Selak v Goodwin

[2025] NZHC 3203

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-1137

[2025] NZHC 3203

BETWEEN

SUZANNE SELAK

Applicant

AND

ASHLEY MICHAEL GOODWIN

Respondent

Hearing:	6 October 2025
Appearances:	Patrick Shanahan-Pinker for the Applicant Andrew Gilchrist for the Respondent
Judgment:	30 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE C B TAYLOR

[Application to sustain notice of claim]

This judgment was delivered by me on 30 October 2025 at 3:00pm

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

……………………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

K3 Legal (Peter Napier/Patrick Shanahan-Pinker), Auckland, for the Applicant Howard-Smith Pascoe (Philip Howard-Smith), Auckland, for the Respondent

Counsel:

Andrew Gilchrist, Southern Cross Chambers, Auckland, for the Respondent

SELAK v GOODWIN [2025] NZHC 3203 [30 October 2025]

Introduction

[1]                 Ms  Suzanne  Selak  (Ms  Selak)  applies  for  orders  that  a   notice   of claim 13235552.1 (the Notice) lodged over eight properties (the Properties) owned by Mr Ashley Goodwin or trusts associated with him (Mr Goodwin) not lapse.

[2]                 Ms Selak and Mr Goodwin were in a de-facto relationship for at least 10 years until 2024. Ms Selak is now bringing a claim under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) in the Family Court for division of the relationship property. She seeks an order that the Notice remain on the title of the Properties to protect her substantive claim until it is finally determined in the Family Court.

Background

[3]                 On 5 May 2025, Mr Goodwin applied to Land Information New Zealand to lapse the Notice over the Properties. Ms Selak then filed her application that the Notice not lapse with this Court on 20 May 2025.

[4] are:	The (a)	details of the Properties in respect of which the Notice has been lodged Unit 325, Scenic Suites, 27 Stanley Street, Queenstown, contained in
RT 5167;
(b)	Unit 326, Scenic Suites, 27 Stanley Street, Queenstown, contained in RT 5168;
(c)	910-912  New  North  Road,  Mt  Albert,  Auckland,  contained   in RT NA404/235 and RT NA379/230;

(d)6/66    Hamilton    Road,    Herne    Bay,    Auckland,    contained    in RT NA69C/256;

(e)4/66    Hamilton    Road,    Herne    Bay,    Auckland,    contained    in RT NA69C/260;

(f)6 Mt Albert Road, Mt Albert, Auckland, contained in RT NA715/309;

(g)5 Bayview Terrace, Tairua, contained in RT SA23A/1452; and

(h)1 Bernard Street, Two Mile Bay, Taupo, contained in RT SA6C/1279.

[5]        Many of the Properties are held by trusts. The ownership of the properties is as follows:

(a)Mr Goodwin in his personal capacity:

(i)100 per cent share in 1 Bernard Street; and

(ii)43 per cent share in 4/66 Hamilton Road.

(b)The Ashley Goodwin Family Trust:

(i)21 per cent share in 4/66 Hamilton Road;

(ii)50 per cent share in Unit 325, Scenic Suites; and

(iii)50 per cent share in Unit 326, Scenic Suites.

(c)The New North Trust:

(i)100 per cent of 6 Mt Albert Road;

(ii)100 per cent of 910–912 New North Road; and

(iii)100 per cent of 5 Bayview Terrace.

(d)The AM Goodwin Family Trust No. 4 holds a 36 per cent share in 4/66 Hamilton Road; and

(e)The Goodwin Realty Trust holds a 100 per cent of 6/66 Hamilton Road.

[6]        On 5 May 2025, Mr Goodwin amended his application to seek only a partial lapse of the Notice, allowing the Notice in respect of the family home (6/66 Hamilton Road, Herne Bay, Auckland) to continue. Consequently, Ms Selak’s application now only relates to the remaining seven Properties.

[7]        Ms Selak says that she has no transparency around the parties’ assets or finances, and that this was the case both during the relationship and since the commencement of proceedings in the Family Court. Accordingly she says she is not in a position to determine whether she has an interest in the Properties, and needs an examination by an accountant to determine what claim she may have.

[8]        Mr Goodwin has agreed to a forensic accountant examining his financial records and that  of  his  trusts  to  determine  the  extent  of  Ms Selak’s  interest.  An accountant was appointed on 1 September 2025.

Legal principles

[9]Section 42(1) of the PRA relevantly provides:

42       Notice of interest against title

(1) A claim to an interest, pursuant to this Act, in any land subject to the Land Transfer Act 2017 shall be deemed to be a registrable interest for the purposes of that Act.

[10]      A notice of claim has the same effect as a caveat lodged under the Land Transfer Act 2017 (LTA).1 There are two requirements to lodge a notice of claim:

(a)the claimant must be, or have been, in a qualifying relationship with the registered proprietor of the land, or a person who is entitled to or beneficially interested in the land;2 and

(b)there must be an unresolved claim under the PRA to an interest in the land in question.3

1      Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 42(3).

2      Martin v Guy [2023] NZHC 1963, [2023] NZFLR 702 at [27].

3 Above n 2, at [29].

[11]      The principles governing the determination of caveats can be applied analogically to the determination of notices of claim. Those principles are well- established.4 The onus is on the caveator to demonstrate an interest in the land sufficient to support the caveat, and the caveator must demonstrate a reasonably arguable case to support the claimed interest.5 This means the caveator need not definitively establish a right to the interest.

[12]      The process by which applications to sustain a caveat are determined is ill- suited to resolving disputed factual questions. An order for removal will only be made if it is clear the caveat cannot be maintained—either because there was no valid ground for its lodging in the first place, or because the ground on which it was lodged has now ceased to exist.

[13]      Although the onus of proof lies with the caveator, any conflict between affidavits will generally be resolved in the caveator’s favour.6 This is not to say that the Court is bound to accept uncritically statements in an affidavit that lack precision, are equivocal, inconsistent with the documentary evidence or other statements of the same deponent, or inherently improbable.7

[14]      While the Court retains a residual discretion to remove a caveat or allow it to lapse even if the caveator has a legitimate and caveatable interest, that discretion is to be exercised cautiously. The Court must be completely satisfied removal would not prejudice the caveator’s legitimate interests.8 But the position as regards notices of claim is more liberal.

4      See generally Philpott v Noble Investments Ltd (1989) 1 NZ ConvC 190, 246 (CA) at [26].

And, for a general statement of the principles, see Wallace v Studio New Zealand Ltd [2021] NZCA 392 at [39]–[41].

5      Botany Land Development Ltd v Auckland Council [2014] NZCA 61 at [24]–[25].

6      Bethell v Rickard [2013] NZCA 68 at [22]. See also MacRae v Rapana HC Auckland M633/94, 17 June 1994.

7      Barrett v IBC International Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 170 (CA) at 175, citing Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan s/o Velayutham [1980] AC 331 (PC) at 341; and Xie v 126 Waimumu Ltd [2020] NZHC 1109 at [8].

8      Pacific Homes Limited (in rec) v Consolidated Joineries Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 652 (CA) at 656.

Trust property

[15]      The general rule is that a notice of claim under s 42 cannot be lodged against land in trust, unless that trust land is vulnerable to a claim under the PRA. Trust land may be vulnerable because one of the parties had a property interest in the trust, the trust is invalid for some reason, or because a disposition to the trust can be challenged under ss 44 or 44C of the PRA.9

[16]Section 44(1) of the PRA relevantly provides:

Where the High Court or the District Court or the Family Court is satisfied that any disposition of property has been made, whether for value or not, by or on behalf of or by direction of or in the interests of any person in order to defeat the claim or rights of any person (party B) under this Act, the court may make any order under subsection (2).

[17]      Section 44(2) empowers the Court to set aside dispositions of property made to defeat the rights of any person under the PRA.

Submissions for Ms Selak

[18]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker, for Ms Selak, submits that there can be no dispute that the parties were in a qualifying de facto relationship. While the parties differ as to the dates of the relationship, both agree it ended in 2024 and that it was of sufficient duration to be a qualifying relationship under the PRA.

[19]      With respect to the Properties at 1 Bernard Street and 4/66 Hamilton Road, Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits that Mr Goodwin is clearly a proprietor in his personal capacity and therefore he has a clear legal interest in these Properties.

[20]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker  relies  on  the  decision  in  Huang  v  Chung  and  Wong & Bong Trustee Company Limited for the proposition that while the claimant must have an interest in land, the interest may be as a registered proprietor or some form of beneficial interest. In respect of s 42(5), the Court stated:10

9      White v MacInnes [2024] NZHC 3375 at [17].

10     Huang v Chung and Wong & Bong Trustee Company Ltd [2015] NZHC 686 at [46].

That shows that the claim is for an interest that might be created later on a division of relationship property, either by agreement or by court order. At the time of lodging the notice, the claim may be inchoate only. The interest of the person lodging the claim need not amount to a caveatable interest under       s 137(1)(a) of the Land Transfer Act 2017. In that respect, s 42 gives a claimant more extensive protection than a caveat.

[21]      In relation to  those  of  the  Properties  which  are  owned  by  the  Trusts,  Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits that it is established that ownership of a property by a third party does not automatically bar lodgement of a notice of the claim and sustainment if the notice of claim, and the third party, as registered owner, does not need to be a party to the proceedings, citing Arrow Farms Ltd v Jackson11 and Bourne v Baker.12 He however acknowledges that it is necessary for the party seeking to sustain a notice of claim to show an arguable case that there is a personal beneficial interest in the land over which the notice is registered. He relies on the position set out by the Court in Darby v Haywood that:13

Issues such as constructive trust can be argued, as a trust owns a property for the benefit of the beneficiary/ies of the trust without any personal right in [or] to the trust asset. It is accepted that equitable remedies can intervene to account to a person where contributions have been made, directly or indirectly in a reasonable expectation of an interest resulting from that contribution.

[22]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker also relies on Bourne v Baker, noting that the case considered a notice of claim registered over land allegedly purchased before the commencement of the relationship and owned by a trustee company, and he submits it is significant that in that decision the Court did not address evidence of the applicant’s alleged contribution to the land, nor was it fatal to the application the land may have been owned by a trust, with the Court stating that “whether the applicant’s claims ultimately succeed is a matter for subsequent determination, but there is an arguable case”.14

[23]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits Ms Selak  has  a  reasonably  arguable  claim Mr Goodwin is beneficially interested in the trust-owned Properties (and therefore they would form part of the relationship property pool) because:

11     Arrow Farms Ltd v Jackson (1991) 7 FRNZ 561 (HC) at 9.

12     Bourne v Baker [2016] NZFC 2668, [2016] NZFLR 944 at [15] and [16].

13     Darby v Haywood [2019] NZFC 6937, [2020] NZFLR 919 at [39].

14     Bourne v Baker, above n 12, at [22].

(a)assets within the relationship property pool have been applied towards and intermingled with the Properties, such that Mr Goodwin would have a constructive or resulting trust interest in the land;

(b)there may have been loans in Mr Goodwin’s name relating to the Properties or the Properties  may  have  been  used  as  security  by  Mr Goodwin, such that Mr Goodwin would have a constructive or resulting trust interest in the land;

(c)following Clayton v Clayton,15 Mr Goodwin’s powers under the trusts which own the Properties may be classified as relationship property;

(d)there is an unresolved claim to an interest in the Properties under the PRA, which is currently pending determination by the Family Court;

(e)the parties will not be in a position to determine Ms Selak’s interest in the Properties before the independent accountant has issued his report; and

(f)Mr Goodwin has not demonstrated there is any urgency in requiring the Notice to lapse over any Properties.

[24]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits that during the course of the relationship, the parties enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle which was funded primarily through the wealth accumulated by Mr Goodwin, made possible through the division of functions in the relationship, and the direct and indirect contributions of Ms Selak. In particular, he submits that evidence in the Family Court proceeding has shown that Mr Goodwin:

(a)was a director and sole shareholder, through the New North Trust, of the company Goodwin Realty Limited;

(b)receives significant distributions from the New North Trust each year, together with director's fees;

15     Clayton v Clayton [The Vaughan Property Trust] [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 at [131].

(c)receives indirect income through renting out both the Properties owned personally and by trusts; and

(d)used his income, being relationship property, and his distributions from New North Trust, to pay for bills for the Properties which he owned in his own name and for trust Properties which he uses.

[25]      Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits that Ms Selak’s position in the proceedings in the Family Court that Mr Goodwin has structured his financial affairs in such a way as to divest himself of legal ownership of his assets so as to “shield his vast amount of wealth from her claim” and he points to what is allegedly an inconsistency between Ms Selak’s current financial position, the small size of the relationship property pool that Mr Goodwin has disclosed on paper, and the standard of living that the parties enjoyed over the course of the relationship.

[26]      While Mr Shanahan-Pinker acknowledges there is dispute as to whether relationship funds have been intermingled with the Properties, he submits:

(a)that this summary proceeding is an unsuitable forum for resolving such a substantial question of fact, which must be left to the Family Court to determine;

(b)that only once the investigation is completed by the forensic accountant can matters progress in the Family Court; and

(c)it would therefore be premature and highly prejudicial to Ms Selak for the Notice to lapse at this juncture.

[27]      In summary, Mr Shanahan-Pinker submits that there is a valid, unresolved claim to an interest in the Properties under the PRA and there is a reasonably arguable case that Mr Goodwin contributed funds that are relationship property to the Properties, and accordingly Ms Selak claims an interest in the constructive/resulting trusts  that  arise  from  those  contributions  by  virtue  of  her  relationship  with   Mr Goodwin and accordingly the Notice should be sustained.

Submissions for Mr Goodwin

[28]      Mr Gilchrist, for Mr Goodwin, submits that the claim is based on Mr Goodwin being a registered owner of various titles, and is not advanced truly on the basis that Ms Selak has any interest in any of the Properties. He submits that being the registered owner does not in itself give rise to a notice of claim—there must be some basis for the claim of an interest in the land.

[29]      Mr Gilchrist accepts that there is an arguable claim over the 6/66 Hamilton Road property (as it was the only Property that could be considered a relationship home), but submits there is no basis for maintaining the Notice over any of the other Properties.

[30]      Mr Gilchrist characterises Ms Selak’s actions as a “scattergun” approach as he suggests she has simply placed a notice of claim on any title where Mr Goodwin’s name appears, without consideration of the legal status of that Property or any arguable claim that she could have in respect of any particular Property. He submits that:

(a)only where there is an arguable claim that the property is relationship property can a notice of claim be sustained and where it is clear that property is either separate property, or not property that comes under the relationship at all, then there is no basis for the lodgement of a notice of claim, and any lodged claim should be discharged;

(b)given that a party can only have one relationship home (and the concession made in respect of 6/66 Hamilton Road, on the basis that it was the relationship home), there is no claim as to legal or beneficial interest in respect of other Properties, as there is no claim that they form part of the relationship property pool;

(c)although many of the Properties are held by Mr Goodwin in a trustee capacity, the trusts were all set up well prior to 2009, the earliest date Mr Selak claims the relationship to have started; and

(d)equal sharing only applies to relationship property, and property owned by trusts that were created between 1985 and 2003, well prior to the relationship, cannot be relationship property.

[31]      Mr Gilchrist submits the Notice should be discharged from the other Properties for the following reasons:

(a)4/66 Hamilton Road, Herne Bay, Auckland: this Property was purchased in January 2002, Mr Goodwin was living in this Property until just before he and Ms Selak moved into 6/66 Hamilton Road, Herne Bay, Auckland, and the de facto relationship commenced. Since then, this property has been continuously tenanted.

(b)6 Mount Albert Road, Mount Albert, Auckland: this is a commercial building, bought in 2002.

(c)910-912 New North Road, Mount Albert, Auckland: this is a commercial property, bought in 1996.

(d)5 Bay View Terrace, Tairua: this property was purchased in 2007 and is a holiday home.

(e)Units 325 and 326, Scenic Suites, 27 Stanley Street, Queenstown: these properties were purchased in October 2001.

(f)1 Bernard Street, Two Mile Bay, Taupo: this property was purchased in 1987.

[32]      Mr Gilchrist notes that Ms Selak’s evidence accepts that Mr Goodwin was relatively well-off before their relationship began, and that this tends to favour a conclusion that the pre-existing interests in the Properties cannot be relationship property.

[33]      Mr Gilchrist submits that the issues of whether a caveat or notice of claim should be sustained or removed are essentially the same. He submits:

(a)the Court retains the discretion to remove a caveat, but one to be exercised judiciously and in limited circumstances;

(b)the Court’s discretion is usually exercised on the basis there exists a dispute between the parties as to whether a caveat will ultimately be sustainable, and whether the caveator has an interest in the property;

(c)the onus lies with the caveator who must show an arguable case or, put another way, that there is a serious issue to be tried which entitles the caveator to protection of the caveat; and

(d)whilst normally the caveator’s evidence is to be preferred, if there are disputes on the caveat application, where the evidence presented by the caveator is patently lacking in credibility, the Court should not accept it.

[34]Mr Gilchrist submits that:

(a)The form of the Notice does not provide the nature of the estate or interest claimed. There is thus an issue as to whether the interest has been described with sufficient certainty, even if not expressly set out.

(b)Even if the Court accepted that there was sufficient particularity, there is no evidence to show how the estate or interest claimed is derived from the registered proprietor (which is the trusts).

(c)There is almost no evidence of a claim for an interest in the trust Properties, and all of Ms Selak’s claims are conjecture and speculation, unsupported by evidence which fall well short of a reasonably arguable position.

[35]      As a result, Mr Gilchrist submits that the Notice should not be sustained simply on the grounds that there may or might be an interest, which is how he characterises Ms Selak’s position given her submission that she is not in a position to determine whether she has an interest in the Properties without an examination by an accountant

taking place. He submits that Ms Selak must have an arguable claim to an interest now, not a speculative possibility that there “just might be a future claim” and that the evidential onus is on Ms Selak,. His submission is that she is not entitled to maintain the Notice while she “endeavours to marshal evidence” to support her claims.

[36]      Mr Gilchrist submits that White v Maclnnes is directly on point and should be conclusive.16 He describes the case as a situation where the material facts are similar to the present case:

(a)the husband had placed a notice of claim on the property that the couple had lived at, owned by a trust, his contention being that it was arguable that the wife had an interest in the property that could be considered as relationship property under the Act;

(b)the wife applied to discharge the notice of claim on the basis that she had no interest in the property capable of being relationship property;

(c)the Family Court had held that the wife had no legal or equitable interest in the trust assets for the purposes of the PRA. She had a mere expectancy. Nor were the powers held by the wife in respect of the trusts so extensive as to amount to property under the PRA;

(d)the Family Court had found that, even if the powers had amounted to property, they would be separate property because the trust was set up six years before the parties began their relationship. In any event it would be the trust’s powers, not the trust assets, that would be relationship property;

(e)on appeal, the Family Court’s findings were upheld by this Court.

[37]      In his response, Mr Shanahan-Pinker submitted that White is distinguishable as it concerned the issue of whether a “right to occupy” was a “life interest” in the property and created a beneficial interest in the land, and whether the trustee’s powers

16     White v Maclnnes [2024] NZHC 3375, [2024] NZFLR 850.

were sufficiently wide that the trust property should be regarded as relationship property. His submission was that this is not comparable to the present case, where Ms Selak argues she has a beneficial interest in the trust-owned Properties by virtue of them being relationship property for the reasons set out at [23].

Result

[38]      I am of the view that Ms Selak’s Notice should be sustained. The reasons for this view are:

(a)By analogy with removal of a caveat, the Notice should only be removed if the Court is completely satisfied removal would not prejudice the claimant’s legitimate interests. The Court cannot be satisfied Ms Selak’s interests will not be prejudiced until the forensic accountant’s  report  is  available,  which  will   indicate   whether   Mr Goodwin has intermingled relationship property with the Properties owned by the trusts and other Properties in which he has a personal interest (other than the family home at 6/66 Hamilton Road, Herne Bay). Accordingly, the Notice should be maintained.

(b)In accordance with the decision in Huang v Chung and Wong & Bong Trustee Company Limited,17 acknowledging that at present Ms Selak’s claim is inchoate, s 42 is intended to give the claim more extensive protection than a caveat. The Family Court proceedings are at an early stage and it would be premature to remove the Notice prior to investigation of the relationship property by the forensic accountant and whether Ms Selak’s claim can be substantiated.

(c)Ms Selak has offered to remove the Notice from any particular Property if Mr Goodwin can demonstrate that she has no interest in that Property. This offer avoids the Notice unjustifiably restricting Mr Goodwin, or the trust-owner of the relevant Property, from dealing with the Property.

17     Huang v Chung and Wong & Bong Trustee Company Ltd, above n 10.

(d)While it is acknowledged that urgency is not a factor in determining whether a notice of claim should be removed, in this instance there is no prejudice to Mr Goodwin which has been demonstrated in respect of the Notice continuing to be sustained in respect of the Properties, such as imminent sale of all Property.

Orders

[39]I make the following orders:

(a)Ms Selak’s application to sustain the Notice is granted;

(b)as Ms Selak is the successful party, costs should follow the event. Counsel are directed to endeavour to agree costs and failing agreement being reached within 20 working days of the date of this judgment, counsel for Ms Selak will file a memorandum as to costs (not to exceed 5 pages) within 5 working days after the expiry of the 20 working day period, and counsel for Mr Goodwin will file a memorandum (not to exceed 5 pages) in response within 5 working days of receipt of counsel for Ms Selak’s memorandum. A decision as to costs will then be made on the papers.

………………………………….

Associate Judge C B Taylor