Siemer v Heron

Case [2013] NZHC 2146


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2012-404-6587 [2013] NZHC 2146

BETWEEN

VINCENT ROSS SIEMER

Plaintiff

AND

MICHAEL RICHARD HERON

First Defendant

MICHAEL PETER STIASSNY
Second Defendant

RUSSELL MCVEAGH SOLICITORS
Third Defendant

SIONE TANAKI
Fourth Defendant

PIO SAMI
Fifth Defendant

Hearing: On the Papers

Judgment:

22 August 2013

COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SARGISSON

This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday 22 August 2013 at 4.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:………………………….

Counsel/Solicitors:

T Clarke, Bell Gully, Auckland

D Salmon, Lee Salmon Long, Auckland D Nilsson, Lee Salmon Long, Auckland

Copy to: The Plaintiff

SIEMER v HERON & ORS[2013] NZHC 2146 [22 August 2013]

[1] On 28 June 2013 I issued my judgment striking out Mr Siemer’s statement of claim.1

[2]      This judgment deals with the remaining issues as to costs. [3]           Memoranda have been filed by:

(a)Counsel for the second defendant seeking 2B costs plus disbursements of $742.25.

(b)Counsel  for  the  first  and  third  defendants  seeking  2B  costs  plus disbursements of $643.43.

(c)Mr Siemer, who seeks 2B costs plus disbursements for travel, parking and copying of $88.00.

[4] Under the statutory costs regime the presumption is that costs follow the event. High Court Rule 14.2(a) provides that the party who fails with respect to an interlocutory application should pay costs to the party who succeeds. Costs are, however, in the overall discretion of the Court2 and the Court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costs otherwise payable under the Rules if, although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party has failed in

relation to an issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs.3 Relevantly the Court may also refuse to make an order or reduce costs otherwise payable if another reason exists to justify refusal or reduction.

[5] There is nothing exceptional in the applications of those defendants who seek costs. They can properly claim to have succeeded overall and are prima facie entitled to costs for the steps they have claimed. They properly identify:

1       Siemer v Heron [2013] NZHC 1604.

2       See r 14.1.

3       See r 14.7(d).

(a)The proceeding as a Category 2 proceeding under r 14.3. It is a proceeding of average complexity requiring counsel of skill and experience considered average in the High Court;

(b)That for the purpose of r 14.5 a normal amount of time is reasonable time for the allowable steps set out in Schedule 3 to the Rules for which they claim costs. Band B therefore applies for the purpose of assessing the time allowance for each of those steps.

[6]   On this basis, the defendants seeking costs have a prima facie entitlement to the awards they seek.

[7]     Turning to Mr Siemer’s costs application I find that there is no basis to make an award in his favour essentially for two reasons.

[8] First, though Mr Siemer relies on my order dismissing the first and third defendant’s application for a debarring order as a measure of his success in respect of their application, he is not the party that has succeeded overall. Secondly, even if his measure of success might otherwise lead to an expectation of a costs award there is an established rule in New Zealand that a lay litigant is not entitled, except in exceptional circumstances, to recover costs.4 The circumstances of this case are not exceptional and do not warrant a departure from the established rule. The request for

a debarring order, though made for the first time in written submissions and without sufficient notice to Mr Siemer to enable him to prepare for an order of undoubted significance, is not sufficient reason to depart from the rule. Nonetheless I consider it is a reason for making some appropriate reduction under r 14.7 in the costs awarded against Mr Siemer which I will return to momentarily.

[9]     I turn then to consider whether a reason exists to justify a refusal or reduction to the costs the defendants seek.

[10] Mr Siemer relies on two factors: that he appeals the judgment of 28 June and has sought a recall.  On 28 July 2013 I dismissed the application for recall. As far as

the appeal is concerned I do not see that as sufficient reason to depart from the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.5 If there is merit in the appeal Mr Seimer may seek to have the costs orders stayed pending determination of the appeal.

[11] I propose to deal with the matter by allowing a 25 per cent reduction in the 2B costs claimed by the first and third defendants.

[12]     I make these orders:

(a)The  plaintiff  is  to  pay  to  the  first  and  third  defendants  costs  of

$4,776.00 (being the amount of $6,368 claimed less 25 per cent), plus disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.

(b)The plaintiff shall  pay the second defendant costs of $5,572 plus disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.

(c)Mr Seimer’s application for costs is dismissed.

H Sargisson Associate Judge

Details
AGLC
Siemer v Heron [2013] NZHC 2146
Case
[2013] NZHC 2146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Siemer v Heron, the plaintiff, Vincent Ross Siemer, filed a claim against multiple defendants, including Michael Richard Heron, Michael Peter Stiassny, Russell McVeagh Solicitors, Sione Tanaka, and Pio Sami. The plaintiff sought various remedies, but the court had previously struck out his statement of claim. The present judgment addresses the issue of costs incurred during the litigation process. The second, first, and third defendants applied for costs under the statutory costs regime, while the plaintiff also sought costs for travel, parking, and copying expenses. The court considered the statutory presumption that costs follow the event and whether there were any exceptional circumstances warranting a deviation from this principle.

The court found that the defendants who sought costs had succeeded overall and were entitled to costs for the steps they had claimed. They correctly identified the proceeding as a Category 2 proceeding, requiring counsel of skill and experience considered average in the High Court. The court also determined that the normal amount of time was reasonable for the allowable steps set out in Schedule 3 to the Rules. However, the plaintiff's application for costs was dismissed for two main reasons. Firstly, the plaintiff had not succeeded overall in the proceeding, despite his reliance on the court's dismissal of the first and third defendant's application for a debarring order. Secondly, there were no exceptional circumstances to justify awarding costs to a lay litigant, as established in New Zealand case law.

The court further considered whether there was any reason to justify a refusal or reduction in the costs the defendants sought. The plaintiff's appeal of the judgment and his application for a recall did not provide sufficient grounds for a departure from the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious. Therefore, the court proposed a 25% reduction in the 2B costs claimed by the first and third defendants. The final orders required the plaintiff to pay costs to the first and third defendants, as well as the second defendant, along with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar, and dismissed the plaintiff's application for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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