Sharma v Wati
[2022] NZHC 772
•13 April 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2008-404-4494
[2022] NZHC 772
BETWEEN DEO DATT SHARMA
Appellant
AND
NIRMALA WATI
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
Appellant in Person
R Parmenter for the Respondent
Judgment:
13 April 2022
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
This judgment is delivered by me on 13 April 2022 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
.....................................................
Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Witten-Hannah Howard, Takapuna Counsel: R Parmenter, Auckland
Copy to: Appellant
SHARMA v WATI [2022] NZHC 772 [13 April 2022]
Introduction
[1] This is a long-running relationship property proceeding between Nirmala Wati and her former husband Deo Sharma. The proceeding concerns the division of their relationship property, based on orders made in the Family Court in 2008 and subsequently varied on appeal to the High Court in 2009.
[2] The current application by Ms Wati seeks a recall and variation of my minute dated 14 October 2021 (the minute).1
[3] Dr Sharma who continues to act for himself, opposes the application and seeks orders of his own.
Procedural background
[4] On 16 June 2008, Judge DF Clarkson issued a judgment in the Family Court which determined the division of the couple’s relationship property following their separation under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the Act).2 In accordance with the principles and purposes of the Act, the Judge held that relationship property should be divided on an equal basis. The Judge made findings of value in relation to financial assets and debts held by the parties, including cash, shares, bonds, insurance policies, and ACC/GST payments.
[5] In relation to the family home (the home), which was the couple’s most significant asset, the Judge made orders pursuant to s 26A of the Act, which fixed the value of the home at the date of the commencement of the proceeding and postponed the date of vesting for six years to enable Ms Wati and the children to remain in the home while the children were at school. Dr Sharma appealed Judge Clarkson’s decision to the High Court.
[6] The appeal included grounds relating to Judge Clarkson’s treatment of the home in her orders and claimed the Judge had made errors in the identification and division of the balance of the relationship property.
1 Sharma v Wati HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-4494, 15 October 2021 [Variation of orders].
2 NW v DDS FC Waitakere FAM-2002-090-1294, 16 June 2008.
[7] On 27 February 2009, Justice Allan set aside the Family Court orders which fixed the value of the home and postponed the vesting ( Allan J’s first judgment).3 The Judge substituted an occupation order under s 27 of the Act which gave Ms Wati exclusive occupation until 31 October 2013. The Judge also ordered that the home be sold no later than November 2013, with the proceeds of the sale to be divided equally between the parties.4 The effect of this judgment was that the value of the home remained to be determined by the market at the point of sale. However, the valuations regarding relationship property other than the home remained undisturbed.
[8] There was no change to the items that Judge Clarkson had identified as relationship property and the order that the various items of relationship property be divided equally was undisturbed on appeal.
[9] On 8 October 2009, Allan J issued a further judgment on the papers in relation to supplementary financial matters that were not the subject of earlier orders (Allan J’s second judgment).5 The Judge made findings regarding the value of Ms Wati’s bank account at the date of separation, and various chattels held by the parties.6 Under those orders a small amount was owed by Ms Wati to Dr Sharma.
[10] In an affidavit filed in 2021 Ms Wati said that she endeavoured to sell the property after 31 October 2013, but Dr Sharma created difficulties around the sale process. Dr Sharma takes issue with that. It is not necessary to go into the rights and wrongs of what went on at that time. There was however other litigation which resulted in costs orders by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court against Dr Sharma.
[11] By 2020 Dr Sharma had not paid any of those costs. Ms Wati applied to this Court to place charging orders in relation to the costs orders against Dr Sharma’s share of the home (which was still unsold). Dr Sharma opposed Ms Wati’s application. In
3 S v W HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-4494, 27 February 2009.
4 At [102].
5 S v W (No 2) HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-4494, 8 October 2009.
6 The Judge found that Ms Wati held $5,469.00 in her bank account and chattels to the value of
$1,635.00, while Dr Sharma held chattels to the value of $467.00.
a judgment of 10 August 2020 Downs J made charging orders in the various proceedings.7
[12] In 2021 with the home still unsold and Ms Wati in occupation, Ms Wati applied to this Court for detailed and prescriptive orders to enable the sale process ordered by Allan J in his first judgment to proceed and for the proceeds of sale to be paid out to Ms Wati and Dr Sharma. Dr Sharma’s position was that the home should have been sold in 2013 but he did not object to the sale of it in 2021. He did object to parts of the methodology proposed by Mr Parmenter on behalf of Ms Wati.
[13] I made orders (more or less as sought) in my judgment of 26 March 2021 (my first judgment).8 Those orders included the appointment of an independent solicitor to act for both parties on the sale of the home. As part of the settlement process I ordered the independent solicitor to obtain discharges of the charging orders referred to above and to pay the requisite amounts to Ms Wati’s solicitors Witten-Hannah, Howard.
[14] I reserved leave for either party to apply to the Court to vary the terms of my orders or for any resolution of a dispute as to the terms or effect of my orders.
[15] Relying on the reservation of leave referred to above, Ms Wati applied on 14 May 2021 seeking orders appointing a person to sign documents in place of Dr Sharma to enable the process for the sale of the home to proceed. The evidence before the Court was that Dr Sharma had refused to sign the listing agreement from the real estate agent, which was the necessary first step in the sale process. I made orders which gave Dr Sharma the further opportunity to sign the listing agreement and any further necessary documents, but if he failed or refused to do so I appointed the Registrar of the High Court to sign the documents for and on behalf Dr Sharma (my second judgment).9
[16] I reserved leave for either party to apply to the Court for resolution of any dispute in relation to the orders in my second judgment.
7 Wati v Sharma [2020] NZHC 2010.
8 Sharma v Wati [2021] NZHC 625.
9 Sharma v Wati [2021] NZHC 1444.
[17] The Court subsequently received a memorandum from Mr Parmenter, followed by a memorandum in response from Dr Sharma and a memorandum in reply from Mr Witten-Hannah, Mr Parmenter’s instructing solicitor. Ms Wati sought a variation of the order I made in [11](j) of my first judgment concerning the distribution of the proceeds of sale from the home (distribution order). The distribution order reflected precisely the order sought by Ms Wati in her application that lead to my first judgment.
[18] In seeking a variation of the distribution order counsel for Ms Wati identified an error in the formula provided to the Court, which was then reproduced in my first judgment. On 14 October 2021 I issued the minute which is now the subject of the present recall application by Ms Wati. The minute varied the distribution order as follows:10
(a)Paragraph [11](j) of my judgment of 26 March 2021,11 is replaced with the orders sought as set out in paragraph 4 of Mr Parmenter’s memorandum of 6 October 2021.
(j)As part of the settlement process (including receipt of the settlement monies and the balance of any deposit), the independent solicitor acting on the sale shall be required to effect the transactions noted on the “Distribution statement re Sale of 21 Petrel Place, Massey” attached hereto, including among other things:
(i)repaying and discharging any statutory land charges over the property by paying the requisite amount to the Legal Aid Agency;
(ii)obtaining discharges of any charging orders on the property by paying the requisite amounts to Ms Wati’s solicitors, Witten-Hannah Howard;
(iii)paying any outgoings due in respect of the property, such as land rates;
(iv)paying any land agent’s commission and marketing costs;
(v)deducting the independent solicitor’s reasonable costs;
(vi)disbursing the sum of $530,104.49 to Ms Wati’s direction and $355,982.77 to Dr Sharma’s direction; and
(b)Within a day of distribution by Mr Bilkey, Mr Witten-Hannah is to forward to Dr Sharma’s solicitor, Mr Henley-Smith, the sum of
$5,926.10.
(emphasis added)
10 At [7] (footnote omitted).
11 Sharma v Wati [2021] NZHC 625.
[19] The sum of $5,926.10 referred to in (b) above arises from Allan J’s second judgment in relation to items of relationship property which were not subject to the orders made by Judge Clarkson in the Family Court. The amount directed to be paid to Dr Sharma via his solicitor reflects the findings and orders made by Allan J in his second judgment.
[20] The variation had the effect of defining the exact sums to be directed to each party, based on the sums provided in the ‘Distribution of Sale’ document, rather than providing a distribution formula based on unknown figures. I will refer to the order in the 14 October 2021 minute as the varied distribution order.
The application for recall
[21] On 16 November 2021, Ms Wati filed an on notice interlocutory application for recall of the minute, under r 11.9 of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR). The application proposes that the minute be replaced with a judgment which:
(a)acknowledges that the home has been sold and proceeds distributed between the parties;
(b)acknowledges that to date Dr Sharma has not complied with the orders in relation to relationship property (other than the home) made by Judge Clarkson and upheld in Allan J’s first judgment;
(c)orders Dr Sharma to pay Ms Wati $66,904.60 out of the proceeds of the sale of the home already distributed to him to comply with those orders; and
(d)orders Dr Sharma to pay costs of and incidental to the recall application.
[22] Mr Parmenter frankly says that when he filed Ms Wati’s application for orders in relation to the sale process to implement Allan J’s first judgment, his instructions were simply to divide up the proceeds from the sale of the home on an equal basis in accordance with Allan J’s first judgment (with necessary adjustments including the
need to take into account the charging orders obtained in relation to the costs judgments over Dr Sharma’s share of the home).
[23] Mr Parmenter says he was not alerted to the fact that the orders made by Judge Clarkson in the Family Court in 2008 and upheld in Allan J’s first judgment regarding relationship property other than the home had not been complied with. Naturally, Mr Parmenter was therefore not in a position to alert the Court to this issue.
[24] Mr Parmenter says as a consequence the sum of $66,904.60 was overpaid to Dr Sharma because the varied distribution order did not take into account the relationship property (other than the home) originally held by the parties as recognised by the judgment of Judge Clarkson.
[25] Dr Sharma not only opposes Ms Wati’s application for recall, but argues he is in fact owed $72,043. Dr Sharma has not filed his own application for recall but supports his claim by way of submissions filed in opposition to Ms Wati’s application.
[26] Dr Sharma asks the Court to vary paragraph (b) of the varied distribution order (set out at [18] above) by deleting it in its entirety and substituting the following:
Mr Witten-Hannah has paid $5,956.10 but needs to pay further
$72,043 to Dr Sharma’s solicitors Mr Henley-Smith as adjustment for his share of equal division of all the relationship properties.
[27] In addition, Dr Sharma seeks $154,700 in compensation for Ms Wati’s occupation of the home between November 2013 and when it was sold in 2021. He says he was obliged to pay rent for another property for himself during this period. Related to that claim Dr Sharma also claims $40,000 in damages for pain and suffering caused by the delay of the sale of the home.
Should the 14 October 2021 minute be recalled?
Rule 11.9 of the High Court Rules 2016
[28] Rule 11.9 of the HCR provides that a Judge may recall a judgment given orally or in writing at any time before a formal record of it is drawn up and sealed. Judgment includes a decree or order of the court.12
[29] Here, the application concerns a minute. A minute is subject to a recall application in the same way as a judgment. Minutes do not need to be sealed but nevertheless constitute a formal record of the court. A formal court record includes a judgment, order, or minute of the court, including any record of the reasons given by a Judge.13 In this case, the minute in question varied orders made in my first judgment dated 26 March 2021.
[30] The Courts consider the recall of a judgment as a serious step, due to the principle of finality of litigation. Recall should only be undertaken in certain situations, which have been defined by case law. In Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), decided before a rule on recalling judgments was incorporated into the High Court Rules, Wild CJ stated as follows:14
Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled-first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court's attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.
[31] This statement has been applied, in the context of a recall application in a civil proceeding, by the Supreme Court15 and the Court of Appeal.16 It is now well-
12 Senior Courts Act 2016, s 4(1).
13 Senior Courts Act, sch 2, pt A; (definition provided within the context of an access to documents application).
14 Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632, at 633.
15 Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76.
16 See, for instance, Rainbow Corp Ltd v Ryde Holdings Ltd (1992) 5 PRNZ 493 (CA), Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission [2007] NZCA 49, and Erwood v Glasgow Harley [2007] NZCA 88, (2007) 18 PRNZ 336.
established that the court may only recall a judgment under one of the three situations set out in Horowhenua, as follows:
(a)Since giving the judgment there has been amendment to relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of higher authority.
(b)Where counsel have failed to direct the court’s attention to a legislative provision or precedent which is clearly relevant.
(c)When for some very special reason justice so requires.
[32] The Court of Appeal in Erwood v Maxted17 stated that (other than cases of slips or omissions) the criteria set out in Horowhenua are to be followed and strictly applied. In particular, the Court said:18
Applications which merely seek to relitigate matters already considered, or to challenge substantive findings of fact and law, will not be entertained.
Inherent jurisdiction
[33] Apart from r 11.9, the court has inherent jurisdiction to revisit a decision in exceptional circumstances when required by the interests of justice.19
[34] Established principles governing the recall of a perfected judgment under the court’s inherent jurisdiction have been stated as follows:20
(a)finality of litigation is in the public interest; however
(b)there are established categories of exception to finality of litigation which are:
(i)a slip or omission may be rectified;
(ii)a judgment obtained by fraud may be set aside usually by a separate proceeding;
17 Erwood v Maxted [2010] NZCA 93.
18 At [32] (footnotes omitted).
19 R v Smith [2003] 3 NZLR 617 (CA). See also Lopdell v Deli Holdings Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 551, following Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (decided before any rule dealing with recall).
20 Matthew Casey and others Sim’s Court Practice (online ed. LexisNexis) at [HCR11.9.4].
(iii)discovery of material fresh evidence;
(iv)a judgment by consent may be reopened; and
(v)a supplementary judgment may be given to cover a matter not previously dealt with.
Discussion
Counsel failure
[35] In her application for recall, Ms Wati relies on the second and third grounds identified in Horowhenua as relevant to her case. These are (a) counsel’s failure to direct the court’s attention to a legislative provision or precedent which is clearly relevant, and (b) some very special reason required by the interests of justice.
[36] I accept that counsel did not advise the Court that the orders regarding the division of the couple’s relationship property other than the home, pursuant to the orders made in the judgment of Judge Clarkson and the High Court judgments of Allan J (collectively, the orders) had not been complied with by Dr Sharma. This is quite different to a legal precedent or legislative provision. While relevant, the division of other relationship property was a matter internal to the proceeding, rather than a point of law. However, the Court of Appeal has acknowledged English case law which indicates a wider formulation of the counsel failure exception. In Re Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Ltd (No 3), Neuberger J set out “strong” reasons for recall as follows:21
[A] plain mistake on the part of the courts; a failure of the parties to draw to the court’s attention a fact or point of law that was plainly relevant; or discovery of new facts subsequent to the judgment being given.
[37] I accept that the unresolved relationship property orders were plainly relevant to the matter of selling the home for the purpose of finalising the division of relationship property. Counsel for Ms Wati did not put the relevant facts before the court when seeking the distribution order and the varied distribution order.
21 Re Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Ltd (No 3) [1999] TLR 4, cited in Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 12, at [32]; applied in Deliu v Independent Police Conduct Authority [2021] NZHC 10.
[38] Although Neuberger J considered that the failure of counsel to alert the court to a relevant fact may justify the recall of a judgment in some circumstances, he emphasised that:
It would be ... foolish to pretend that in every application where one or more of those requirements was satisfied the court should think it right to reopen the case.
The court might, for example, think it inappropriate to change its mind where the successful party or a third party had acted reasonably and irrevocably on the basis of the judgment.
[39] Here, the varied distribution order contained in the minute of 14 October 2021 has been properly acted upon by the independent solicitor. Both parties have received their share of the proceeds of the sale of the home accordingly. In these circumstances, I do not consider that counsel’s failure to put a relevant fact before the court justifies departure from the principle of finality of litigation.
Special reason
[40] In regard to the special reason, Ms Wati submits that the effect of the amended orders made by the minute is that Dr Sharma has received $66,904.60 more from the division of relationship property than he is entitled to, contrary to the orders, and that this circumstance is contrary to justice. Ms Wati has not filed an affidavit stating she has not received payment from Dr Sharma pursuant to the 2008 and 2009 orders (apart from payment in relation to the home). That assertion has been made by way of submissions on her behalf. However, it is apparent from a number of the documents filed by Dr Sharma, both by way of submission and affidavit, that his position is that he has not made any payments to Ms Wati in relation to the orders regarding relationship property apart from the home. On this basis, I accept that payment for the division of relationship property other than the home is yet to be resolved.
[41] The Court of Appeal in Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission concluded that the “special reason” category is intended to be “narrow” and that cases appropriate for recall are “likely to be rare”.22 However, recall in the interests of justice is appropriate in circumstances where the Court failed to determine an issue
22 At [34].
that was properly put to it and raised for determination,23 or overlooked a material factor in reaching a decision. In these circumstances, recall avoids the risk that an appeal might be allowed and remitted to the trial judge for consideration at unnecessary further cost to the parties.24
[42] Here, counsel for Ms Wati acknowledge that they did not raise the issue of the orders set out in the Family Court judgment when seeking the distribution order and the varied distribution order. In these circumstances, there is no basis for arguing that a relevant matter was overlooked by the Court. There is therefore no special reason for recalling the decision in the interests of justice, as per the third ground in Horowhenua.
[43] Moreover, this is not a case where Ms Wati is without remedy. She already has the benefit of the orders of Judge Clarkson concerning relationship property other than the home. These orders were upheld in Allan J’s first judgment. Ms Wati can seek to enforce those orders. Any order I would make would simply repeat those orders, save for the particular sought by Ms Wati that the amount owing by Dr Sharma be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of the home. As the proceeds have already been distributed, the horse has bolted in that regard.
[44] In light of the principles governing recall applications and the relevant case law, I consider that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to recall the minute. My first judgment and orders dealt specifically with the sale of the home, and the division of proceeds arising from the sale. The orders were tailored to a particular purpose and were ultimately effective. The distribution order contained in the March 2021 orders was specific to the proceeds of sale of the family home, and the varied distribution order clarified the amounts due to the parties in an accurate way. The proceeds of the sale have now been properly divided. No injustice has occurred in this regard.
23 Brake v Boote (1991) 4 PRNZ 86 (HC), Y v Foulkes [2014] NZCA 396 at [33].
24 Munro v Gladvale Farms Ltd (No 3) [2017] NZHC 2692 at [14].
Other relationship property
[45] Although I am not required to decide on the matter of outstanding amounts owed between the parties in regard to relationship property other than the home, I provide my assessment in order to assist the parties if and when either party takes action to enforce the earlier judgments. Both parties have filed detailed submissions including calculations on this particular point.
[46] The difference of opinion between the parties relates to the division of relationship property other than the home. The value of the different elements of this property was established by the judgment of Judge Clarkson and Allan J’s first judgment in 2008 and 2009 respectively, and is not in dispute.
[47] Judge Clarkson made the following findings of fact regarding relationship property held by the parties at the time of separation:25
Dr Sharma Ms Wati Bonus bonds $100,000 Cash in home
office
$12,000 Sovereign Policy $18,593 National Provident
fund
$2,000 BNZ account $16,400 Auckland Airport
shares
$1,994 TOTAL $136,987 TOTAL $14,000
[48]Dr Sharma therefore owed Ms Wati $61,493.50 to correct this imbalance.26
[49] In Allan J’s second judgment the Judge made supplementary findings concerning Ms Wati’s ASB bank account and chattels held by both parties. He also upheld Judge Clarkson’s finding regarding the GST debt. The effect of this decision
25 At [49].
26 Where total other relationship property is $150,987, a 50 per cent share is $75,493, and Ms Wati already holds $14,000. Note that this table does not account for the IRD and ACC debt identified by the Family Court judgment as $6,542. Neither party has identified if or when these debts were paid, or who paid them. As Judge Clarkson noted at [44], if Dr Sharma has paid these debts, “he is to have credit accordingly”.
was that Ms Wati owed Dr Sharma $5,926.10.27 This sum has been paid to Dr Sharma by Ms Wati’s solicitor, as per the terms of the varied distribution order. Dr Sharma acknowledges receipt of this sum in his memorandum dated 22 November 2021. These aspects of relationship property (as identified in Allan J’s second judgment) are now neutral and need not complicate further calculations.
[50] I accept the evidence provided by solicitors Graham & Co concerning the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the home. This distribution was undertaken in accordance with the varied distribution order, on an equal share basis, taking into account various debts and credits connected with the sale of the property and the charging orders over Dr Sharma’s share. No reference was made to any relationship property other than the home. I consider that the proceeds of the sale of the home have been properly and accurately divided on an equal share basis. This aspect of the division of relationship property is now complete.
[51] Dr Sharma argues that he is owed $72,043. In Judge Clarkson’s judgment, calculations concerning the proper division of relationship property were made on the basis of a fixed price for the home, which was held by Ms Wati. These calculations became irrelevant once the fixed price approach was overturned on appeal in Allan J’s first judgment. The value of the home was thereafter left to the open market to determine. For this reason, Dr Sharma causes confusion when he relies on figures identified in Judge Clarkson’s judgment which include the fixed valuation of the home. The amount of $177,500, which he refers to in his memorandum in opposition to the current application, is therefore outdated and irrelevant. He acknowledges receipt of $5,926.10, which effectively resolved the order made in Allan J’s second judgment. His reference to this judgment is therefore also irrelevant. In short, I am unable to find any basis for Dr Sharma’s claim to $72,043.
[52] The amount of $61,493.50 identified by Judge Clarkson, as a debt owed by Dr Sharma to Ms Wati, appears to remain outstanding to this day. This amount reflects
27 Comprising $2,734.89 (50 per cent of Ms Wati’s ASB bank account holdings), $584 (to correct imbalance in value of chattels held), and $2,607.21 (50 per cent contribution to GST debt).
the unequal holdings of the parties at the time of their separation, other than the home. My calculation of the amount varies slightly from Mr Parmenter’s, but is not far off.28
[53] I accept in principle Mr Parmenter’s submission that the debt remains outstanding. Judge Clarkson’s orders remain extant. It would be open to Ms Wati to seek enforcement of the orders through the District Court.29
Dr Sharma’s claim for compensation and damages
[54] Dr Sharma seeks $154,700 in compensation for Ms Wati’s occupation of the home between November 2013 and 2021 when it was sold. He says he has been obliged to pay rent for another property for himself all this time.
[55] Dr Sharma also claims $40,000 in damages for pain and suffering caused by the delay of the sale of the home. He says that he has had to change flats twice and his personal property, including a collection of books, has been damaged during relocation.
[56] Neither of these claims is properly raised in the context of Dr Sharma’s opposition to Ms Wati’s recall application. It is not necessary to address them further.
Result
[57]Ms Wati’s application for recall is refused.
Costs
[58] Dr Sharma says that costs arising out of this application should lie where they fall. He says that even if Ms Wati is successful, she should not be awarded costs because the recall application was only needed due to an error on the part of her legal team.
28 Mr Parmenter’s calculations in the ‘Respondent’s memorandum responding to the Minute dated 22.10.21, re variation of orders’, dated 3 November 2021 contains an error at [24]. Ms Wati was found to hold the total amount in the ASB account of $5,469.78, and chattels to the value of $1,635. Mr Parmenter instead identifies the amounts Ms Wati was ordered to pay to Dr Sharma. See fn 6 above. Mr Parmenter also errs at [22] when he deducts $6,542 (for IRD and ACC debts) from the total before dividing equally. See fn 27 above; Judge Clarkson indicated that these debts may have been paid separately by Dr Sharma.
29 District Court Act 2016, Pt 10.
[59] Mr Parmenter accepts that the recall application was made as a consequence of errors. However, he observes that Dr Sharma did not need to file an opposition and could simply have accepted the situation as it was.
[60] Ms Wati’s recall application has failed. As Dr Sharma is self-represented, he has not incurred costs.
[61] Dr Sharma’s notice of opposition and purported counterclaim were beyond the scope of what he could argue in opposition and he has not enjoyed any success.
[62]I direct that costs lie where they fall.
Gordon J
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