Shepherd v The King

Case [2025] NZHC 280


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CRI-2024-483-015

[2025] NZHC 280

BETWEEN JASON CHRISTOPHER DAVID SHEPHERD
Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing: 13 February 2025

Appearances:

J H C Waugh for Appellant

K B Bell & D Lye for Respondent

Judgment:

25 February 2025


JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

[Appeal against suppression]


[1]                 Jason Shepherd (the appellant) appeals against a decision of Judge Marinovich refusing to grant him permanent name suppression. 1

Background

[2]                 On 25 October 2024, the appellant was sentenced following his pleas of guilty to two charges:

(a)meeting a young person following sexual grooming;2 and

(b)grooming for sexual conduct with a young person.3


1      R v Shepherd [2024] NZDC 25973.

2      Crimes Act 1961, s 131B.

3      Crimes Act 1961, s 131AB.

SHEPHERD v R [2025] NZHC 280 [25 February 2025]

The law

[3]                 Matters  of  name  suppression  are  governed  by  s  200(2)  of   the   Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the Act).

[4]                 The appeal is against the making of a permanent suppression order rather than an interim one.

[5]                 The grounds upon which the Court may make a permanent suppression order are listed in s 200(2) of the Act. Relevant for the purposes of this appeal, the Court is required to be satisfied that publication of the appellant’s name would be likely to cause extreme hardship to the appellant or any person connected with him.

[6]                 When the Court is making a permanent order under s 200(6), the Act requires the Court to take into account any views of a victim of the offending.

[7]                 The appellant has the onus of satisfying the Court that extreme hardship to him or people connected with him will result unless there is name suppression.

[8]                 The Court undertakes a two-step inquiry: firstly, to see whether the threshold ground in s 200(2)(a) of the Act is met and then secondly, to make a discretionary assessment evaluating the competing issues of open justice with the interests of the appellant and those connected with him.4

[9]                 The threshold of extreme hardship is a high one and has been described as requiring a “compelling reason” or a “very special circumstance”.5

[10]              The assessment of whether the threshold is met requires a comparison between the hardship that is contended for, and the consequences normally associated with the publication of a defendant’s name.6


4      D (CA 443/2015) v Police [2015] NZCA 541, (2015) 27 CRNZ 614 at [10]–[12].

5      R v N [2012] NZHC 2042 at [21]–[22].

6      Robertson v Police [2015] NZCA 7 at [43]–[46].

The decision under appeal

[11]              The Judge held that the appellant, his wife, and two children would suffer extreme hardship if permanent suppression were not granted. In balancing the issues of open justice and the interests of the appellant and his family members, he concluded that the interests of open justice prevail.

[12]The Judge’s reasoning is set out in his sentencing decision as follows:

[42]      I, however, have to…

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Shepherd v The King [2025] NZHC 280
Case
[2025] NZHC 280
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jason Shepherd appeals against the decision of Judge Marinovich to refuse him permanent name suppression. The appellant was convicted of meeting a young person following sexual grooming and grooming for sexual conduct with a young person, and sentenced on 25 October 2024. The appeal is against the refusal of a permanent suppression order rather than an interim one. The Criminal Procedure Act 2011 sets out the grounds upon which the Court may make a permanent suppression order. The Court is required to be satisfied that publication of the appellant's name would be likely to cause extreme hardship to the appellant or any person connected with him. The Court undertakes a two-step inquiry: firstly, to see whether the threshold ground in s 200(2)(a) of the Act is met and then secondly, to make a discretionary assessment evaluating the competing issues of open justice with the interests of the appellant and those connected with him. The threshold of extreme hardship is a high one and has been described as requiring a "compelling reason" or a "very special circumstance".

The Judge concluded that the appellant, his wife, and two children would suffer extreme hardship if permanent suppression were not granted. However, in balancing the issues of open justice and the interests of the appellant and his family members, the Judge concluded that the interests of open justice prevail. The Judge noted the seriousness of the offending, the appellant's position as a teacher and the significant breach of trust that occurred, and the views of the victims who did not support suppression of name. The Judge also noted the public interest in knowing the character of the appellant given the position he held, and the concern that there may be other victims of his discrete offending.

The appellant submitted that, even with interim name suppression, the appellant and his family had been subject to a five-year long campaign of abuse, harassment, and demonisation. These issues had resulted in significant medical issues for the whole family, including the two children. The loss by the appellant of his livelihood was said to threaten to destroy the family unit and any long-term prospects of rehabilitation. The Court found that the appellant's wife and son met the level of extreme hardship. However, the Court concluded that the public interest factors discussed above justified the publication of the appellant's name. The factors which justified the decision were the wishes of the victims, the fact that there already seemed to be a level of knowledge of the appellant's identity in the school and wider community, that publication would clear other teachers at the school from suspicion, the nature of the offending and the need for the appellant to be held accountable for his actions. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

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Background

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Evidence

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Decision

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