IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA
TE WHANGANUI-Ā-TARA ROHE
CIV 2017-485-496 [2017] NZHC 2604
BETWEEN KERRY SELLWOOD
First Appellant
AND
GREGORY DAYMAN Second Appellant
AND
SHERYL STANFIELD Third Appellant
AND
LESLIE MARINKOVICH Fourth Appellant
AND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
Hearing: 16 October 2017 Counsel:
J M Miller and B J Peck for Appellants
S M Bisley and B R McKinnon for RespondentJudgment:
25 October 2017
JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J
[1] Each of the appellants has had a hip replacement involving the implantation of a metal-on-metal hip prosthesis known as the De Puy Articular Surface Replacement (DPASR). The DPASR has been the subject of a world-wide recall because it has an unacceptably high failure rate.1 The relevant mechanism of failure is that some patients with DPASR prostheses suffer from metallosis, caused by the
release of metal ions into a patient’s bloodstream and surrounding tissue. In high
1 The DPASR was withdrawn from the Australasian market in late 2009. It was then the subject of a worldwide recall by De Puy on 24 August 2010.
SELLWOOD v ACC [2017] NZHC 2604 [25 October 2017]
doses, and in some cases, those metal ions cause pseudotumours, loosening, and muscle, bone and/or tissue damage.
[2] Some 75 New Zealand recipients of the DPASR prostheses have suffered the effects of such failure and have had cover under the Accident Compensation Act
2001 (the Act) for “treatment injury” confirmed.
[3] By contrast, the appellants have not been diagnosed as having metallosis.2
Two have had their DPASR prostheses removed, at De Puy’s cost. The other two have been advised that their prostheses (at this point) are working well; removal is not recommended. They nonetheless seek to establish that they, too, have “cover” under the Act for treatment injury arising from the implantation of the prostheses. Cover has been denied by the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC).
[4] ACC’s position has been upheld by the District Court in four separate decisions, primarily on the ground that the applicants have suffered no personal (physical) injury.3 Leave to appeal has, nonetheless been granted on the following
question:4
Is the implantation of a defective prosthesis a physical injury entitling the claimant to cover for a treatment injury?
The statutory provisions
[5] Section 20 of the Act relevantly provides:
20 Cover for personal injury suffered in New Zealand (except mental injury caused by certain criminal acts or work-related mental injury)
(1) A person has cover for a personal injury if—
2 All metal-on-metal prostheses release metal ions into the bloodstream and surrounding tissue and are regarded as failing when an excessive amount of such ions are released into the bloodstream and surrounding tissue. While DPASR prostheses have a higher failure rate than other similar prostheses, the majority of DPASR prostheses do not fail.
3 Sellwood v Accident Compensation Corporation [2016] NZACC 207; Stanfield v Accident Compensation Corporation [2016] NZACC 255; Dayman v Accident Compensation Corporation [2016] NZACC 242; and Marinkovich v Accident Compensation Corporation
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- [2017] NZHC 2604
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The reasoning of the Court was that the appellants had not demonstrated that their prostheses were defective. The mere fact of a recall did not establish defect, and the majority of DPASR prostheses had not failed. The Court further held that the statutory provisions did not encompass a risk of future injury as a "physical injury". The Court rejected the analogy to pregnancy cases, where profound and unintended physical consequences of failed surgery can be considered personal injuries. The Court also noted that the Act's purpose to reduce the incidence and severity of injury did not extend to interpreting the coverage provisions in a manner that included risks of injury. The Court concluded that the appellants' successful implantation of functioning prostheses did not constitute a treatment injury, and they were not entitled to cover for future risks of injury. The Court's decision affirmed that the appellants had no entitlement to cover under the Accident Compensation Act 2001.