Sellwood v Accident Compensation Corporation

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA

TE WHANGANUI-Ā-TARA ROHE

CIV 2017-485-496 [2017] NZHC 2604

BETWEEN

KERRY SELLWOOD

First Appellant

AND

GREGORY DAYMAN Second Appellant

AND

SHERYL STANFIELD Third Appellant

AND

LESLIE MARINKOVICH Fourth Appellant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

Hearing: 16 October 2017

Counsel:

J M Miller and B J Peck for Appellants
S M Bisley and B R McKinnon for Respondent

Judgment:

25 October 2017

JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J

[1]      Each of the appellants has had a hip replacement involving the implantation of a metal-on-metal hip prosthesis known as the De Puy Articular Surface Replacement (DPASR).   The DPASR has been the subject of a world-wide recall because it has an unacceptably high failure rate.1   The relevant mechanism of failure is that some patients with DPASR prostheses suffer from metallosis, caused by the

release of metal ions into a patient’s bloodstream and surrounding tissue.  In high

1      The DPASR was withdrawn from the Australasian market in late 2009. It was then the subject of a worldwide recall by De Puy on 24 August 2010.

SELLWOOD v ACC [2017] NZHC 2604 [25 October 2017]

doses, and in some cases, those metal ions cause pseudotumours, loosening, and muscle, bone and/or tissue damage.

[2]      Some 75 New Zealand recipients of the DPASR prostheses have suffered the effects of such failure and have had cover under the Accident Compensation Act

2001 (the Act) for “treatment injury” confirmed.

[3]      By contrast, the appellants have not been diagnosed as having metallosis.2

Two have had their DPASR prostheses removed, at De Puy’s cost.  The other two have been advised that their prostheses (at this point) are working well; removal is not recommended.  They nonetheless seek to establish that they, too, have “cover” under the Act for treatment injury arising from the implantation of the prostheses. Cover has been denied by the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC).

[4]      ACC’s  position  has  been  upheld  by  the  District  Court  in  four  separate decisions, primarily on the ground that the applicants have suffered no personal (physical) injury.3    Leave to appeal has, nonetheless been granted on the following

question:4

Is the implantation of a defective prosthesis a physical injury entitling the claimant to cover for a treatment injury?

The statutory provisions

[5]      Section 20 of the Act relevantly provides:

20       Cover  for  personal  injury  suffered  in  New  Zealand  (except mental injury caused by certain criminal acts or work-related mental injury)

(1)       A person has cover for a personal injury if—

2      All metal-on-metal prostheses release metal ions into the bloodstream and surrounding tissue and  are  regarded as  failing when an  excessive amount of such ions are  released into  the bloodstream and surrounding tissue.  While DPASR prostheses have a higher failure rate than other similar prostheses, the majority of DPASR prostheses do not fail.

3      Sellwood v  Accident Compensation Corporation  [2016] NZACC 207;  Stanfield v  Accident Compensation   Corporation   [2016]   NZACC   255;   Dayman   v   Accident   Compensation Corporation [2016]  NZACC  242;  and  Marinkovich v  Accident Compensation Corporation

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Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 2604
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sellwood v Accident Compensation Corporation involves four appellants who had received DePuy Articular Surface Replacement (DPASR) hip prostheses, which were later recalled due to their high failure rate. The appellants, who have not yet experienced metallosis or other failure-related injuries, sought to establish that they were entitled to cover for treatment injuries under the Accident Compensation Act 2001. The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) denied their claims, a decision upheld by the District Court. The central legal issue was whether the implantation of a defective prosthesis constitutes a physical injury that entitles the claimant to cover for a treatment injury. The statutory provisions of the Act were examined, particularly the definitions of "personal injury" and "treatment injury". The Court found that while the appellants had suffered some pain and dysfunction, these were not deemed to be injuries under the Act. Moreover, the Court held that the mere risk of future injury was not sufficient to trigger cover, as the Act focuses on realised outcomes rather than potentialities. The Court also noted that the appellants' argument did not align with the established interpretation of the Act, which does not consider the risk of injury as a "physical injury".

The reasoning of the Court was that the appellants had not demonstrated that their prostheses were defective. The mere fact of a recall did not establish defect, and the majority of DPASR prostheses had not failed. The Court further held that the statutory provisions did not encompass a risk of future injury as a "physical injury". The Court rejected the analogy to pregnancy cases, where profound and unintended physical consequences of failed surgery can be considered personal injuries. The Court also noted that the Act's purpose to reduce the incidence and severity of injury did not extend to interpreting the coverage provisions in a manner that included risks of injury. The Court concluded that the appellants' successful implantation of functioning prostheses did not constitute a treatment injury, and they were not entitled to cover for future risks of injury. The Court's decision affirmed that the appellants had no entitlement to cover under the Accident Compensation Act 2001.