Sanders v Police
[2017] NZHC 1838
•3 August 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY
CRI-2016-476-000007 [2017] NZHC 1838
BETWEEN CHARLES SCORE SANDERS
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 13 July 2017 (In Christchurch) - Mr McRae appearing by AVL
from Timaru
Appearances:
S J Shamy for Appellant
A R McRae for RespondentJudgment:
3 August 2017
JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J
Introduction
[1] The appellant applies for costs following his successful appeal to this Court against conviction and sentence in the District Court on charges involving violence against his former wife. The prosecution consented to the appeal being allowed and the conviction and sentence were quashed on 10 February 2017. A retrial was ordered in a minute of this Court also dated 10 February 2017, but the Police, as I understand it, have since agreed that this matter is not now to be the subject of a retrial.
[2] The appellant represented himself at trial in the District Court but was represented by counsel in this Court at his successful appeal. The present application therefore seeks costs only in relation to the appeal. The respondent opposes the
application for costs.
SANDERS v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2017] NZHC 1838 [3 August 2017]
Facts
[3] The procedural history of this matter is somewhat convoluted. The appellant faced a number of charges loosely described under the general umbrella of “domestic violence”. The appellant first appeared in November 2014. Throughout he had been represented by a number of lawyers, but eventually sought to be self-represented at his trial.
[4] As to his original conviction, in July 2016, the appellant was convicted1 and sentenced2 in the District Court at Timaru on the various charges which as I note, involved violence against his former wife.3 The conviction essentially, it seems, turned largely on her evidence. These decisions were appealed finally on the basis that the appellant was not able to properly test the complainant’s evidence.
[5] On 20 January 2017, counsel then acting for the appellant on the appeal requested all material relevant to what was said to be a complaint made by the complainant in December 2012 to a “Detective Johnson”. This was relating to alleged events involving various sexual allegations made by the complainant against the appellant and another male. These allegations were not pursued. Counsel repeated his request for the disclosure of this material on 25 January 2017 and 30
January 2017. Counsel for the respondent replied each time that the request had been passed on to Police, who it seems were having difficulty locating the file. The matter was called in this Court before Davidson J on 3 February 2017. Counsel for the respondent informed the court that the file had only been located and received that morning as it had been held, it seems, in Police records in Wellington. The matter was adjourned to be heard on 10 February 2017.
[6] In the interim, counsel for the respondent had a brief opportunity to review the file and concluded that it was potentially relevant in terms of the complainant’s credibility. As such, the failure to disclose the material was an “irregularity” as
defined by s 232 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, and the respondent
1 Police v Sanders [2016] NZDC 12166.
2 Police v Sanders [2016] NZDC 14210.
3 One charge of injuring with intent to injure, three charges of assault with intent to injure, two charges of threatening assault with a weapon and one charge of doing a threatening act. Following conviction, the appellant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
acknowledged that if the material was held to be admissible, it may have resulted in a more favourable verdict for the appellant. The respondent again acknowledged this at the hearing on 10 February 2017 and consented to the appeal being allowed. Dunningham J in this Court at that 10 February 2017 hearing issued a minute which stated in part:
[1] By consent, this appeal against conviction and sentence is allowed and a retrial is ordered…
and the appellant was remanded on bail. The respondent then it seems liaised with the complainant regarding a retrial and, given her confirmation at that point that she did not wish to be involved in a retrial, Mr McRae confirmed that the Crown made the decision not to pursue these matters further.
Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
[7] The appellant submits that the trial process was flawed entirely due to the failure by the Police to disclose this relevant material, which they were required to discover. Therefore it is said that it is only right that the appellant have his costs on the successful appeal paid by the Police. This present application is brought therefore in reliance on the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (the Act). With regard to the types of factors set out in s 5 of the Act, the appellant contends that:
(a) The Police did not act in good faith over the issue of disclosure. It is submitted that the Police did not provide their own counsel with the file for an extensive period of time. Furthermore, counsel for the appellant had to repeatedly make requests for disclosure;
(b)The Police did not take proper steps to investigate whether all relevant materials had been disclosed and the issue of disclosure was not conducted in a reasonable and proper manner; and
(c) The appellant did nothing to contribute to that situation.
[8] Counsel submits that s 13(3) of the Act indicates too that the quantum of costs here should be above the scale rate of $226 because this case was a difficult, complex and important one.
Respondent’s submissions
[9] In response, the respondent submits that, as in R v Rust4 (a decision of this Court I will refer to below), this is not a case involving a novel issue and there is nothing to take it out of the ordinary. Therefore, the mere fact that the appeal succeeded is insufficient to justify an award. The respondent emphasises too that the appellant’s initial focus on appeal was not on issues regarding disclosure. This reason, for which the appeal was eventually allowed, only arose later. The respondent suggests that it would be unjust for costs, which would largely relate to the work done on the other grounds of appeal, to be awarded.
[10] With reference to the s 5 considerations, the respondent’s position is that:
(a) The Police acted in good faith in bringing the proceedings and continuing them;
(b) There was an evidential basis for the proceedings;
(c) There was no evidence of bad faith. The Crown consented to the appeal being allowed shortly after it reviewed the file in question;
(d)The Police investigation was conducted in a reasonable and proper manner; and
(e) The appellant chose to be self-represented at trial and then to appeal the decision.
Therefore, the respondent argues that an award of costs is not appropriate here.
4 R v Rust [1998] 3 NZLR 159.
[11] The respondent further submits that if the Court disagrees with these contentions and finds that costs should be awarded, in any event these should not exceed the scale set by the Regulations (which I have noted above would amount to an award of $226). The present case, it is said, is not one that is of special difficulty, complexity or importance, as required by s 13(3) to justify an award of costs above the maximum scale.
Law
Awarding costs
[12] The Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (the Act) is a code setting out the circumstances in which the Court may exercise its discretion to order costs in a criminal case. Section 8 provides:
8 Costs on appeals
(1) Where any appeal is made pursuant to any provision of Part 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 the court which determines the appeal may, subject to any regulations made under this Act, make such order as to costs as it thinks fit.
(2) No defendant or convicted defendant shall be granted costs under this section by reason only of the fact that his appeal has been successful.
(3) No defendant or convicted defendant shall be refused costs under this section by reason only of the fact that the appeal was reasonably brought and continued by another party to the proceedings.
(4) No Judge, Justice, or Community Magistrate is liable to costs just because an appeal is filed against a determination by that judicial officer.
(5) If the court which determines an appeal is of opinion that the appeal includes any frivolous or vexatious matter, it may, if it thinks fit, irrespective of the result of the appeal, order that the whole or any part of the costs of any party to the proceedings in disputing the frivolous or vexatious matter shall be paid by the party who raised the frivolous or vexatious matter.
(6) If the court which determines an appeal is of opinion that the appeal involves a difficult or important point of law it may order that the costs of any party to the proceedings shall be paid by any other party to the proceedings irrespective of the result of the appeal.
[13] The section gives little guidance as to when the Court should exercise its discretion.5 However, the courts have been cautious about making an award for costs. As s 8(2) makes clear, success on appeal alone is not a sufficient basis for an award of costs. Unlike civil cases, there is no overriding principle that costs should follow the event.6 Richardson P observed in R v Leitch that:7
There is no presumption for or against granting of costs and so costs are not to be granted merely because the appeal succeeded. An application for costs is invoking the Court’s discretion and must show good grounds why the discretion should be invoked in the applicant’s favour.
[14] In R v Rust the Court held that:8
As is frequently the case in such a situation, the issue was one requiring a balancing exercise. The Crown's opposition at trial, and again on the appeal, was justified. The appeal did not involve any novel issue and there was nothing to take it out of the ordinary category where there has been a wrong decision on a question of law or a misdirection which has resulted in the quashing of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial. It was not a case such as Collector of Customs v Athfield [1979] 2 NZLR 272, where costs were awarded to an unsuccessful respondent on a second appeal brought by leave on an important point of law. On examination, the only ground for an award which is discernible here is the fact that the appeal was successful. As the legislation stands, that is insufficient.
[15] The factors discussed in section 5 regarding when a successful defendant should be awarded costs are of some help in guiding the Court’s discretion here. Section 5 provides:
5 Costs of successful defendant
(1) Where any defendant is acquitted of an offence or where the charge is dismissed or withdrawn, whether upon the merits or otherwise, the court may, subject to any regulations made under this Act, order that he be paid such sum as it thinks just and reasonable towards the costs of his defence.
(2) Without limiting or affecting the court’s discretion under subsection (1), it is hereby declared that the court, in deciding whether to grant costs and the amount of any costs granted, shall have regard to all relevant circumstances and in particular (where appropriate) to—
5 R v Kerr CA60/91, 15 April 1992 at 2.
6 R v AB [1974] 2 NZLR 425 at 433.
7 R v Leitch CA195/97, 22 December 1997 at 1.
8 R v Rust, n 4 above.
(a) whether the prosecution acted in good faith in bringing and continuing the proceedings:
(b) whether at the commencement of the proceedings the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant in the absence of contrary evidence:
(c) whether the prosecution took proper steps to investigate any matter coming into its hands which suggested that the defendant might not be guilty:
(d) whether generally the investigation into the offence was conducted in a reasonable and proper manner:
(e) whether the evidence as a whole would support a finding of guilt but the charge was dismissed on a technical point:
(f) whether the charge was dismissed because the defendant established (either by the evidence of witnesses called by him or by the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise) that he was not guilty:
(g) whether the behaviour of the defendant in relation to the acts or omissions on which the charge was based and to the investigation and proceedings was such that a sum should be paid towards the costs of his defence.
(3) There shall be no presumption for or against the granting of costs in any case.
(4) No defendant shall be granted costs under this section by reason only of the fact that he has been acquitted or that any charge has been dismissed or withdrawn.
(5) No defendant shall be refused costs under this section by reason only of the fact that the proceedings were properly brought and continued.
[16] The Courts in considering s 5 in the past have indicated that the Court should do what it thinks right in the particular case.9
[17] When considering the parameters of the discretion under s 5, the Court of Appeal in Solicitor-General v Moore10 made it clear that investigative errors alone are insufficient to justify an award of costs. In that case, the Court held at [36]:
[t]he initial Crown case was a very strong one. While there were serious blunders in investigating and preparing the case, they disadvantaged the prosecution more than the defence. The evidence ruling and the s347 discharge are subject to substantial question. All of those matters and others
9 R v AB, above n 6, at 429; R v Margaritis HC Christchurch T66/88, 14 July 1989 at 2.
10 Solicitor-General v Moore [2000] 1 NZLR 533.
considered in this judgment, particularly those touched upon in the last paragraph, bear on the exercise of the broad power conferred by s 5 of the [Act]. We conclude, weighing all those matters, that it is not just and reasonable that a sum be paid towards the respondent’s defence.
[18] And, in R v Connolly11 Fogarty J in considering s 5(2)(b), (c) and (d) noted that:
[t]he consideration as to whether the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support conviction, in the absence of contrary evidence, is central to any application of costs. It is important to appreciate that context.
Quantum of costs
[19] The Court which determines the appeal may make such orders as to costs as it thinks fit, subject to a scale of costs which has been set out in Regulations established for this purpose.12 However, the Court has power to make an order for the payment of costs in excess of that scale “if it is satisfied that, having regard to the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case, the payment of greater costs is desirable”.13
[20] It is useful to set out in full s 13 of the Act which provides:
13 Regulations
(1) The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council, make regulations for all or any of the following purposes:
(a) prescribing the heads of costs that may be ordered to be paid under this Act:
(b) prescribing maximum scales of costs that may be ordered to be paid under this Act:
(c) prescribing the manner in which costs for which the Crown is liable shall be claimed from or paid by the Crown:
(d) providing for such matters as are contemplated by or necessary for giving full effect to the provisions of this Act and for the due administration thereof.
(2) Any regulations made under this Act may—
11 R v Connolly (2006) 22 NZTC 19,844 at [9].
12 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967, s 8(1).
13 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967, s 13(3).
(a) apply scales of costs, fees, or expenses prescribed from time to time under other enactments:
(b) delegate, or empower a court to delegate, to any person or officer the power to determine the costs to be allowed under any particular head.
(3) Where any maximum scale of costs is prescribed by regulation, the court may nevertheless make an order for the payment of costs in excess of that scale if it is satisfied that, having regard to the special difficulty, complexity, or importance of the case, the payment of greater costs is desirable.
[21] Schedule 1 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Regulations 1987 (the Regulations) sets the maximum fee for an appeal at $226 for each half day or part half day in court.
Analysis
Should costs be awarded?
[22] As I have noted above, the Courts do not often award costs in criminal cases. The authorities are clear that an applicant must show good grounds why the discretion should be invoked in his/her favour. Section 8 does not set out what good reasons are. However, the list in s 5(2) (noted above at[15]) without limiting the Court’s discretion, nevertheless does provide some insight into appropriate factors to consider.
[23] Counsel for the appellant makes much of the Police’s failure to disclose earlier the material at issue here. He submits that “Police have done nothing short of endeavouring to hide evidence from [the appellant].” On all the material which is before the Court, however, I do not accept this depiction of events suggested by Mr Shamy. Although it is appropriate to say that there has been a failure here on the part of the Police to disclose appropriate evidence, I find that in all the prevailing circumstances, this was not done in bad faith. Mr McRae for the respondent says, and I accept, this was a simple error made on the part of the Police as to the true relevance of aspects of the documents in question. He does go on to maintain in addition, that this was in the context where the appellant must have been aware of the sexual allegations in the background made by the complainant. That these could have led to a possible Police prosecution, it is said, would have been clear to the
appellant throughout. These matters, therefore, Mr McRae suggests, together with the redacted evidential interview by the complainant which he had, would have alerted him to possible credibility issues that arose for the complainant.
[24] Leaving on one side those contentions advanced before me by Mr McRae, however, there is a reasonable argument here that the Police failed to fully disclose relevant evidence and material to the appellant, such that it must mean the Police have, to some extent, acted improperly.
[25] At one level it might be said this failure to disclose contributed towards the appellant’s convictions, which may not otherwise have happened. On this, counsel for the appellant points out that the Police have agreed now that the matter will not be the subject of a retrial. Mr McRae for the respondent as I have noted above says, however, that the reason for this is purely because the complainant has indicated she would not give evidence and participate in a retrial.
[26] In R v Smith, the Court of Appeal refused an application for costs on appeal.14
The appellant had been successful in his appeal against conviction and a retrial was ordered. The successful ground was that the trial Judge made a misdirection in summing up. Following Rust, the Court did not consider that there was any element of the appeal which took it out of the ordinary category where there has been a wrong decision on a question of law or a misdirection.15 Other relevant factors in the Court of Appeal’s decision to reject the application for costs there were the fact that three of the four grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant failed, and the appellant’s own delays and non-compliance with Court directions were likely to have increased his costs.16
[27] Like Smith, it might be said that the present case does not involve any special point of law that needed to be canvassed and the majority of the grounds intended to be relied upon at appeal were not ultimately found to be successful (although, unlike in Smith, these grounds were not in fact tested before the Court). These factors, and
the fact that the appellant in terms of s 5(2)(f) has not demonstrated he is not guilty
14 R v Smith [2013] NZCA 300.
15 At [8].
16 At [10] – [11].
of the charges, could go some way to pointing against the Court using its discretion to award costs to the successful appellant.
[28] On the other hand, the fact that the very late disclosure of this evidence contributed towards the decision preventing a retrial from taking place, is a factor under s 5 which suggests an award is appropriate. The appeal in the present case was not allowed, as in Smith, on a technical point of law. Instead, it was conceded by the respondent and allowed due to this late evidence which threw a possible doubt on the appellant’s guilt. The failure by the Police to disclose this evidence until just before the date set for the appeal hearing must also point towards an award being made here.
[29] The Court in Smith did go on to say that it considered the appropriate time to seek costs, as was said in Rust, was after the ultimate outcome.17 As the current matter before me is not to be retried, now is an appropriate time to seek an award of costs.
[30] Weighing all the matters I have outlined above in the balance, I conclude here, but only by a relatively fine margin, that this application must succeed. The respondent had a duty to disclose the information in question as relevant under s 13
Criminal Disclosure Act 2008 and did not do so until just before the appeal hearing. I accept this was not in the nature of a bad faith situation on the part of the respondent and was simply an error made as to the true relevance of the material. Nevertheless, it was important material relevant to the credibility of the complainant which was not provided pre-trial as was required. It was also not incumbent on the appellant to hound the respondent for this material. Finally, the material in question included information that arguably was of sufficient importance that it led to concession of the appeal.
Quantum of costs
[31] I turn now to the question of quantum. As to this, no statutory guidance is provided as to the level of an appropriate costs award in cases such as the present,
apart from the scale rates specified in Schedule 1 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Regulations 1987. Those rates however, have not been reviewed since 1988 and are significantly out of date.
[32] On that aspect, as I have noted above at [21], the scale costs under the regulations here would amount to $226 representing one half day. That amount must be seen, however, as simply derisory, given the actual costs on this appeal which the appellant says he has incurred amount to over $20,000.
[33] On this issue of inadequacy of the scale, however, in Solicitor-General v Moore18 the Court of Appeal held that the perceived inadequacy of the scale was irrelevant to the determination under s 13(3) of the Act whether the case was “of special difficulty, complexity, or importance”.
[34] Amounts for costs above that specified for scale in the Regulations have been awarded in cases where a prosecution was brought improperly. In R v Afato the Court of Appeal held that:19
The defence had effectively provided a rational explanation for the prosecution case. A proper police investigation would have revealed there was not sufficient evidence to charge the appellant.
The Court of Appeal found that an award of costs to the defendant above the scale was justified in those circumstances, but not at a level of full indemnity costs. This was because some relativity to the scale needed to be kept.20 The Court considered that “Parliament clearly intended that scale costs should only be exceeded if the grounds identified in s 13(3) could be met”.21 An award of $28,072.80 was made, which was slightly less than 30% of the overall costs sought.
[35] Therefore, even if a quantum above scale was awarded, it would not be full indemnity costs. The present case is no more serious than Afato so an award approaching not more than 30% of the costs sought would be the maximum
appropriate if the grounds in s 13(3) are found to be met. And, in another Court of
18 Solicitor-General v Moore 18 November 1999, CA310/99.
19 R v Afato [2008] NZCA 208 at [13].
20 At [18].
Appeal decision, R v Donovan22 the Court dismissed an appeal against a costs order where scale was exceeded and a figure awarded amounting to just over 25% of the actual trial costs involved.
[36] Returning to the s 13(3) stipulations, these require there to be special difficulty, complexity or importance in the case in question to warrant an award of costs above the scale set out in the Regulations. Turning now to the present case, the situation here was not especially complex. The matter on which the appeal succeeded was essentially that certain retained information should have been disclosed to the appellant. Whether the information was required to be disclosed was not a difficult question. Both parties before me have readily agreed that the information should have been made available. Neither did the matters raised in the
appeal involve an issue of wider importance for this area of law.23 And it is not
enough here for the appellant to contend that by virtue of its current features the present case has special importance to him.
[37] I turn now to the words “special difficulty” outlined in s 13(3) of the Act. Significantly, as I see it, the learned authors of Adams on Criminal Law at para CC13.02(1)24 address this aspect of 13(3) in this way:
Where the circumstances of a case indicate that there may have been bad faith or negligence on the part of the prosecution, the case may be one of “special difficulty” falling within the ambit of s 13(3). Where the case is one of special difficulty, the scale provided in the Regulations does not apply. and the criterion for an award of costs rests solely upon the Court’s consideration of what in the circumstances may be just and reasonable…
(emphasis added)
[38] In the present case I have found there has been no bad faith on the part of the prosecution. The respondent, however, was in error in not providing the material in question which it had wrongly thought was irrelevant. This amounted to what seems to be almost an inadvertent mistake but in my view under all the circumstances prevailing here, this does reach the threshold of negligence at a level to trigger s
13(3). And, this was not a contested question before me given that counsel for both
22 R v Donovan [2007] NZCA 46.
23 Wynyard v R [2017] NZCA 104 at [21].
24 Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC13.02(1)].
parties readily agreed that the information should have been disclosed at an early stage and, if so, the appellant would not have incurred the appeal costs which he was claiming.
[39] Given my finding of negligence regarding the s 13(3) requirement, and that this was therefore a case of special difficulty, the Court is now required to set an amount above scale for just and reasonable costs here.
[40] On this aspect, the Courts have considered in the past that a comparison between just and reasonable costs and the scale payable to Crown Solicitors as being appropriate. Indeed, in Adams on Criminal Law25 the learned authors note:
CC13.04 “Just and reasonable costs” — comparison with Crown Scale
Where the case is one of special difficulty, complexity or importance it may be proper to set the quantum of costs having regard to the comparable scale of costs payable to counsel for the Crown: R v Hopkirk (1994) 12
CRNZ 216. The inadequacy of the scale and what, having regards to the terms of the legislation, could be regarded as just and reasonable costs, was
discussed by Fogarty J in R v Connolly 1/12/05, Fogarty J, HC Auckland
CRI-2004-004-988. The Judge’s discussion commences at para 71. The
Judge concluded:
•It was unlikely that Parliament intended by s 13 to give the Executive power to set the maximum scale of costs and then not expect it to update the scale as it became out of date;
•The manifest scheme of the Act was not to indemnify a defendant for costs actually incurred;
•Where the case was one of special difficulty and complexity (as this was) the Judge favoured the view “that the regulations correctly interpret s 13(1)(b) as calling for a common rate (Crown counsel scale) unless there are special reasons”;
• A judgment as to what is “just and reasonable” must be
made within the confines of the purpose of the statute; and
•Parliament did not intend that counsel for the defendant who entitled to costs should be remunerated at a higher rate than the Crown absent special circumstances.
The judgment of Fogarty J was reversed by a majority of the Court of Appeal but restored by the Supreme Court (Reid & Ors v R 14/11/07, SC95/2006), the Supreme Court considering that Fogarty J had not erred in principle in any respect…
25 Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at CC13.04.
[41] This approach was applied in R v Taylor, where MacKenzie J then directed counsel for the applicant to submit a schedule prepared in accordance with the practice of Crown Counsel under the Crown Solicitors Regulations 1994, or as closely as possible.26 That was in order for the Court to make an assessment of the appropriate costs to be awarded and to the extent to which particular items could be included. The respondent notes that there is no material currently before the Court
that contains details about the costs claimed. The appellant has simply claimed the full $20,784.33 he has incurred on legal costs for the appeal.
[42] In my view an appropriate assessment of just and reasonable costs here is an amount representing 25% of the comparable scale of costs payable to counsel for the Crown for the work undertaken on the appeal by counsel for the appellant, to the extent that this work was reasonably required in all the circumstances.
Conclusion
[43] The appellant has demonstrated that there are good reasons why the Court should exercise its discretion to award him costs for his appeal. The Court now orders an amount for costs (being above the scale rate set out by the Regulations) on the basis that the matter on which the appeal succeeded was especially difficult in terms of s 13(3), given the respondent’s negligence in failing to disclose the material in question. This amount for costs is to be 25% of the comparable scale costs payable to counsel for the Crown for the reasonable work undertaken on this appeal by counsel for the appellant as noted above. An order to this effect is now made.
[44] I direct counsel for the appellant to submit a schedule, prepared as nearly as circumstances permit in accordance with the practice appropriate for Crown Counsel under the Crown Solicitors Regulations 1994. That schedule is to set out the attendances claimed on this appeal in sufficient detail to enable me to make an assessment of the extent to which particular items should be awarded. Costs to be included should be for one counsel at the senior Crown rate applicable on the date the work was carried out and to be reasonable and directly relevant to this appeal.
That schedule is to be discussed with counsel for the respondent with a view to
26 R v Taylor [2014] NZHC 1165.
reaching agreement on particular points or isolating differences. Counsel are then each to file a memorandum setting out their respective contentions on the appropriate amount of the award which, as I note above, is to be 25% of the final costs figure assessed. I will then fix that quantum figure on the papers.
...................................................
Gendall J
Solicitors:
Simon Shamy, Christchurch
Gresson Dorman & Co, Timaru
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