an applicant attempts to prove the Tribunal’s factual findings are so incorrect as to constitute an error of law, a very high threshold applies.
[15] When the applicant attempts to prove the Tribunal’s factual findings are so incorrect as to constitute an error of law, a very high threshold applies. In such cases, applicants must satisfy the “triple hurdle” set out by Kós J in Taafi, which requires them to establish:23
(a) First, a serious arguable case that the Tribunal’s factual findings are actually wrong. An appeal court will not interfere where there is an available evidential basis for the court’s finding.
(b) Second, that the factual errors are, in combination and in context of the whole decision, so grave as to constitute an error of law.
(c) Third, that the question of law (here based on alleged fundamental errors of fact) is one of “general public importance” or is one which for “some other reason” ought to be considered on appeal.
21 LMN v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2013] NZHC 2077.
22 Applications for leave to appeal and seek judicial review: Guo v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 804 at [58]-[59]; JS v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2015] NZHC 2832, [2016] NZAR 111 at [51]; SK v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 2693 at [6]-[7] (upheld in SK v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2015] NZCA 26, [2015] NZAR 335). Application for leave to seek judicial review only: X v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 1647 at [31]-[32]. Application for leave to appeal only: D v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 3017 at [10]; Fu v Chief Executive, Minister of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZHC 3346 at [22]; C v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2015] NZHC 3253 at [65].
23 Taafi v Minister of Immigration [2013] NZAR 1037 (HC) at [19].
[16] In terms of whether there is “any other reason”, a matter ought to be considered on appeal, the Court of Appeal has confirmed “it would only be in exceptional circumstances, involving individual injustice to such an extent that the Court simply could not countenance the first instance decision standing, that this alternative requirement will be met”.24
Application for leave to judicially review the Tribunal’s decision
[17] Under s 249 of the Act, the Court must have regard to three matters of present relevance:
(a) The first is whether the proposed review proceedings would involve issues that could be adequately dealt with in an appeal against the Tribunal’s decision (s 249(6)(a)). In practice, if the issue could adequately be dealt with in an appeal, leave to bring a judicial review proceeding is unlikely to be granted.25
(b) The second consideration is whether the proposed review proceeding raises a question capable of bona fide and serious argument.26
(c) The third consideration, as with applications for leave to appeal, is whether the issues in the judicial review proceedings are, by reason of their general or public importance, or for any other reason, ones that ought to be submitted to the High Court for review (s 249(6)(b)).27
24 Machida v Chief Executive of Immigration New Zealand [2016] NZCA 162, [2016] NZAR 662 at [8].
25 Panchal v Minister of Immigration [2017] NZHC 2080 at [20]; see SK v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2015] NZCA 26, [2015] NZAR 335 at [13].
26 Allada v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 953, [2014] NZAR 880 at [36], holding that the test in Waller v Hider, [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA) at 412 - 414, applies also to applications for leave to bring judicial review proceedings. Allada was followed in Kumar v Minister of Immigration [2016] NZHC 1593 at [35].
27 There is currently some disagreement at High Court level in terms of whether the “any other reason” criteria in s 249(6)(b) is to be read consistently with that in s 245, or whether it should be given an expanded meaning in the context of judicial review sufficient possibly to tip the balance in a marginal case (for example, SK v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2014] NZHC 2693 at [6]-[7]; RM v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2016] NZHC 735 at [42]-[50]). The respondent’s position here was that the two tests should be approached in the same way. However, the respondent submitted this was not, in any event, a marginal case.
Discussion
[18] A number of the grounds advanced for the applications by Mr Singh’s counsel, Mr Ward, were common to both the application for leave to appeal and the application for judicial review.
The Tribunal made an error of law in failing to recognise Mr Singh would be liable for deportation on a permanent basis.
[19] Mr Ward submitted the Tribunal failed to recognise the provisions of ss 169 and 179 of the Act. He submitted that, pursuant to those sections, Mr Singh would be liable for deportation on a permanent basis. He submitted the error was apparent through the Tribunal saying “Ms Kaur may have to accompany the appellant, at least for the short to medium term”28 and the Tribunal’s further statement:
The Tribunal accepts that deportation of the appellant would make it difficult for them to return as a couple because of the effect that his convictions would have on the “good character” requirement.
[20] Mr Ward said the Tribunal’s reference to “good character” requirement would have been a reference to the character requirements for residence and temporary work visa categories and there was an error because the Tribunal did not refer to the difficulties Mr Singh and Ms Kaur would face if trying to return to New Zealand as a result of his permanent deportation if his appeal was unsuccessful or to the particular difficulties he would face if making an application to the Minister under s 182.
[21] Assessing the decision as a whole, the Tribunal did consider the effects on Ms Kaur, Mr Singh’s parents and Mr Singh from the perspective of a permanent prohibition. The Tribunal did discuss the effect of separation at numerous points in the decision.29 In para [68], the Tribunal said “both Ms Kaur and the appellant’s parents will suffer either separation from him, or the end of their hopes of living permanently in New Zealand”.
28 At [57].
29 Paras [10], [36], [56], [63].
[22] The Tribunal also had to be aware of the consequences of s 179 as Mr Singh had referred explicitly to that section in his written submissions on appeal to the Tribunal.
[23] Furthermore, it is incorrect that, if Mr Singh is unable to successfully appeal or review the Tribunal’s decision, he will be permanently prohibited from returning to New Zealand. Pursuant to s 179, Mr Singh would be permanently prohibited from returning to New Zealand and from being granted a visa or entry permission, but only if he is deported from New Zealand. At present, he has been served only with a notice that he is liable for deportation. He will be able to avoid the prohibition that applies to someone who has actually been deported by leaving New Zealand voluntarily before actual deportation. Even if permanently prohibited from re-entry, pursuant to s 182, he would be able to apply to the Minister for a reduction or removal of that prohibition.
[24] There was no error in the way the Tribunal noted that Ms Kaur would need to accompany Mr Singh for the short or medium term. In referring to this, they were not indicating that Mr Singh would have to leave New Zealand for only a short or medium term. The Tribunal said that, if Mr Singh is deported, Ms Kaur would lose her present right to stay in New Zealand on partnership grounds and it was on that basis they said she would have to accompany Mr Singh for the short to medium term. They referred to her ability to apply for residency in her own right given she was well qualified but acknowledged this would require her to separate from Mr Singh and would make it impossible for them to sustain their marriage. The Tribunal considered the consequences for her on the basis she would continue to live in India.
Discrimination against Mr Singh through breach of s 19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and s 21(k) Human Rights Act 1993 because of claimed discrimination on the grounds of Mr Singh’s employment status
[25] Section 19 NZBORA says “Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993”.
[26] Pursuant to s 21 Human Rights Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination include employment status which means being unemployed.
[27] In their assessment of whether there were exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, the Tribunal referred to Mr Singh as a 28 year old married man, with little employment history and no significant qualifications. It said that, for most of his life, he had been entirely dependent on his parents and, more latterly, his wife. At the time the appeal was heard, he was receiving an unemployment benefit. The Tribunal said:
Given his past history of unemployment and dependence on others, and his acknowledgement that he had a spoilt upbringing in India, with little desire to work, the Tribunal places little weight on the appellant’s professed intention to seek employment in New Zealand.
[28] In explaining why they considered he had “a limited nexus to New Zealand”, the Tribunal referred to his limited connection with New Zealand society. They said “the evidence suggests that he lives an indolent lifestyle, socialising and caring for his American Pitbull dog”.
[29] Mr Ward referred to this last statement as evidencing a particularly negative attitude towards Mr Singh due to his unemployment history.
[30] As Ms Clarke submitted, it is an “undisputed proposition” that the essence of discrimination lies in the different treatment of people in comparable circumstances.30
[31] Immigration decisions under the Act often require consideration of an individual’s employment situation. The Act recognises that “immigration matters inherently involve different treatment on the basis of personal characteristics”.31
[32] Relevantly too, s 392(2) says no complaint may be made under the Human Rights Act in respect of the application of the Immigration Act.
[33] Mr Singh’s employment status was relevant to the matters the Tribunal had to consider because Mr Singh had argued before the Tribunal that staying in New Zealand would provide him with an opportunity to put his difficult past behind him. As part of that, he asserted he would be seeking employment if he was permitted to stay in New
30 See Ministry of Health v Atkinson (2010) 9 HRNZ 47 at [127], endorsed on appeal in Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184.
31 Section 392(3).
Zealand. These were matters which he was asking the Tribunal to consider in deciding whether there were exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature.
[34] I accept that the Tribunal’s consideration of Mr Singh’s personal characteristics regarding employment was consistent with the Act’s purpose to “manage immigration in a way that balances the national interest, as determined by the Crown, and the rights of individuals”.
[35] Mr Singh may disagree with the conclusion the Tribunal reached in this regard. However, it is apparent from the Tribunal’s decision that those conclusions were open to it and supported by evidence which they referred to. The assessment and weighting of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal.
The Tribunal reached its decision in breach of s 27 NZBORA by breaching Mr Singh’s right to natural justice
[36] Mr Singh contends the way the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing on 21 February 2017 (despite Mr Singh’s solicitor advising on that day that she would no longer be acting for him) was a breach of natural justice. It was submitted for Mr Singh that the Tribunal’s failure to enquire as to whether he required further legal representation and allowing him to continue with the hearing unrepresented, particularly so with his history of lack of education, drug issues, unemployment and dependence on his parents and wife, as referred to in their decision, was also a breach of natural justice.
[37] Section 27(1) NZBORA did require the Tribunal to observe the principles of natural justice. I agree that the relevant principles here were that he be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the appeal before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal be impartial and unbiased.
[38] Section 27(1) NZBORA does not mean that natural justice requires legal representation in every case.32
32 Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA).
[39] Kumar v Minister of Immigration was a case involving an appeal against liability for deportation.33 Rodney Hanson J confirmed that, in that context:
· there is no automatic right to representation;
· legal representation may advantage an appellant but it is by no means essential to a fair hearing;
· the enquiry before the Tribunal is essentially factual, inquisitorial in nature and unlikely to raise difficult or complex procedural or legal issues; and
· the Tribunal’s procedure is informal.
[40] The Tribunal was clearly sensitive to Mr Singh’s lack of representation when the hearing resumed. In their decision, they said that, when counsel withdrew, they were told Mr Singh would be representing himself. They acknowledged that it was his right to do so but went on to say:
[9] … Nevertheless, the Tribunal was conscious of the appellant’s predicament occasioned by counsel’s withdrawal part-way through a hearing and it endeavoured to ensure, at the resumed hearing, that he was not disadvantaged by the fact that he had been left representing himself. In particular, it reads nothing adverse into the withdrawal of counsel (which might have been for any reason) and, with the appellant’s consent, it has continued to have regard to Ms Mitchell’s written submissions on his behalf.
[41] Mr Singh submitted numerous documents to the Tribunal which are listed in its decision. It heard from three witnesses, including Mr Singh. As pointed out by Ms Clarke, there was no evidence Mr Singh was under any incapacity at the hearing or had any particular language difficulties. During the hearing, he had the support and assistance, if that had been required, of his wife and parents who are sophisticated people and certainly, as far as his father and wife were concerned, highly educated.
[42] The nature of the appeal was essentially factual. Mr Singh has not identified any way in which his case would have been advanced differently and to his benefit if he had continued to be represented by counsel.
33 Kumar v Minister of Immigration [2013] NZHC 546, [2013] NZAR 529.
The Tribunal made various errors of fact / failed to consider factors
[43]The particular errors of fact Mr Singh alleged were:
(a) the Tribunal’s conclusion that Ms Kaur was resourceful, hardworking, well qualified, would be able to find employment in India in due course and would provide some support to Mr Singh back in India;
(b) Ms Kaur would have support from her family in India; and
(c) Ms Singh would find India familiar and would not find it difficult to re- assimilate back into India on his return.
[44] It was submitted that the errors of fact in these respects, in terms of Taafi, were so grave as to constitute an error of law.
[45] I accept the submission that it is apparent from the Tribunal’s decision that they considered the evidence, including a number of documents which were put before it. The Tribunal is a specialist tribunal and the conclusions they arrived at are entitled to respect for that reason. In its decision, the Tribunal summarised the basis for the particular conclusions it reached which Mr Singh now seeks to attack. It is not necessary for me to refer to such matters. The conclusions they reached were however justified and reasonable based on the evidence before them. Mr Ward submitted that these particular conclusions were not justified on the evidence but he could not explain why that was so. In this regard, it is relevant that he had not put before the Court a transcript of all the evidence which was before the Tribunal.
[46] In its decision, the Tribunal explains the basis on which it reached the particular conclusions which Mr Singh claims were in error. On the face of it, there appears to be a proper and reasonable factual basis for the Tribunal’s conclusions.
[47] In these circumstances, it would be wrong for this Court to grant leave to appeal or to bring an application for judicial review on the basis the Tribunal reached conclusions not reasonably available to it on the evidence, when this Court does not have a record of what that evidence was.
[48] Mr Ward also submitted there had been a breach of natural justice in that the Tribunal had demonstrated they were biased against Mr Singh. It was suggested this was apparent in the way they commented on his lifestyle, particularly the use of the word “indolent”.
[49] Mr Ward referred to the test for whether bias existed as given in the case of Saxmere Company Limited v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Limited.34 There, the Supreme Court referred to the test as being whether “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”.35
[50] It cannot be suggested there was a potential issue of bias in that sense with the Tribunal. To the extent it is suggested there was bias, the claim is not based on any suggestion the Tribunal would be unable to bring an impartial mind to the issues before it. Rather, the claim is based on the language the Tribunal used in its decision. The decision however reflected conclusions the Tribunal came to on the evidence which was before it. Because those conclusions were supportable on the evidence it referred to, it cannot be said the particular language the Tribunal used in its decision demonstrated bias in the way required to establish a breach of natural justice.
Conclusion
[51] To obtain leave to appeal, Mr Singh had to persuade this Court that there was a proposed question of law that was capable of bona fide and serious argument and, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, such a question ought to be submitted to the High Court. Mr Singh has been unable to do this.
[52] Had Mr Singh been able to establish there were errors or questions of law arising out of the Tribunal’s decision on the grounds he advanced and if they were of sufficient importance, those questions could have been dealt with by way of appeal. If the issues could adequately have been dealt with in an appeal, then it would not have
34 Saxmere Company Limited v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Limited [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35.
35 At [80], citing Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41.
been appropriate to grant leave for those questions to be dealt with by way of judicial review.36
[53] As with an application for leave to appeal, on an application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings, Mr Singh has to demonstrate that there are questions capable of bona fide and serious argument and that such questions, by reason of their general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the High Court for review. For the reasons discussed, I am clear that there are no such questions.
[54] Mr Singh’s applications for leave to appeal and for leave to bring judicial review proceedings are dismissed.
Costs
[55] The respondent is entitled to costs on a 2B basis with usual disbursements as approved by the registrar. If there is any disagreement as to what those costs are to be, a memorandum is to be filed by the respondent within 21 days. Any reply from the applicant is to be filed within 14 days after filing of the respondent’s memorandum. The memoranda are to be no longer than three pages. If there is disagreement, I will determine the matters in dispute on the basis of those memoranda.
Solicitors:
R Ward, Barrister, Christchurch Crown Law, Wellington.
36 SK v Immigration & Protection Tribunal [2015] NZCA 26, [2015] NZAR 335 at [13].
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