Ryan v Sovereign Assurance Company

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2013-404-31544 [2013] NZHC 3300

BETWEEN  FRANCES HELEN RYAN Plaintiff

ANDSOVEREIGN ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

First Defendant

BARNES JENKINS LIMITED Second Defendant

Hearing:                   25 November 2013

Appearances:           Mr Paul Dale for Plaintiff/ Respondent

Ms Jane Forrest & Mr Richard Flinn for Second
Defendant/Applicant

Judgment:                10 December 2013

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J P DOOGUE [Application for Strike out /Summary judgment]

This judgment was delivered by me on

10.12.13 at 5 pm, pursuant to

Rule 11.5  of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

RYAN v SOVEREIGN ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED & ANOR [2013] NZHC 3300 [10 December

2013]

Background

[1]      The background to the litigation in this case is that in 1993 the plaintiff entered into life and total permanent disability insurance policies with two insurers, namely Metropolitan Life and Sovereign Assurance.  Some time before entering into the policies, the plaintiff had experienced a number of episodes which subsequently led to the diagnosis that she suffered from epilepsy.  That diagnosis was not made until 2 December 1993.

[2]      There is a dispute between the parties about when the plaintiff completed the proposals for insurance.  It is common ground that she did so in conjunction with Mr Jenkins, a representative of the second defendant, who was an insurance broker.  The significance of the dispute about time is explained further below.  It is necessary to note, though, that the plaintiff acknowledges that she had had episodes of déjà vu in the past.  She did not make reference to these in her insurance proposal because she apparently did not regard them as being relevant.  However, in 1993, she had further episodes  which   caused  more  concern.     She  seems  to   have  experienced   a disassociated state which was evidenced by the fact that she was responding inappropriately to events in conversations occurring around her — for example by laughing when there was no reason to do so.  She also had what could be described as seizures or fits.  However, as I understand her position, unlike the déjà vu events which went back some years, she did not experience the second group of occurrences before September and October 1993.

[3]      The  plaintiff  says  that  she  completed  the  insurance  proposal  application forms at meetings with Mr Jenkins in July and August 1993.  Mr Jenkins however dated the application forms 15 October 1993 and 29 November 1993, and gives evidence that the application forms were forwarded to the insurance companies around about those respective dates.   He disputes that the application forms were signed some months previously and that he held them, which is the only possible inference if he is wrong.  The significance of the dispute about the dates will become apparent later in this judgment.

[4]      The application form which is dated 15 October 1993 included a question requiring the plaintiff to disclose whether she had ever had:

(iv)       Epilepsy,  fits,  dizziness,  depression  or  any  brain,  nervous  or  mental disorder?

[5]      She answered “no”.

[6]      In  the  application  form  dated  29…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ryan v Sovereign Assurance Company and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] NZHC 3300
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Frances Helen Ryan sued Sovereign Assurance Company Limited and Barnes Jenkins Limited, an insurance broker, alleging that she had entered into insurance policies with them in 1993 on the basis of misleading and deceptive conduct. The insurers declined her claim for disability benefits in 2009 and 2010. The defendants applied to strike out the plaintiff's claims or enter summary judgment on them on the basis that they were time-barred. The Court found that the Fair Trading Act claim was not time-barred because the plaintiff could reasonably have believed that she was not uninsured despite the insurers' declinature of her claim. The negligence claim was not time-barred because the plaintiff could argue that the insurance broker had a duty to disclose any delay in lodging her insurance applications. The equitable estoppel claim was time-barred because it mirrored the statutory claims and the remedy sought was damages rather than an equitable remedy. The equitable estoppel claim was struck out.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.