S v Police HC Rotorua CRI 2006-470-000005
[2006] NZHC 687
•16 June 2006
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
CRI 2006-470-000005
S
Appellant
v
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Appearances: The appellant in person
S E Simmers for the respondent
Judgment: 16 June 2006 at 10.30am
JUDGMENT OF PRIESTLEY J
This judgment was delivered by me on 16 June 2006 at 10.30 am, pursuant to
Rule 540(4) of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
Counsel:
S E Simmers, Crown Solicitor, P O Box 13063, Tauranga
Copy to:
N S , 880 Whakamarama Road, Tauranga
S V NEW ZEALAND POLICE HC ROT CRI 2006-470-000005 16 June 2006
The Issue
[1] The sole issue is whether the appellant should be granted leave under s144(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (“the Act”) to appeal against a determination of this Court on a question of the law arising in a general appeal.
Background
[2] On 19 December 2005 the appellant was convicted of assault in the Tauranga District Court. A fine was imposed as a sentence. The conviction came at the end of a defended hearing before Ingram DCJ who heard four prosecution witnesses and three defence witnesses, including the appellant herself.
[3] The appellant appealed against both conviction and sentence. I gave a judgment in the High Court at Rotorua on 24 April 2006 allowing the appeal against sentence and imposing a reduced fine. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
Leave to Appeal
[4] The appellant, who throughout has insisted on acting for herself, wants to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In terms of s144(1) leave must first be obtained, with the proviso that if leave is refused, the Court of Appeal has the statutory right to grant leave.
[5] The documents filed by the appellant did not disclose any easily discernible question of law. Nor was any matter of general or public importance apparent.
[6] I thus issued a minute on 18 May 2006 directing the appellant to file a short memorandum identifying exactly what point of law she wished to take to the Court of Appeal and why that point raised an issue of general or public importance.
[7] I also gave the parties the option of my dealing with the leave application on the papers rather than convene a formal hearing in Rotorua. Both parties accepted that option.
[8] Section 144(2) relevantly provides:
(2)A party desiring to appeal to the Court of Appeal under this section shall, within 21 days after the determination of the High Court, give notice … for leave to appeal … and the High Court may grant leave accordingly if in the opinion of that Court the question of law involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for decision.
[9] The clear policies behind the provision are to ensure a degree of finality so far as prosecutions under the Act are concerned, to discourage second appeals beyond the right of appeal conferred to permit error correction, and to ensure that the Court of Appeal is not troubled by second appeals unless some important matter of principle or policy is involved.
[10] In R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211, the Court of Appeal, when considering the same threshold tests in s144(3) stated:
The requirements of s 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act
But the requirements of s 144(3) are crystal clear. They do not require any judicial explanation or clarification. Under subs (3) this Court can grant "special leave" for an appeal to be heard by this Court if it is of the opinion that the question of law which is involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court for decision. Thus, there must be: (i) a question of law; (ii) the question must be one which, by reason of its general and public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal; and (iii) the Court must be of the opinion that it ought to be so submitted. It is probably neither necessary nor desirable, however, to break the requirements of the subsection down in this way. Such an analysis merely serves to highlight the essential elements which must be present before leave to appeal can be granted. It is sufficient to pose the statutory question: is there a question of law which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for decision.
…
Section 144 was not intended to provide a second tier of appeal from decisions of the District Court in proceedings under the Summary Proceedings Act. Parliament intended such proceedings to be brought to
finality with the defendant having an appeal to the High Court other than when the conditions it has specified in subss (2) and (3) are met and leave to appeal is granted. Neither the determination of what comprises a question of law, nor the question whether that point of law raises a question of general or public importance, are to be diluted.
[11] The appellant’s response to my minute was to file a memorandum which I have subjected to close scrutiny. The questions of law and/or the issues of general or public importance which the appellant identifies are:
• The courts breached the jurisdiction conferred by the Act.
• The District Court Judge, in collusion with the police and the Western
Bay of Plenty District Council, discriminated against the appellant.
• The Judge failed to permit a jury trial.
• Eleven parties are involved, including vendors of land, a legal firm, the District Council, a surveyor, Environment Bay of Plenty, the complainant, the appellant and her family, police, the Police Complaints Authority, and an earth moving company.
• The appellant denies she assaulted the complainant, and is making a personal investigation of criminal activity involving the District Council, a law firm and the Tauranga Police.
• The District Council breached the Resource Management Act 1991 as a result of which the appellant’s residential property is landlocked.
• There is a conspiracy involving the District Council, the police, and a law firm to cover up the law firm’s criminal activity which led to the police fabricating the prosecution against the appellant in the District Court.
• There was intentional (possibly systemic) delay of her case imposed by the court system.
• That in general terms what has happened to the appellant is “a real crime” which has destroyed the faith of her and her family in the New Zealand judicial system.
[12] The appellant also, by way of this putative appeal, wishes to seek compensation against the Western Bay of Plenty District Council for various statutory breaches relating to landlocked land and its alleged obligation to build a public road.
[13] The appellant specifically identifies as “very serious matters of general and public importance” breaches of the Resource Management Act and the Property Law Act by the District Council and breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990, the Human Rights Act 1993, and the Summary Proceedings Act 1997 by the
Tauranga District Court.
Discussion
[14] I have set out in detail the points relied on by the appellant in her memorandum, first out of fairness to her so that she does not carry away an impression that I have ignored the points, and secondly to give subsequent readers of this judgment something of the flavour of the surrounding context.
[15] It is very clear that the assault for which the appellant was convicted occurred at a gate across a driveway leading to the appellant’s residence across paddocks in a semi-rural location. As I indicated in para [7] of my 24 April judgment the driveway has some history to it. Obviously, as is apparent from the appellant’s memorandum, the issue of access to the appellant’s home is of concern to her.
[16] The central issue before the High Court on the appeal was whether the various credibility findings made by the Judge were safe findings, and whether his conclusion that the prosecution had proved the charge of assault was open to him.
[17] There being no reasons advanced in the High Court to question those findings, the appeal was dismissed.
[18] Nor was there any evidence before either the High or District Courts to justify the serious allegation of improper conduct, or that in some way the police had conspired with other people to bring a false charge against the appellant.
[19] There is absolutely nothing in the appellant’s memorandum which sails close to crossing the stipulated threshold of a question of law which raises matters of general or public importance. Nor is there any other discernible reason advanced which would justify granting leave.
[20] Thus in terms of s144 and the principles governing leave applications, the application is refused.
[21] That the appellant feels aggrieved is unquestionable. As is apparent from the wide-ranging nature of her memorandum, the assault for which she is convicted is probably one relatively trivial and isolated incident in wider problems which the appellant and her family face. Regrettably the appellant has ignored helpful suggestions from this Court that she should obtain competent legal advice. The phenomenon of a querulous litigant, I suspect, is emerging here, aggravated by societal and historical differences between common law countries and Russia, and of course by language difficulties.
Result
[22] The appellant’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s144(1) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 is refused.
Costs
[23] Given that no hearing was involved and minimal preparation so far as the
respondent is concerned, I am disinclined to award costs against the appellant. If the respondent takes a contrary view counsel can file the appropriate memorandum.
.........................................… Priestley J
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