Sharma v Police
[2025] NZHC 1178
•15 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2025-404-143 [2025] NZHC 1178
BETWEEN SUREN SHARMA
Appellant
AND NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 12 May 2025
Counsel:D N Rawson for applicant P R McNabb for respondent
I A S S Ieremia for NZME Publishing Ltd as intervenor
Judgment: 15 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF JOHNSTONE J
(appeal against refusal to grant identity suppression)
This judgment was delivered by me on 15 May 2025 at 3.30 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: MC, Auckland
SHARMA v POLICE [2025] NZHC 1178 [15 May 2025]
[1] The Crown alleges that, in the period from early 2022 to late 2023, Suren Sharma committed 11 offences of money laundering.1 It says he distributed more than $1,700,000, which had been transferred by the victims of online investment scams into bank accounts under his control, knowing of the risk that the transferred amounts were criminal proceeds, but unreasonably distributing them anyway. Mr Sharma’s trial, in the District Court at Auckland, is set to commence on 29 September 2025.
[2] By judgment dated 13 March 2025, Judge N Mathers declined to extend, until the conclusion of his trial, the interim identity suppression that Mr Sharma had previously been granted.2 Mr Sharma appeals Judge Mathers’ decision.
Principles
[3] When considering applications for identity suppression in criminal cases, the courts recognise the importance of free speech and openness in judicial proceedings by presuming that such applications should be rejected unless they meet a two-stage test. The first stage relates to whether the necessary statutory threshold has been met. If it has, the second stage requires the weighing of competing interests and the exercise of discretion.3
[4] An appeal against a refusal of identity suppression may require the appellate court: 4
(a)to re-evaluate whether the first stage threshold was met (if it were not thought to be met at first instance), considering the merits afresh and giving judgment in accordance with its own opinion; and/or
(b)to determine whether a first instance discretionary refusal of identity suppression at the second stage involved application of some wrong
1 Crimes Act 1961, s 243(2). Maximum penalty: seven years’ imprisonment.
2 R v Sharma [2025] NZDC 4911.
3 Robertson v Police [2015] NZCA 7 at [39]–[46]; D (CA443/2015) v Police [2015] NZCA 541,
(2015) 27 CRNZ 614 at [9]–[12].
4 Parker v R [2020] NZCA 502 at [29]–[30]; citing Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [16] and Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [32].
principle, consideration of an irrelevant matter or oversight of a relevant one, or was plainly wrong.
Judge Mathers’ judgment
[5] Judge Mathers observed that statutory thresholds upon which Mr Sharma relied were those described in s 200(2)(a) and (d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, which provide that:
The court may make an order under subsection (1) only if the court is satisfied that publication would be likely to—
(a)cause extreme hardship to the person charged with, or convicted of, or acquitted of the offence, or any person connected with that person; or
…
(d) create a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial; or
…
[6] The Judge referred to an affidavit from Mr Sharma, and supporting information from his wife and family, and to his “main concern” over his ability to support his family as the sole income earner if his identity is published. But the Judge found Mr Sharma’s concerns not to meet the threshold of “extreme hardship”. Further, the Judge observed that she would not have exercised her discretion to grant identity suppression, had the threshold been met.
[7] The Judge did not squarely address the s 200(2)(d) question whether a real risk of prejudice to Mr Sharma’s trial might arise from publication of his identity. However, I understand that Mr Sharma’s submissions at first instance had not raised that possibility.
Mr Sharma’s position
[8]On appeal, Mr Sharma submits that:
(a)The first stage threshold set out in s 200(2)(a) was met; that is, publication of his identity would be likely to cause him extreme
hardship. Mr Sharma would be at risk of losing his company, his reputation as a taxation agent, and hence his livelihood. His status as a defendant yet to be tried increases the likelihood of extreme hardship.
(b)The fact that the Crown alleges only that Mr Sharma dealt with funds derived from others’ criminal offending, being reckless as to whether they were criminally derived, undermines the public interest in Mr Sharma’s identity being published.
[9] Again, Mr Sharma did not raise the prospect of prejudice to the fairness of his trial. I put that aspect of Judge Mathers’ remarks to one side.
NZME and Crown position
[10] A media organisation, NZME Publishing Limited (NZME), appeared by its counsel, Ms Ieremia, with my consent. NZME opposes Mr Sharma’s appeal, submitting that his circumstances fail to meet the statutory threshold.
[11]For the Crown, Ms McNabb similarly opposes Mr Sharma’s appeal.
Assessment
[12] The question whether, in terms of s 200(2), publication of identity details “would be likely to cause” the relevant threshold outcome involves consideration whether the outcome is a “real and appreciable possibility”.5
[13] A likelihood of “extreme hardship”, in terms of s 200(2)(a), connotes a real and appreciable risk of:6
… a very high level of hardship. The word “hardship” on its own means “severe suffering or privation”. The addition of the “undue” in s 200(2)(c) indicates something more than [simple hardship] is required, while the word “extreme” in s 200(2)[(d)] indicates something more again.
[14]As the Court of Appeal observed in D (CA443/2015) v Police: 7
5 D (CA443/2015) v Police, above n 3, at [30](a).
6 Robertson v Police, above n 3, at [48].
7 At [11], citing Robertson v Police, above n 3, at [49].
Distress, embarrassment and adverse personal and financial consequences usually attend criminal proceedings, and something out of the ordinary is needed if [an applicant for identity suppression] is to get across the threshold.
[15] Assessment whether likely hardship would be extreme must be based on all potential hardship, looked at cumulatively.8
[16] Mr Sharma is 73 years old. He has been a Justice of the Peace for around 40 years. Mr Sharma’s affidavit evidence is to the effect that:
(a)He operates the business of General Management Company Ltd as its sole director. The business is that of a taxation agent. It is not currently providing much income, barely allowing Mr Sharma to pay his rent. But nevertheless, it is his “main income”, and is additional to income he receives by way of New Zealand Superannuation.
(b)His business involves the receipt of clients’ money, which is then paid to Inland Revenue in respect of their tax obligations. His clients include individuals, and small to medium sized companies, running businesses.
(c)He thinks his business clients would not want to work with him if his name were published, his good reputation would be tarnished beyond repair and his business would fail. He would no longer be able to support his family.
(d)Facing charges has been stressful, and his name being published would “feel like a dagger through [his] heart”.
(e)His wife is also very stressed. She has written a letter supporting his identity suppression, outlining the serious effect of his prosecution upon her mental health.
(f)His defence to the Crown’s case of money laundering is that he received and distributed the scam victims’ money on the instructions of a client:
8 X (CA226/2020) v R [2020] NZCA 387 at [40].
a named company and one of its directors. Mr Sharma says the director of this company sent him documents and instructions by email and sometimes by WhatsApp. Implicitly, he says he was also fooled by those responsible for the scam; that is, that he was unaware of any real risk he was facilitating their crimes.
[17] Having reviewed Mr Sharma’s assertions, and considered the submissions Ms Rawson makes for him, I am not persuaded Judge Mathers was wrong.
[18] First, Mr Sharma’s case is distinguishable from that in H v R, where the Court of Appeal found pre-trial publication of the identity of a professional entertainer, accused of laundering a large sum of cash for an international methamphetamine ring, to give rise to a likelihood of extreme hardship.9 In that case, independent evidence from multiple sources had been given of the significance of reputation in the entertainment industry, and that publication would give rise to “irrevocable” damage to the appellant’s excellent reputation, which would severely compromise his ability to work in that industry. The Court noted the appellant’s concern that (in addition to the allegation of money laundering) he was alleged to have participated in an organised group, and found that publication would mean the appellant “[would] be unable to work in his chosen field, both immediately and in the long term”.10
[19] In the present case, there is no evidence of there being a particular significance of reputation in Mr Sharma’s business. Undoubtedly, a general level of customer concern will arise when a defendant offering commercial services is charged with money-related offending. But Mr Sharma’s defence, if vindicated at trial, is such that there is no obvious impediment to that concern being overcome in short order. Notably, Mr Sharma is not accused of associating directly with international organised criminals.
[20] Relatedly, it is not apparent that Mr Sharma’s business requires others to pay him money, for on-payment to Inland Revenue, rather than to pay Inland Revenue directly. Regular customers who have relied on Mr Sharma to calculate and file their
9 H v R [2022] NZCA 200.
10 At [45].
tax returns should not be troubled by him continuing to do so, at least until the outcome of his trial is known, particularly if Mr Sharma adjusts his practice by inviting clients to pay tax owed to Inland Revenue directly.
[21] And in any event, while commercial relationships and transactions will inevitably be affected when a defendant of the commercial world is allegedly involved in commercial misconduct, impact of that type does not amount to undue hardship, let alone extreme hardship.
[22] Mr Sharma’s case is also distinguishable from that in R v BGE (No 2) where identity suppression was granted in light of the likely impact, not only directly upon the applicant’s business interests, but also other factors: the applicant’s wife had recently given birth to the fourth of their dependent children, the oldest of whom was eight years old; and his father was suffering from a debilitating disease, which (on the evidence of a distinguished neurologist) would be exacerbated by the stress of publication.11
[23] There is no medical evidence suggesting that Mr Sharma’s wife is confronting health impacts more significant than those associated with the usual degree of stress experienced by the family members of those facing serious criminal charges. His sons are adults, and can be expected to provide financially for themselves.
[24] Overall, the factors Mr Sharma calls in aid do not accumulate to establish a likelihood of extreme hardship. I agree with Judge Mathers that in this case the statutory threshold for identity suppression is not met.
[25] In light of that conclusion, it is not necessary that I express a concluded opinion whether the discretion to order identity suppression should have been exercised. If I am wrong in my view on the question of threshold, my view on the discretion will have been poorly founded, and of limited value. But that said, I do not accept that the fact the Crown has alleged merely that Mr Sharma knew there was a risk the funds he distributed were criminally derived, rather than that he knew that was the case, has any material impact on the strength of the public interest in his prosecution. His
11 R v BGE (No 2) HC Hamilton CRI-2005-419-122, 1 June 2006.
position as a JP, with long-standing involvement in business matters, contributes to significant public interest in the case either way.
Result
[26]Mr Sharma’s appeal is dismissed.
Johnstone J
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