IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 70/2010
[2010] NZSC 119
BETWEENSHAUN ROGER NIXON (WITHDRAWING PARTNER) AND MARTIN VICTOR RICHARDSON AND SHAUN ROGER NIXON AS TRUSTEES OF THE FIRM TRUST (NIXON TRUSTEES)
Applicants
ANDGEOFFREY DONALD CAMPBELL WALKER, ROWAN JOHN CHAPMAN, TIMOTHY JOSEPH GOLDFINCH, MARTIN VICTOR RICHARDSON, DIANNE MAREE LUDWIG AND KURT SHERLOCK (CONTINUING PARTNERS) AND GOSLING CHAPMAN LIMITED (GCL)
Respondents
Court:Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ
Counsel:S A Grant for Applicants
F J Thorp for Respondents
Judgment:27 September 2010
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500 to the Respondents.
REASONS
[1] The applicant, Mr Nixon, shared in the first instalment of a goodwill payment made by two incoming partners of the Gosling Chapman firm. Those partners were admitted to the partnership on 1 April 2002. However, Mr Nixon gave notice of retirement as at 31 March 2004, and thus one day before the second and final instalment from the incoming partners was to be paid, on 1 April 2004. Negotiations took place concerning the terms on which Mr Nixon would be a consultant to the firm. It was announced to the staff that after his retirement Mr Nixon was to be a consultant.
[2] In fact, before the date on which he was to retire, Mr Nixon made arrangements to move to another accounting practice. The other partners then proposed that he should immediately withdraw from the partnership, i.e prior to the announced retirement date, in default of which they said they would call a meeting at which his expulsion would be moved. Mr Nixon left the firm on 9 March 2004 and started work with the other firm the next day.
[3] There was an issue between the parties as to whether in these circumstances Mr Nixon was entitled to share in the second instalment of goodwill. The partnership deed also provided that where a partner retired not more than 24 months (i.e 24 months or less) after the admission date of a new partner, the retiring partner must refund part of the goodwill received by him from the new partner. A second issue arose as to whether Mr Nixon must make a partial refund to the partners admitted on 1 April 2002.
[4] A third matter concerned Mr Nixon’s claim for breach by the firm of the consultancy agreement he said he had negotiated with the firm.
[5] The issues were referred to the arbitration of the Hon Robert Fisher QC. He found that Mr Nixon did not qualify to share in the second instalment as, even if the events of 9 March had not occurred, it had been his intention to cease to be a partner before 1 April 2004. On that basis also, the arbitrator found that Mr Nixon was obliged to make a refund to the incoming partners. The arbitrator said that, in the event, Mr Nixon had accepted termination of his partnership as at 9 March 2004. He further found that, despite the announcement…
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- Case
- [2010] NZSC 119
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether Nixon was entitled to share in the second instalment of goodwill, if he was required to refund a portion of the goodwill he had already received, and if there was a valid consultancy agreement in place. The Court of Appeal had already determined that Nixon was entitled to the second instalment of goodwill, despite retiring a day before it was due, but had also found that he was required to make a corresponding refund due to an error in calculating the amount of the refund. The Court of Appeal also found that Nixon's claim for a consultancy agreement was not sustainable.
The Supreme Court found that the proposed arguments by Nixon's counsel did not reveal any miscarriage of justice and were confined to the particular facts and pleadings of the case. The arithmetic in the Court of Appeal's reasons for judgment was not questioned, and the proposed adjustments to the result and costs award would not reflect what was actually required by the terms of the partnership agreement. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs of $2,500 to the Respondents.
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