S (SC 36/2018) v The Queen - [2018] NZSC 64

NOTE: ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF APPLICANT PURSUANT TO S 200 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 REMAINS IN FORCE. SEE
NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANTS PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE
NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF ANY COMPLAINANTS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS WHO APPEARED AS A WITNESS PROHIBITED BY S 204 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

SC 36/2018
[2018] NZSC 64

BETWEEN	S (SC 36/2018) Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	Elias CJ, Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ
Counsel:	N Levy for Applicant M J Lillico for Respondent
Judgment:	30 July 2018

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is granted (S (CA377/2017) v R [2018] NZCA 101).
BThe approved question is whether the Court of Appeal was right to dismiss the appeal on the mode of trial point.

____________________________________________________________________

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2018] NZSC 64
Decision Date: 30 July 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand considered an application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. The applicant, referred to as S, sought leave to appeal on a specific point of law concerning the mode of trial. The respondent, the Crown, opposed the application. The case was heard by the Supreme Court, with Elias CJ, Glazebrook, and Ellen France JJ presiding.

The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeal was correct in dismissing the appeal regarding the mode of trial. This issue arose from an earlier decision in the Court of Appeal, which had upheld the conviction of the applicant on certain charges. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal erred in its handling of the mode of trial point, which pertains to the right to be tried by a jury or by a judge alone. The Court of Appeal had determined that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with a jury trial rather than a judge-alone trial.

The Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal, indicating that the issue of the mode of trial was significant enough to warrant further examination. The Court acknowledged the importance of the mode of trial in the administration of justice and recognised that the question raised had implications for the legal principles governing such matters. The approved question for the appeal was whether the Court of Appeal was correct in dismissing the appeal on the mode of trial point. The Supreme Court's decision to grant leave to appeal suggests that the issue merits further judicial consideration.

Orders