Sanson v Ministry of Primary Industries
[2023] NZHC 780
•6 April 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE
CRI-2023-454-000005
[2023] NZHC 780
BETWEEN GEOFFREY JAMES SANSON
Appellant
AND
MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES
Respondent
Hearing: 5 April 2023 Appearances:
P L Murray for the Appellant
A M Barham for the Respondent
Judgment:
6 April 2023
JUDGMENT OF GRICE J
Introduction
[1] The appellant, Mr Geoffrey Sanson, was sentenced in the Palmerston North District Court, jointly with his brother, Mr Richard Sanson, on the following charges:1
(a)reckless ill-treatment of animals (x2);2
(b)failing to comply with s 10 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (x7);3
(c)failing to comply with s 11 of the Animal Welfare Act;4 and
1 Ministry of Primary Industries v Sanson [2023] NZDC 3679 [sentencing decision].
2 Animal Welfare Act 1999, ss 28A(1)(c) and (3)(a) — maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment and $75,000 fine.
3 Sections 12(a) and 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months’ imprisonment and $50,000 fine.
4 Sections 12(b) and 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months’ imprisonment and $50,000 fine
SANSON v MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES [2023] NZHC 780 [6 April 2023]
(d)transporting an animal unfit for transport.5
[2] On 24 February 2023, Judge Northwood sentenced the appellant to one year and 10 months’ imprisonment.6 The sentencing followed a sentence indication earlier given by the Judge on 22 June 2022 indicating a sentence of two years and 10 months’ imprisonment across all offences, with the possibility of further discounts.7
[3] The appellant now appeals his sentence on the basis it is manifestly excessive. In particular, the appellant submits:
(a)the Judge provided inadequate discounts for further mitigating factors, including the appellant’s remorse, reduced culpability, previous good character, and other personal matters, leading to an end sentence imposed that was too high; and
(b)the Judge should have imposed a sentence of home detention.
[4] In respect of the first ground of appeal, the respondent submits the Judge gave adequate consideration to each mitigating factor and made no error in weighing them as he did. The respondent says the decisions the Judge made in relation to the discounts to be applied and not applied were open to him.
[5] In respect of the second ground of appeal, the respondent accepts the Judge might have given disproportionate weight to imprisonment as the only sentence that could address the sentencing purposes. However, the respondent submits that a sentence of imprisonment was open to the Judge, given his finding that the offending was within the most serious category of its kind.
Background and sentencing
[6] The offending in this case involved the reckless ill-treatment of a large number of animals being farmed on farms owned and managed by the appellant and the
5 Sections 23(2)(c) and s 25(a) — maximum penalty 12 months’ imprisonment and $50,000 fine.
6 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [80]–[84].
7 Ministry for Primary Industries v Sanson [2022] NZDC 10876 [sentencing indication].
appellant’s brother.8 Of the 3,995 sheep being farmed across the three properties that were able to be assessed (of 4,251 in total), 1,965 were in unacceptable health conditions, 460 of which in such poor body condition they had to be euthanised.9 Of the 126 cattle across the three properties, 86 were in unacceptable health conditions, four of which had to be euthanised.10 In total, 2,096 animals on the three properties owned and operated by the appellant and his brother were in unacceptable health condition, 464 of which had to be euthanised.11
[7] The sentencing followed a sentence indication provided on 22 June 2022, in which the Judge indicated a starting point for the animal welfare offending of two years and 10 months’ imprisonment.12 The Judge indicated a 25 per cent reduction if guilty pleas were entered and further reductions and adjustments to the sentence were likely depending on the outcome of reports and submissions.
[8] At sentencing, the Judge recorded they had since received that additional material.13 As the Judge noted, these included a pre-sentence report recommending a sentence of home detention, 13 personal references, a medical report, a psychological assessment, and a letter expressing remorse.14
[9] The Judge recorded the Ministry’s position that even if the further discounts resulted in an end sentence below 24 months’ imprisonment, the sentence imposed should nevertheless be a term of imprisonment, not home detention.15
[10]Prior to considering the sentence, the Judge noted:16
… It is important to return to the basics and review exactly what happened and why we are here. This matter involves the reckless ill-treatment of an unprecedented number of farm animals over an extended period. The offending occurred in the face of previous interventions by the Ministry of Primary Industries and a failure to implement lawful directives by them …
8 In respect of the appellant’s brother, there was also an associated aggravated assault charge, for which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced.
9 Sentencing indication, above n 7, at [13].
10 At [14].
11 At [15].
12 At [2].
13 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [5] and [7].
14 At [11]–[25].
15 At [10].
16 At [36].
[11]The Judge continued:
[37] It is important to recall some of the factors that the prosecution pulls together in its summary of facts. The failings on the farm included massive overstocking and serious underfeeding. Poor infrastructure was found together with the lack of stockproof fencing and insufficient reticulated stock water supply. Differing classes of stock were being run together with no regard for their differing physical and health needs. Animals were chronically underfed, particularly ewes and lambs. There was ineffective parasite control and diseases and injuries were not being treated. Sheep had not been culled for undershot jaws or for having low or no teeth. There was low or no fertiliser application. There was an absence of and unwillingness to have an effective means of euthanasia on the farms. Pasture levels were far higher on neighbouring properties and that was simply established by looking at those properties rather than anything more being required. Fencing, water reticulation and pasture damage reflected a history of prolonged deterioration.
[12] The Judge found that this offending was within the most serious category of its kind. As the Judge stated, it had been “hard to find a more serious case and indeed others that may have involved a handful of animals have been considered serious, yet here we have a matter involving thousands and over 400 deaths.”17
[13] The Judge noted the decision in Williamson v R, involving six charges of wilful ill-treatment of six horses which were ultimately euthanised after suffering from malnourishment and parasites.18 The sentencing Judge imposed a sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment, declining to impose a sentence of home detention, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[14] The Judge noted that case could be distinguished on the basis it involved wilfulness and recklessness, but that that distinction “fade[d] into the background” given only six horses were involved in that case, unlike the large number of animals in this matter.19
[15] The Judge noted that although the choice by the prosecution to bring charges of recklessness had “necessarily resulted in less serious charges in themselves”, the facts of the offending in this case made “the totality of this situation very serious and, indeed, at the upper range of seriousness.”20 The Judge found a high level of
17 At [38].
18 At [39], citing Williamson v R [2015] NZCA 621.
19 At [40].
20 At [41].
recklessness in this case, given the extended period over which the Ministry had to deal with animal welfare issues on the defendants’ properties.21 The Judge found that although the defendants were on notice that things at the farm were not good enough and had to improve, they did not.22
[16] The Judge rejected arguments raised by the defendants that the offending was brought on by drought or COVID-19 lockdown restrictions. Given the “strong and substantial pasture growth” and “excellent grass cover” at adjoining farms at the time, it was clear the extent to which there were poor pastoral conditions and insufficient feed on the property was due to the “completely inappropriate” number of livestock being grazed on the farms, about which the defendants did nothing.23 Similarly, if, due to the COVID-19 restrictions, the defendants could not move or dispose of the stock by stock sales, they were obliged to humanely euthanise the animals, rather than leaving them to starve.24 The obligation was on the defendants to take steps to remove stock where necessary and deal with issues preventing them from doing so.
[17] The prosecution sought a prohibition against the defendants farming production animals of any kind. The Judge reviewed the purposes behind the Animal Welfare Act and considered this was a “clear case” for disqualifying the defendants from holding or obtaining farm production animals on an indefinite basis.25 The Judge made the order accordingly.
[18] The Judge then ordered costs against the defendants for costs reasonably incurred in respect of veterinary treatment and the costs of destroying the animals in the same manner as a fine in the amount of $9,054.50 with respect to each defendant.26
[19] Against the sentencing indication of two years and 10 months’ imprisonment, the Judge applied a 25 per cent discount for guilty plea, a reduction of eight-and-a-half months, resulting in a sentence of two years and one-and-a-half months’
21 At [42].
22 At [42].
23 At [44] and [59].
24 At [46]–[47].
25 At [49].
26 At [50]–[51].
imprisonment.27 By way of further reductions, the Judge was not persuaded to provide further discounts due to the circumstances of COVID-19 or drought conditions.28 The Judge also declined to reduce the sentence on the basis of the defendants’ previous good character, personal stresses and circumstances or expressions of remorse.29 However, the Judge was prepared to reduce the starting points by 10 per cent on account of the defendants’ poor health and the rigors on the two defendants, both being in their sixties, of a sentence of imprisonment.30
[20] This brought the appellant’s sentence to one year and 10 months’ imprisonment. The Judge declined to convert that sentence into a sentence of home detention. The Judge considered the nominated sentencing purposes may not be met by a sentence other than imprisonment, and that no sentence other than imprisonment would be consistent with applying the following sentencing principles, namely the gravity of the offending in this case, including the appellant’s degree of culpability or responsibility, the seriousness of the type of offence when compared with other types of offences, and the fact the offending represented a case within the most serious category of its kind.31
Approach to appeal
[21] The appellant submits the end sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and a sentence of home detention ought to have been imposed.
[22] An appeal against sentence is an appeal against a discretion and must only be allowed if the Court is satisfied that, for any reason, there was an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should have been imposed.32 The Court must dismiss the appeal in any other case.33
27 At [52].
28 At [58]–[59].
29 At [60]–[67].
30 At [68].
31 At [78].
32 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]–[27].
33 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(3).
[23] In an appeal against sentence, an appellate court will not intervene unless a sentence was outside the range available to the sentencing Judge.34 The focus is on the final sentence and whether that was in the available range, rather than the exact process by which it was reached.35 An appellate court must therefore exercise an appropriate degree of restraint and will intervene only where the sentence imposed is “manifestly excessive” on the basis of some material error so that a different sentence should be imposed.36
First point on appeal — insufficient discounts provided
[24] Under the first point on appeal, the appellant submits the Judge erred in giving insufficient weight to a number of mitigating factors raised by the appellant and failing to award discounts in respect of them.
Culpability
[25] The appellant submits there was a clear evidential basis to distinguish between the culpability of the two defendants and the Judge erred in concluding he could not overlook the fact that the appellant was also involved in the management of the farms.
[26] I agree with the respondent’s submission that separate levels of culpability is a factor to be assessed at the first stage of the sentencing exercise when setting the starting point. This has been confirmed in Patel v R, in which the Court of Appeal stated that when fixing a starting point the Court must have regard to the gravity of the offending, which entails consideration of the nature of the offending, the offender’s culpability, the extent of the damage, harm or danger to the community caused by the offender’s conduct and any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to culpability.37
[27] This is the basis on which the sentencing indication, which was accepted, proceeded. Though the culpability of the defendants might have been different, this was a matter for fixing the starting points at the first stage of sentencing, in providing
34 Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [36].
35 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15]; and Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [36].
36 Kumar v R [2015] NZCA 460 at [81]; and Tutakangahau, above n 32, at [32].
37 Patel v R [2017] NZCA 234 at [34].
a sentencing indication. The Judge did not err in declining to provide a further discount at the second stage of the sentencing exercise when considering adjustments to be applied to that starting point.
Remorse
[28] A discount for remorse separately from any guilty plea discount is of course available.38 However, an assessment of genuine remorse over a bare acceptance of responsibility is a matter of fact and judgement, and the defendant bears the onus of showing it is genuine.39 The Judge considered all relevant material pertaining to the appellant’s remorse, including his comments to the psychologist and PAC report writer, which the Judge considered directly contradicted his letter of remorse at sentencing.40 The Judge was explicitly open to the possibility of providing a discount for remorse with respect to the appellant, but ultimately found he was unable to accept the appellant’s expression of remorse.41 I do not consider the Judge erred in reaching this conclusion and consequently declining to provide any reduction as a result.
Previous good character
[29] I am also satisfied there was no error in the Judge’s decision declining to provide a discount for the appellant’s previous good character. Admittedly, the Judge ought to have dealt with the appellant’s personal references separately from his discussion of the appellant’s brother. Nevertheless, I am satisfied the Judge’s conclusions on this point were sound. I also note that, as the Crown submitted, the history of concern over animal welfare on the farm does not indicate a positive history of behaviour when it came to animals, as opposed to good character in general terms.
[30] The Judge noted he could not and did not treat the defendants’ past behaviour as if they were previous convictions, and that he could not and did not increase the starting point to take those factors into account.42 But as the Judge said, “the absence of a conviction [resulting from the appellant’s previous interactions with MPI] does
38 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [64]; and Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296,
[2020] 3 NZLR 583 at [24].
39 Moses v R, above n 38, at [24].
40 Sentencing decision, above n 1, at [66].
41 At [65]–[67].
42 At [61].
not mean that what happened prior to 2020 should be disregarded.”43 The Judge considered that the fact that the defendants were “appalling farmers [who] deeply maltreated” their animals overrode the fact that the appellant was “clearly well thought of” in his own community.44 I am satisfied that the Judge’s conclusions were clearly reasoned and the decision not to reduce the appellant’s sentence on the basis of his previous good character sound.
Other personal factors
[31] The appellant also submits the Judge ought to have provided discounts in respect of other personal factors, including the death of the appellant’s mother, improved farming practices and impact from COVID-19 restrictions and drought conditions.
[32] I am satisfied the Judge considered each personal factor properly and made no error in declining to provide any discount for any of these factors. The Judge noted the impact of the death of the appellant’s mother on the appellant but was entitled to refuse to accept, against the longstanding animal welfare problems, that this was causative of the offending. The Judge’s conclusions as to the impact of drought and COVID-19 restrictions were also sound. Given the satisfactory pasture growth in the relevant area at the time, the Judge was entitled to adopt the conclusion of the veterinarian that the poor condition of the properties was due to the defendants having a “completely inappropriate” number of livestock being grazed on the farms.45 As the Judge also correctly noted in respect of the COVID-19 restrictions, the obligation was on the defendants to humanely euthanise the animals if they could not dispose of them by stock sales (notwithstanding that stock sales remained available at the relevant time as they were essential businesses), and in any case the suffering of the animals began long before the commencement of the lockdown in March 2020.46 Overall, the Judge summarised the point well in describing the farming disaster as “avoidable and … a
43 At [62].
44 At [60] and [62].
45 At [44] and [59].
46 At [47].
long time coming.”47 The Judge made no error in declining to provide a discount in respect of these factors.
Conclusion on first point on appeal
[33] I am satisfied the Judge properly considered each personal mitigating factor in turn, and provided 25 per cent and 10 per cent discounts appropriately to recognise the appellant’s guilty plea and poor health respectively. I do not consider the Judge erred in declining to make any further adjustments by way of discounts.
Second point on appeal — failure to commute sentence to home detention
[34] The second point raised on appeal is that the Judge erred in declining to convert the sentence to a sentence of home detention. The appellant submits imprisonment was not the only way to achieve the relevant sentencing purposes, and the Judge was required to impose the least restrictive outcome available in the circumstances which would achieve the purposes of sentencing.
[35] Ms Barham for the Crown accepts it is not clear from the sentencing notes whether the Judge took into account the indefinite disqualification from farming when assessing whether a sentence of home detention was appropriate. However, the respondent says the purposes of sentencing require something more than an indefinite disqualification. The respondent says that given the Judge’s finding that the offending was within the most serious of its kind, the Judge’s finding that no sentence other than imprisonment would be consistent with the principles of sentencing was available to the Judge.
[36]Section 16 of the Sentencing Act provides:
16 Sentence of imprisonment
(1)When considering the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for any particular offence, the court must have regard to the desirability of keeping offenders in the community as far as that is practicable and consonant with the safety of the community.
47 At [63].
(2)The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that,—
(a)a sentence is being imposed for all or any of the purposes in section 7(1)(a) to (c), (e), (f), or (g); and
(b)those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other than imprisonment; and
(c)no other sentence would be consistent with the application of the principles in section 8 to the particular case.
[37]The nominated purposes under s 7(1) are the following:
(a)to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the community by the offending; or
(b)to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and an acknowledgment of, that harm; or
(c)to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or
…
(e)to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or
(f)to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar offence; or
(g)to protect the community from the offender …
[38] In considering whether to impose either a sentence of imprisonment or a lesser sentence, a sentencing Judge must therefore consider and set out whether a sentence short of imprisonment could achieve the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing.
[39] In this case, the Judge considered that “the least restrictive outcome is arguably home detention”.48 However, the Judge determined that imprisonment was the only way one or more of the nominated sentencing purposes could be achieved. The Judge noted those purposes were the need to hold the appellant accountable for the harm done, to promote in the appellant a sense of responsibility, to denounce the appellant’s conduct, to deter others and the appellant from committing the same or a similar offence, or “possibly to protect the community” from the appellant.49
48 At [77].
49 At [77].
[40] The Judge considered no sentence other than imprisonment was consistent with applying the following principles of sentencing, namely the gravity of the offending, including the appellant’s degree of culpability or responsibility, the seriousness of the type of offence when compared with other types of offences, and the fact the offending represented a case within the most serious category of its kind.50
[41] I have reached the view, however, that the Judge erred in finding that only a sentence of imprisonment could achieve these purposes and principles. I consider the Judge erred in concluding that a sentence of home detention would be insufficient to meet these purposes and principles. In the circumstances, I consider the least restrictive sentence available was one of home detention, and that to impose a sentence of imprisonment here was manifestly excessive and a difference sentence should have been imposed.
[42] Where home detention is available, the Court must make a considered and principled choice, identifying which sentence is the least restrictive taking into account all the purposes of sentencing.51 The Judge accepted that home detention was “arguably” the least restrictive outcome in the circumstances, but felt unable to impose such a sentence for the reasons described. However, I consider that in reaching his conclusions, the Judge failed to take into account adequately the effect of the indefinite disqualification from farming, in combination with which a sentence of home detention would have achieved the purposes and principles of sentencing.
[43] The respondent accepts the imposition of such an indefinite disqualification is a full answer to protecting the relevant “community”, here being other animals. The respondent also accepts the indefinite disqualification is relevant to holding the appellant accountable for the harm done, promoting in the appellant a sense of responsibility and acknowledgement of that harm, denouncing the appellant’s conduct, and deterring both the appellant and others from such offending.
[44] I consider that the indefinite disqualification in combination with a sentence of home detention would achieve all the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing.
50 At [78].
51 Fairbrother v R [2013] NZCA 340 at [30].
[45] In terms of personal deterrence, I consider imprisonment will serve no further purpose of deterring the appellant from offending again than the disqualification and home detention would. Given the disqualification, the appellant will never again be in a position to commit offences of this nature.
[46] In terms of general deterrence, I consider such a disqualification by itself is enough, and sufficient to prevent others from offending in a similar way, given that if found to have engaged in such offending it would mean they would never be able to farm again. Imprisonment is not also necessary.
[47] Imprisonment is undoubtedly a strong denunciation of this clearly reprehensible conduct. However, home detention is a severe sentence in its own right, and as the Court of Appeal has acknowledged, a sentence of home detention carries a considerable measure of deterrence and denunciation.52 Although it is important such gross and inhumane behaviour is strongly censured, I believe the less restrictive sentence of home detention is able to achieve this.
[48] I am also of the view a sentence of home detention would adequately promote in the appellant a sense of responsibility for and acknowledgement of the harm of his offending. It is notable in this regard that the appellant has expressed remorse for his actions in the form of a letter to the sentencing Judge, as well as entering a guilty plea to the charges. While not enough to warrant an adjustment to the sentence, the appellant appears to understand and acknowledge the wrongness of his actions and the harm he has done to these poor animals. I am satisfied a sentence of imprisonment is not also necessary in this respect.
[49] Finally, I note the importance of holding the appellant accountable for the harm he has done. The offending in this case is atrocious. However, the appellant will never be able to inflict such ill-treatment on animals again. He has in this way been held accountable for the harm. The appellant has been duly arrested, charged and required to face criminal prosecution and liability for what he has done. He will also after my decision be required to serve a sentence of home detention. With these, I consider the
52 See R v Iosefa [2008] NZCA 453 at [41].
appellant has been held accountable for what he has done. A sentence of imprisonment is not also necessary to do so.
[50] I turn to those principles of s 8 consistency with which the Judge also considered required him to impose a sentence of imprisonment. Again, these were (a) the gravity of the offending, including the appellant’s degree of culpability or responsibility, (b) the seriousness of the type of offence when compared with other types of offences, and (c) the fact the offending represented a case within the most serious category of its kind.
[51] The offences carry a maximum penalty of a term of imprisonment of three years. The offence is undoubtedly a serious offence, opening someone to a criminal sentence of the most restrictive type for a number of years. The Judge was also undoubtedly correct in describing this offending as within the most serious cases of its kind. Section 8(c) therefore requires the Court to impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence, unless circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate. Given the final sentence imposed, the Judge clearly considered such circumstances existed. And I agree. I note in particular here the appellant’s poor state of health, having been diagnosed with cancer in 2020, from which he reportedly still experiences symptoms and requires ongoing monitoring, as well as his limited sight in one eye and painful shoulder condition.
[52] I also consider the appellant’s degree of culpability (a principle of sentencing in its own right under s 8(a)) is relevant in this regard. As noted, the Judge made no error in declining to provide the appellant a discount for a lesser role in the offending. Nevertheless, as the Judge noted, all the evidence and material before the Judge suggested the appellant’s brother was the primary manager of the farm and perpetrator of the harm caused, and I accept the appellant’s clearly lesser culpability was germane to the question of whether it was appropriate to impose home detention. I consider the appellant’s lesser degree of culpability in respect of the gravity of the offending is relevant both in respect of s 8(a) and as a circumstance relating to the offender making the maximum penalty of imprisonment inappropriate in respect of the appellant under s 8(c). I am therefore of the opinion the maximum penalty prescribed was not required to be imposed under s 8(c).
[53] I conclude that the Judge made a material error in determining that no sentence other than imprisonment would achieve the relevant principles and purposes of sentencing. Given the indefinite disqualification in this case, I am satisfied a sentence of home detention would have been adequate to achieve the necessary purposes and principles. A sentence of imprisonment was not necessary, and was in the circumstances manifestly excessive.
[54] Mr Sanson has been serving his sentence of imprisonment in Whanganui Prison since 23 February 2023. Therefore taking into account tomorrow he has spent approximately 41 days in prison. That should be taken into account.
Conclusion
[55] I am satisfied the Judge properly considered each personal mitigating factor in turn and made no error in declining to make any further adjustments by way of discounts.
[56] However, I consider the Judge erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment. Given the indefinite disqualification from farming imposed, I am satisfied a sentence of home detention was adequate to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing, and the end sentence of one year and 10 months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
[57] I have not reached this conclusion lightly given the serious nature of the offending. However, in this case a sentence of home detention together with the disqualification in particular meets the principles of sentencing, including those of deterrence and denunciation. Imprisonment is a sentence of last resort,53 and s 16(1) of the Sentencing Act clearly contemplates that an offender should be kept within the community insofar as that is practicable and consonant with the safety of the community.54 Such offending is to be censured in our society. However, imprisonment in this case was not necessary to do so.
53 R v Rawiri [2011] NZCA 244 at [18].
54 See also R v Iosefa, above n 52, at [17].
Result
[58] The appeal is allowed. I would have set aside the sentence of imprisonment of one year and 10 months’ and instead imposed a sentence of 11 months’ home detention. However, in view of the fact that Mr Sanson has served over one month of the term of imprisonment I impose a sentence of nine months’ home detention. This is not a sentence capable of mathematical precision but reflects the totality of offending. As I have only converted the sentences of imprisonment which have been imposed to be served concurrently, the original sentences remain prorated across the offences in the same proportions as the original sentences. The terms of the home detention and supervision are set out below.
[59] In all other respects the sentence imposed and the orders made in the District Court remain in place.
[60] The terms applying to the home detention and post-release conditions for six months as set out in the PAC report of 14 September 2022 apply as follows:
(a)to travel immediately from Palmerston North District Court to [the home detention address] and there await the arrival of a Probation Officer and a representative of the monitoring company;
(b)to reside at [the home detention address] for the duration of home detention;
(c)to abstain from the consumption and/or possession of alcohol and non-prescription drugs, unless prescribed to you by a medical practitioner, for the duration of home detention;
(d)any dogs are to be contained away from the main dwelling at all times to allow unhindered access to the property for the Probation Officer, the Monitoring Company and Police for the duration of the home detention sentence;
(e)not to be in possession or control of an airgun or firearm for the duration of the home detention sentence; and
(f)to complete an assessment and undertake any counselling/ treatment/programmes as directed by the Probation Officer and to the satisfaction of the Probation Officer and provider.
[61]The post-detention conditions are:
(a)to complete an assessment and undertake any counselling/ treatment/programmes as directed by the Probation Officer and to the satisfaction of the Probation Officer and provider.
Grice J
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