Sara-Jane Skeet v The Queen - [2016] NZSC 120

NOTE: DISTRICT COURT ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF ADDRESS OF HOME DETENTION LOCATION REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 74/2016
[2016] NZSC 120

BETWEEN	SARA-JANE SKEET Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	William Young, Arnold and OʼRegan JJ
Counsel:	C J Tennet for Applicant P D Marshall for Respondent
Judgment:	6 September 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the applicant, Ms Skeet, was convicted on two counts of blackmail, one of kidnapping and one of aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to seven months home detention,[1] which she has served. On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed her aggravated robbery conviction but upheld her convictions on the blackmail and kidnapping counts.[2] Ms Skeet now seeks leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision with respect to those three convictions.
[1]R v Skeet [2015] NZDC 4183.
[2]Skeet v R [2016] NZCA 198 (French, Simon France and Ellis JJ) [Skeet (CA)].
We begin with the blackmail convictions. Relevantly, a person breaches s 237 of the Crimes Act 1961 if they make one of four specified threats with intent to cause the victim to act in accordance with their will and with intent to obtain a benefit for themselves or cause loss to another. The form of threat at issue is “a threat to endanger the safety of any person”. The Crown case was that Ms Skeet threatened the victim that she would harm him and/or his disabled daughter if he did not give her money and other assistance, and thereby committed blackmail.
On appeal, Ms Skeet argued that a threat of actual violence was not a qualifying threat, relying on the decision of the High Court in R v Winn.[3] In that case, Ellis J held that blackmail was not the appropriate charge where a demand for money or property was accompanied by threats of direct violence or physical harm to the victim or another person. There were two principal reasons for this view. First, s 237 in its present form was introduced into the Crimes Act in 2003, when the previous pt 10 was replaced by a new pt 10. Section 237, which replaced the previous s 238 (extortion), included for the first time the phrase “a threat to endanger the safety of any person”. Ellis J considered that the legislative background showed that the phrase was introduced to address situations of industrial blackmail – it related to threats to contaminate consumer products and such like, not to direct threats of violence.[4] Second, Ellis J considered that a threat “to endanger the safety of any person” was not the same as a threat “of violence”, as found in, for example, s 234 of the Crimes Act (robbery). There was a qualitative difference between a threat of direct violence and a threat to endanger safety. Accordingly, on a purposive, contextual and plain meaning interpretation, the phrase was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2016] NZSC 120
Decision Date: 6 September 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sara-Jane Skeet sought leave to appeal against her convictions of blackmail and kidnapping, and the Court of Appeal's rejection of her appeal against those convictions. The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed her application for leave to appeal. Ms Skeet was convicted of blackmail and kidnapping after a jury trial in the District Court, and subsequently, the Court of Appeal upheld her convictions for blackmail and kidnapping but quashed her aggravated robbery conviction. Ms Skeet argued that the blackmail conviction should not stand because it was based on threats of direct violence, which she believed did not fall within the scope of s 237 of the Crimes Act 1961. The Court of Appeal had rejected this argument, finding that a threat to endanger the safety of any person could encompass threats of direct violence. The Supreme Court also rejected Ms Skeet's argument, finding that the phrase had a plain meaning which encompassed threats of both direct and indirect harm. With regard to the kidnapping conviction, the Court of Appeal had rejected the argument that Ms Skeet was not guilty of kidnapping if the victim had gone with her voluntarily, albeit reluctantly. The Supreme Court also dismissed this argument, finding that it raised no issue of general or public importance and there was no risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice. The application for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed.

Orders